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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 1, 1973, the United States central bank,1 the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (The Board),
t Special thanks go to Ms. Helen Wolcott of the Public Information Office of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, who, by her interest in and efforts for those
seeking to utilize the Board's procedures for providing public access to its materials, makes a
reality of Congress' intentions in the Freedom of Information Act.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; B.A., Radcliffe College; J.D.,
Yale University; M. Comp. Law, University of Chicago Law School; Harvard Fellow in Law
and Humanities, 1973-74.
I The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, established under the title
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announced the creation of a System Steering Committee on Interna-
tional Banking Regulation to study the "structural aspects of U.S.
activities of foreign banks and foreign operations of U.S. banks."
2
The announcement was hardly surprising. Quite apart from any
suspicion of the role that foreign banks operating in the United
States3 might have played in the huge sweep of dollars to Germany
in the monetary crisis of the spring andosummer of 1971, and the
even more extensive dollar outflows in January 1973, the growth of
foreign-owned banking institutions in the United States since 1965
would have led any self-respecting bureaucracy to consider adding
this prospering child to its tutelage. 4 What is surprising is that at the
"Federal Reserve Board" by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (codified at
31 U.S.C. § 409 (1970) and in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), is not precisely a central bank,
but, under a novel system of supervision over twelve regional Reserve Banks, performs
central banking functions of monetary control as well as supervisory regulation of those
private commercial banks and bank holding companies entrusted by Congress to its bailiwick.
However, under a system of federal banking regulation which has grown haphazardly, the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation also have
supervisory jurisdiction over groups of commercial banks. For a complete description of the
historical development of the spheres of jurisdiction of the three agencies and a fascinating
picture of just how senselessly complex federal regulation of commercial banking is, a
two-part article by Howard H. Hackley, former General Counsel of the Board, is invaluable.
See Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 Va. L. Rev. 565, 771 (1966).
2 59 Fed. Res. Bull. 123 (1973).
3 Like all legal entities operating transnationally, foreign banks may choose to penetrate
the United States market either by a direct extension of the foreign corporate entity in the
form of a United States office or United States offices, or by the establishment of a separate
entity or entities, that is, subsidiary banks chartered under state or federal law. However,
unlike industrial establishments, the foreign bank must receive a license from a supervisory
authority before it may engage in depository banking. If the direct route is chosen (and only
eight states make any provision in their banking statutes for licensing of offices of foreign
banks), the foreign bank offices are referred to variously as "branches," "agencies," or
"representative offices," generally depending upon the usage in the state statute under which
the office is licensed. The term "representative office," however, has a functional meaning,
generally referring to an office which does not itself conclude contracts so as to subject it to
process and taxation within the jurisdiction. The New York statute under which foreign
banks are licensed to do business in New York distinguishes between a "branch" and an
"agency" by the ability to take demand deposits from the public. However, "agencies" hold
funds for customers in such a way that they probably are required by 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(2)
(1970), discussed in text at notes 27-29 infra, to be licensed by a supervisory authority. A
"representative office" does not itself conduct business in such a way as to require licensing
under the federal statute. California, however, requires a permit even for such minimal
presence. For an exact delineation between agencies, branches and representative offices as
utilized by United States banks abroad, see S. Robinson, Multinational Banking (1972). The
different consequences for a foreign bank of a particular choice of form of entry are described
in detail in a study by Professor Jack Zwick for the Joint Economic Committee of Congress.
See Joint Economic Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess., Foreign Banking in the United States
(Economic Policies and Practices, Paper No. 9) (Comm. Print 1966) [hereinafter cited as
Zwick].
4 Since there is no overall federal supervision of foreign bank entry into the United
States, there is no central repository for statistics with respect to foreign bank presence in the
United States, and published figures must be regarded as estimates. However, the tremendous
growth of their presence over the past five years is readily apparent. Richard P. Cooley,
President of the Wells Fargo Bank in San Francisco, estimated in 1973 that there were more
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moment there is no federal statute specifically subjecting to central
bank supervision the establishment and conduct of banking5 offices
in the United States by nonnationals of the United States. 6 While
than 430 foreign-controlled banks, agencies, branches or representative offices in this country,
as compared to 175 in 1965. Wall Street Journal, May 10, 1973, at 1, col. 6. The New York
Times, in a lead article on the growth of foreign bank presence in the United States, estimated
total foreign banking assets in the United States in mid-1972 at $23 billion. N.Y. Times, Oct.
8, 1972, § 3, at 1, col. 1. The Zwick study, in comparison, had reported only $7 billion in
total foreign banking assets for the end of 1965. See Zwick, supra note 3, at 1.
- With the use of this term, "banking," we encounter a definitional problem which
plagues any lawmaker-state or federal-who sets out to regulate "banking": What is the
business of "banking"? The Canadians ten years ago decided to exclude aliens from Canadian
"banking" and, having first amended their commercial bank statute, soon found that the dike
against foreign control of the nation's financial intermediators had to include exclusion from
trust companies, loan companies, finance companies, etc. See Can. Rev. Stat. ch. 40, §§ 30,
38, ch. 87, § 53(1) (1970). Hackley, supra note 1, met the definitional problem by discussing
only the regulation of commercial banks:
The term "commercial bank". . . [means] a corporation that engages in the business
of receiving demand deposits subject to check althbugh it may also accept "time"
and "savings" deposits not subject to check. . . . Unless otherwise specifically
indicated, the term "bank"... means only a commercial bank and does not include
such institutions as mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations, insurance
companies, finance companies, and other financial institutions that compete in some
respects with banks but do not meet the traditional concept of a commercial bank.
Id. at 565 n. 1. However, this definition is too narrow to cover the variety of modes of
operation in the United States financial markets utilized by foreign institutions. As stated in
note 3 supra, such modalities include "agencies" which, unlike "branches" and commercial
bank subsidiaries, do not take demand deposits from the public, although they may hold
credit balances for customers. Moreover, a foreign institution may do business in New York
through the establishment of a subsidiary, a so-called investment company, chartered under a
special provision of the New York State Banking Law. An investment company may not take
deposits from the general public but may otherwise exercise what would be thought of as
traditional "banking" powers. See text at notes 267-72 infra. When one discusses "foreign
banking" in the United States, the parameters are not defined only by deposit gathering.
The most recent attempt at regulation of foreign entry into the United States banking
market, Rep. Patman's bill, H.R. 11,440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), introduced on Nov. 13,
1973, would "solve" the problem of definition of foreign-owned banks by outlawing branches
and agencies, and permitting the Secretary of the Treasury to "deem" any United States (state
or federal) bank chartered to be a bank subject to the Draconian requirements of the bill if
more than 5% of its voting stock is owned by foreign persons. For a full description of the bill,
see text at notes 148-52 infra. In any event, when this article uses the term "foreign-owned
institution" or simply "foreign bank," it means United States arms (whatever the legal form)
of entities that are classified as "banks" under the law of their place of incorporation and
United States incorporated "banks" that are in fact controlled by non-United States persons.
6 The Second Annual Report of the President's Council on International Economic Policy
[hereinafter cited as Report of the President's Council], which devotes Chapter 4 to "U.S.
Banking and Securities Regulation-Some Consequences for International Financial Competi-
tion," prefaces its remarks with the observation:
Because of the great importance of financial institutions to any industrialized
economy, governments in all countries regulate and supervise their market opera-
tions. Banks, investment banks, brokerage firms and insurance companies all oper-
ate within a comprehensive framework of state and Federal laws and regulations
designed to protect the vitality of the financial industry and the economic security of
those that it serves.
Wash. Fin. Rep. at T-1 (Feb. 18, 1974). It is perhaps a measure of the United States
government's insularity of viewpoint on transnational financial phenomena that it had not
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foreign entry by means of establishment or acquisition of a "bank" is
regulated by the Board under the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956 (the Act), as amended by the Bank Holding Company Act
Amendments of 1970 (the 1970 Amendments), 7 the scheme of regu-
lation of that Act was never intended to deal with transnational
interpenetration of financial markets, and the statute offers the
Board no real guidance toward an integrated policy of foreign bank
regulation. Even if the provision of the Act permitting separate
treatment of certain aspects of foreign ownership were a better guide
to policy, the Act would not permit an integrated scheme of federal
regulation of foreign entry: as "bank" is defined by the Act,8 only
the acquisition of voting interests in commercial banks incorporated
under state or federal law is covered. Since the opening of a United
States office of a foreign corporation does not involve the acquisition
of stock, the Act does not give the Board any supervisory authority
over direct entry (as opposed to the chartering of a separate entity),
through the establishment of bank branches, agencies or representa-
tive offices. Nor is the acquisition of interests by foreign banks in
financial institutions (such as New York investment companies) that
do not fall within the Act's definition of "bank" covered by the Act
unless the foreign bank is already subject to the Act because of
ownership of a United States "bank." 9
In such an intensively regulated field as banking,-the anomaly
presented by the lack of federal control over foreign bank entry has
not gone totally unnoted. At the urging of Senator Jacob Javits 0 of
New York, the Joint Economic Committee of Congress in 1966
engaged Professor Jack Zwick of the Graduate School of Business of
Columbia University to prepare a study of foreign bank operations
in the United States. A special study was needed because "[fln spite
occurred to the executive branch before 1973 to study the impact of this domestic regulation
on international financial competition. Only in the 1974 State of the Union message did the
President announce that the Administration is "studying the competitive position of foreign
banks within this country and of American banks abroad to make sure that discriminatory
regulations do not prevent American banks and other financial institutions from doing
business they are entitled to do." Wash. Fin. Rep. at A-10 (Feb. 4, 1974).
7 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1970). The Act was extensively overhauled by Pub. L. No.
91-607, 84 Stat. 1760 (1970).
8 f2 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1970).
9 See text at. notes 139-41 infra.
10 Senator Javits' concern would seem not to have been the lack of regulation, but rather
the lack of opportunity for entry under a system whereby state authorization for the branch or
charter had to be obtained. Senator Javits' constituency includes two of the three largest
United States banks, First National City Bank and The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., both
with extensive foreign operations. To the extent that foreign countries only permit United
States bank entry on a reciprocal basis, these banks have considerable interest in supporting
freedom of access to the United States for foreign banks. See Zwick, supra note 3, at 4, for a
description of the participation by these banks in the liberalization of the New York Banking
Law in 1960 so as to authorize foreign branch entry.
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of the extensive Federal interest in such [foreign bank] operations,
which affect the balance of payments, as well as our international
commercial relations, there is very little information on these opera-
tions available."11 In the absence of published data, Dr. Zwick
interviewed officers of the foreign bank offices and held discussions
with the various governmental departments concerned with foreign
bank operations. The study noted the irony, in view of the impor-
tance attached to international monetary conditions in the 1960's, of
a state of affairs in which the activities of foreign branches and
agencies "have been examined only by State authorities who are
largely uninterested in the inflow-outflow implications of the
[foreign] banks' activities. ' 12 The study concluded that it would be
in the public interest for Congress to "provide for the Federal
examination and supervision of foreign banks so that foreign policy
and the broader national and international implications of foreign
bank activities can be adequately appraised. ' 13 The study also
recommended that the National Bank Act 14 be amended to au-
thorize the licensing of foreign agencies and branches by the federal
government as a response to the problems of reciprocity being faced
by the United States banks moving abroad.
The study was transmitted to the Joint Economic Committee
on July 5, 1966. However, the next event with respect to federal
regulation of foreign bank entry apparently was triggered not so
much by Dr. Zwick's analysis as by the dramatic closing of the New
York branch of Intra Bank, S.A., and the consequent realization by
the banking community of just how involved-with minimal
supervision-Intra Bank, S.A., had been in the New York money
market. 15 On August 25, 1966, Senator Javits introduced S. 376516
11 Letter of transmittal of Zwick study from Wright Patman, Chairman of the Joint
Economic Committee, to Members of the Committee, July 5, 1966, in Zwick, supra note 3, at
M.
12 Zwick, supra note 3, at 26.
13 Id. at 27.
14 Ch. 343, 18 Stat. 123 (1874) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 18, 19, 28 and 31
U.S.C.).
15 Klopstock, Foreign Banks in the United States: Scope and Growth of Operations, in
Monthly Rev. of Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y. 140 (June 1973), contains a full description of the
activities of foreign banks' offices in New York money market operations and notes the
advantage to foreign banks' offices of freedom from the reserve requirements imposed upon
domestic banks subject to its jurisdiction by the Board. The activity of foreign banks with
United States offices and United States banks with foreign offices in arbitrage between the
Eurodollar and the New York money market and the consequent effects upon problems of
national monetary policy cannot be treated within the scope of this article. Even the Board
had limited its Steering Committee study to exclude review of "the volume and types of
international flows of funds through such institutions." 59 Fed. Res. Bull. 123 (1973).
However, apparently the large money center United States banks subject to the Board's
Regulations D and M (the regulations concerned with reserves against deposits) have begun to
think about the competition from the foreign banks in this market. See Wash. Fin. Rep. at
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to provide for federal control over foreign banking corporations
operating within the United States, but the bill was never reported
out of the Committee on Banking and Currency to which it was
referred. Four subsequent bills-three introduced in 1967 and one in
1969, three in the House (two introduced by Representative Patman
and one by Representative Fino) and one in the Senate (by Senator
Javits)-met the same fate. 17 Until Representative Patman's latest
proposal for regulation, H.R. 11,440,18 nothing more on the subject
was heard in Congress. Moreover, probably because of the more
visible changes, taking place in the structure of the domestic indus-
try, the unusual rate of growth in foreign entries went virtually
unnoticed until the New York Times headlined the process in a lead
article in its Sunday finance section entitled "Foreign Banks Flower-
ing on U.S. Soil." 19 Shortly thereafter, the Board announced the
establishment of its System Steering Committee to investigate the
activities of foreign banks in the United States. Since this an-
nouncement, the financial pages have regularly had a new event
involving foreign bank entry to report: the Royal Trust Company of
Quebec, in what should have been a routine acquistion of a com-
paratively small national bank in Miami, raised the specter of an
out-and-out conflict between Board approval under the Bank Hold-
ing Comlany Act and Florida law; Barclays Bank of London ap-
plied to the Board and to the New York Banking Board for permis-
sion to acquire the shares of a major suburban retail banking
institution, the Long Island Trust Company, and was flatly turned
down by New York. On December 10, 1973, the Board announced
its approval of the acquisition of First Western Bank and Trust
Company of Los Angeles, a 1.4 billion dollar bank, by Lloyds Bank
Limited of London, the fourth largest commercial bank in London.
It could be argued that the most recent acquisitions or propos-
als reflect simply an initial reaction to the relatively cheaper cost of
United States investment as a result of the devaluations of the
dollar, bankers being, of course, among the first positioned to take
advantage of the investment implications of a devaluation. No
A-10 to A-I1 (July 9, 1973), reporting that Rep. Henry Reuss has requested the House
Banking Committee to hold hearings on foreign banking operations in the United States,
noting, among other alleged discriminations against United States banks, the lack of parity in
reserve requirements. Section 14 of the Patman bill, H.R. 11,440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973),
would require the banks licensed under it to maintain the same reserves as member banks.
16 S. 3765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
17 See Foreign Banks in the United States, A Study in Reciprocity 34 (Sept. 27, 1972)
(paper prepared for the Bankers' Association for Foreign Trade) [hereinafter cited as BAFT
Study].
Is H.R. 11,440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
19 N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1972, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
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doubt also, the increase in entry is a concomitant of the large
increase in foreign investment in United States enterprises in recent
years. Just as the major United States banks have followed their
multinational customers abroad, so foreign bankers intend to be
their customers' "man on the spot" in the United States.2 0 Neverthe-
less, it is believed that the interpenetration of financial markets is
more than a temporary phenomenon, and that this growth in foreign
bank entry into the United States is a part of a global trend towards
transnational banking2 l which may be expected to continue. As the
multinational banks already present in the United States seek to
expand their operations here, and as those not yet present seek one
or more opportunities for participation in both the United States
domestic banking markets and the international banking markets on
our coasts, the pressure for, and the need for, an articulated federal
policy toward integration of our complex schema of banking regula-
tion and foreign bank entry will increase. This article will attempt
to describe, in some detail, the morass of legislation and regulation,
both state and federal, presently applying to foreign bank entry, and
will suggest some considerations that might inform proposals for
legislation aimed at specific, not backhanded, federal regulation of
the phenomenon. To penetrate the morass, however, it is best to
start with a contour map: a description of the characteristics of
United States banking regulation that would seem most striking to a
foreign bank lawyer observing our system (or lack thereof). These
characteristics also are ideological in character; that is, the princi-
ples are norms which, as we shall see in the analysis of Board
decisions on foreign bank entry under the Act, the Board, in the
absence of any congressional directive on the subject, has utilized as
the basis for its handling of foreign bank subsidiaries. The extent to
which it is desirable-or politic-for a policy toward transnational
banking22 to be formed by the myths of domestic banking structure
is a portion of the inquiry of this article.
20 Klopstock, supra note 15, in detailing the operations of the money center foreign
banks' offices, also suggests the opportunities for profit for a sophisticated money desk,
untrammeled in its operations by central bank regulations applicable only to domestic institu-
tions. To take full advantage of the opportunities for profit in an unstable international
monetary situation, however, it is advisable to have a trader in each of the money capitals of
the world.
21 For a description of this trend, see International Banking Gets the Team Spirit,
Fortune, June 1972; Dicker, International Banking Abroad, in Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, The International Monetary System in Transition 114 (1972).
22 An initial question, of course, for any lawyer advising a client with respect to a
proposed transnational operation is the extent to which the "host" country in its positive law
distinguishes between nationals and nonnationals. The consideration of this question leads
immediately to a careful examination of any international obligation the proposed "host" may
have undertaken not to discriminate against nationals and companies of the client's state. See,
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II. A CONTOUR MAP OF UNITED STATES BANKING REGULATION
FOR FOREIGN LAWYERS
2 3
The major features of the United States' banking regulation
terrain are, in the order of discussion within this article: the limita-
tion of entry into "depository" banking; the federal attempt to sepa-
rate that business from business characterized as "investment bank-
e.g., Netherlands-United States Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, March 27,
1956, art. VII, [1957] 2 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942 (effective Dec. 5, 1957), which
provides:
Nationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded national treatment with
respect to engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, financial and other activity
for gain (business activities) within the territories of the other Party, whether directly
or by agent or through the medium of any form of lawful juridical entity ....
However, given the special importance to national economies of ability to control financial
intermediaries, the commercial treaties typically make special provision for banking (as well
as other industries considered strategic). Thus under art. VII, para. 2 of the Netherlands-
United States Treaty,
Each Party reserves the right to limit the extent to which aliens may within its
territories establish, acquire interest in, or carry on enterprises engaged in communi-
cations, air or water transport, banking involving depository or fiduciary functions,
or the exploitation of land or other natural resources. However, new limitations
imposed by either Party upon the extent to which aliens are accorded national
treatment, with respect to carrying on such activities within its territories, shall not
be applied as against enterprises which are engaged in such activities therein at the
time such new limitations are adopted and which are owned or controlled by
nationals and companies of the other Party. Moreover, neither Party shall deny to
transportation, communications and banking companies of the other Party the right
to maintain branches and agencies, in conformity with the applicable laws and
regulations, to perform functions necessary for essentially international operations in
which they engage.
The United States treaties with France, Luxembourg- and Japan have the same provision; the
treaty with Belgium, while differing in language, also treats "banking involving fiduciary or
depository functions" separately. However, the treaties with Italy, Norway, the United
Kingdom and Denmark, while varying in the extent to which they provide for national
treatment for corporations, have no special exception for banking. The effect of these treaties
on the problems of regulation of foreign bank entry does not seem to have been considered to
date. So far as federal regulation is concerned, subsequent legislation having the effect of
giving less than "national" treatment (whatever the exact content of that term might be) to
banks originating from countries having a commercial treaty with the United States without
the exception for "depository" banking, while undesirable as a breach of international obliga-
tion, presumably is permissible as an exercise of congressional power to amend treaties by
subsequent legislation. However, state treatment of foreign banks benefiting from a treaty
that is more restrictive than the treatment that is applied to banks originating from a sister
state presumably is constitutionally forbidden. One wonders how long it will be before
lawyers for foreign banks whose clients either wish to enter the United States, or if, like
Barclays Bank Limited, long since present, have received a setback in expansion, begin to
consider the possibilities inherent in these agreements. In general, however, as the next
section will demonstrate, the major impediment to foreign bank entry is not discriminatory
treatment, but rather the unintended results of the interplay of federal and state legislation in
"our baffling banking system."
23 A wide-reaching, but not fully accurate, article on this topic appeared in Oct. 1972,
prior to the release of the Board decisions on foreign banks under the Bank Holding Company
Act that are discussed in this article. See MacKenzie & MacKenzie, Penetration of the United
States Market by a Foreign Bank, 6 Int'l Law. 876 (1972).
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ing" (the so-called Glass-Steagall "wall"); the notion that depository
banks must not extend their physical places of business beyond state
lines; the impact of antitrust regulation and conceptions on banking;
and the peculiarities of regulation in a federal system where both the
federal and state governments act as chartering and regulatory
authorities (the so-called "dual banking system"). The relatively
recent federal effort to prevent joint ownership of depository banks
and other types of business deemed improper for connection to
"banking" is now also a prominent feature of the regulatory land-
scape. It must be recognized at the outset that these features are less
elements of any actual coherent scheme of legislation than they are
features of the ideological terrain of banking regulation. These are
the major myths of the American way of depository banking, the
ideals toward which, in theory, the total scheme of regulation as-
pires. Now that the rapid growth of foreign bank entry has raised a
fear of foreign competition, 24 the complaints about the competition
are usually framed in terms of the myths: the foreigners may branch
in more than one state; they may combine deposit taking with
investment banking functions; they are not treated, in measuring the
economic impact of their proposals on competition, in the same
manner as a comparably sized United States bank would be
treated. 25 In addition, state regulatory authorities presently regulat-
ing foreign bank entry see the prospect of federal regulation as a
threat to the "dual banking system. '2 6 In practice, of course, the
myths are just that: the last ten years have been a time of profound
change for the structure of the domestic industry and the mythical
walls have come tumbling down for the domestic-owned banks with
the capital and initiative to break them. To the extent, however,
that the tenets of regulation inform the administrative decisions of
the various regulatory authorities, the drafting of legislation to deal
specifically with foreign bank entry, and the interpretation and
application of existing banking statutes to the attempts to enter, the
myths have a real impact and the barriers to entry can only be
24 See note 15 supra. See also Chapter 4 of the Report of the President's Council, supra
note 6:
The growth of foreign bank activity in the United States has led to complaints that
foreign banks enjoy a more favorable competitive position because they are regu-
lated differently than U.S. commercial banks. Although there are differences in
regulation, sometimes the complaints simply reflect a prejudice against competition
from foreign banks per se . ...
Wash. Fin. Rep. at T-3 (Feb. 18, 1974).
2- See the discussion of the New York decision on the Barclays Bank proposal to acquire
the Long Island Trust Company, in text at notes 119-34 infra.
26 See, e.g., Address by Harry W. Albright, Jr., New York State Superintendent of
Banks, 79th Annual Convention of the New York State Bankers Association, Lake Placid,
N.Y., June 14, 1973.
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understood in the context of the imperfect legislative attempts to
realize the myths in concrete legislation.
A. The General Licensing Requirement for "Depository" Banking
It has previously been stated that, apart from the impact of the
Bank Holding Company Act on incorporation of a foreign-owned
subsidiary bank, there is, at present, no federal legislation governing
foreign bank entry. This statement is not strictly accurate in that it
does not take into account section 2 1(a)(2) of the Banking Act of
1933.27 Since enactment of this provision as part of the post-crash
overhaul of federal regulation of banking, there has been no free
entry into depository banking in the United States, either for citizen
or for alien. Under sanction of criminal penalties 28 for violation of
the statute, any person or entity engaging "in the business of receiv-
ing deposits subject to check or to repayment upon presentation of a
passbook, certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon
request of the depositor" in the United States must receive
affirmative permission from a chartering authority, either federal or
state, and be subjected by such authority to examination and regula-
tion, or if not chartered to do the business, at least be examined by
the banking authorities of the jurisdiction and publish periodic
reports of condition in the same manner as banking institutions
incorporated in the jurisdiction.
29
Given the overriding command of section 2 1(a)(2), a foreign
bank that determines to enter the United States to do a business
involving the receiving of "deposits ... repayable upon the request
of the depositor" (whatever the scope of the term "deposits" may
be)30 must either find a welcoming jurisdiction, that is, a state with
27 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(2) (1970).
28 Section 21(b) of the Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 378(b) (1970), provides for a
$5,000 fine or five years imprisonment or both for both the violator of § 21(a) and for "any
officer, director, employee, or agent [of the violating organization] who knowingly participates
in any such violation." Section 2 1(a)(2) has never been interpreted and it is unknown just how
far an unlicensed organization can go in holding credit balances for its customers (as bank
"agencies" typically do) without coming under this prohibition. A possible reason for the lack
of interpretation is the criminal penalty attached. The Board has refused to interpret § 21(a)
(one of the provisions of the Banking Act of 1933 setting up the "Glass-Steagall wall" between
depository and investment banking) on the grounds that the question whether a person should
be prosecuted for violation of § 21 is withii the jurisdiction of the Justice Department and an
expression of opinion by the Board "would not afford protection from prosecution if the
Department of Justice, upon consideration of the matter, should take the position that a
corporation had violated the statute and should feel it necessary to prosecute for such
violation." 20 Fed. Res. Bull. 41 (1934); 12 C.F.R. § 302.543 (1973).
29 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(2) (1970). If foreign branches are to be federally licensed, clause B
of § 378(a)(2), which presently refers only to entities licensed "by any State, Territory, or
District to engage in such business," must be amended. None of the bills providing for federal
licensing of foreign branches, discussed in text at notes 142-52 infra, were so drafted.
30 Presumably a foreign bank could open an office which engages only in the making of
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a statute affirmatively providing for the opening of branches or
agencies by foreign banks and providing for their supervision and
inspection in accordance with the terms of section 21(a)(2), or must
obtain a charter for a domestic banking subsidiary. The desirable
markets and the welcoming jurisdictions do not always coincide.
The states are jealous of their chartering prerogatives and have not
seen fit to authorize sister state bank entry, much less to authorize
entry by "foreigners. '3 1 For example, New York, always the prime
market for financing of international trade, only amended its statute
authorizing entry in the form of "agencies" without the power to
receive deposits from the public, so as to give foreign banks the
option to establish "branches" with, in effect, full service powers
competitive with those of domestic banks, in 1960. Even so, a
branch may only be authorized if a New York bank would be
permitted to enter the country of origin of the foreign bank.3 2 At the
time of the Zwick study, only six states authorized foreign banks to
conduct business as foreign institutions (directly, rather than
through a separately chartered subsidiary) and only three of those
states (New York, Massachusetts and Oregon) permitted foreign
banks to operate branches as well as agencies. 33 Since that time,
two more states, California 34 and Illinois, 35 have amended their
laws to permit foreign banks to enter by means of direct branching,
but the history of the California legislation is instructive. As in New
York, the impetus for.the change in California law, amended in
1964 to authorize foreign branches as well as agencies, came from a
United States multinational bank, Bank of America, N.A., con-
cerned with reciprocity problems in its foreign expansion. However,
the new authorization offered by the California statute was illusory;
the new legislation required the foreign branch to be approved for
federal insurance of its deposits, 3 6 and the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act37 does not provide for insurance of deposits in non-United
States incorporated institutions. In 1969, however, the original per-
commercial loans without crediting the proceeds to the customer's account, or in financ-
ing foreign trade without the creation of credit balances which could be "deposits" under
§ 21(a)(2), but if the business is to be so restricted, it presumably is easier to open a
"representative office" officially doing no business at all within the jurisdiction, all evidences
of transactions being signed abroad, thus avoiding, one hopes, "presence" not only for
banking law purposes but also for tax and jurisdictional purposes.
31 See N.Y. Banking Law § 202-d (McKinney 1971), which specifically forbids conduct
of banking business by other than home state chartered or national banks. The same result is
accomplished by N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:9A-316 (1963).
32 N.Y. Banking Law § 202-a (McKinney 1971).
33 Zwick, supra note 3, at 5.
34 Cal. Fin. Code § 1750 (West Supp. 1968).
3. Illinois Foreign Banking Office Act, Pub. Act 78-346 (1973).
36 Zwick, supra note 3, at 4.
37 12 U.S.C. §§ 264, 1728, 1811-31 (1970).
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mission which would have required all deposits to be insured was
changed to permit foreign banking corporations so authorized by, the
State Banking Department to accept deposits originating from ab-
road without insurance. 38 The new Illinois legislation also limits the
newly extended privilege of direct entry, but does so not by origin of
deposits, but by geography and number. The office of the foreign
banking corporation may conduct "a general banking business," but
only one office per foreign bank may be authorized and it must be
located in the area presumed by the legislation to be most suitable
for its assumed international trade business, the central business
district of Chicago.
39
Compliance with section 21(a)(2) of the Banking Act of 1933
through state licensing of branches and/or agencies, therefore, is
feasible only in eight states, and in only three will the branch be the
functional equivalent of a state bank or national bank charter.
40
Why, then is direct entry into the United States of interest to foreign
banks at all? Since there are no laws, federal or state, that restrict
foreign (non-United States) ownership of stock in separately char-
tered banking institutions, it would appear that entry by means of a
separately chartered subsidiary would be preferable. While state
bank supervisors may be highly reluctant to grant a charter to
non-local organizers 4 1 and a national bank must have all citizen
directors, 42 there is no present legislation in the United States re-
sembling the Canadian limitations on alien, interests in Canadian
financial institutions. 43, There are, however, other considerations
38 BAFT Study, supra note 17, at 13; Klopstock, supra note 15, at 142 n.4.
39 Illinois Foreign Banking Office Act, Pub. Act 78-346, § 3 (1973).
40 The Illinois legislation, of course, is equal-handed in that since Illinois does not permit
its own chartered banks to have more than one place of business, a Chicago bank cannot put
direct branches in the suburbs either; but the domestic bank has an initial choice of location.
Although it is unlikely that a foreign bank would choose a retail suburban operation over a
wholesale international banking operation in Illinois, it does not have the option under the
new law.
41 See the reaction of the Florida Superintendent of Banks to the purchase by a Cana-
dian bank of the shares of a national bank located in Florida, described in text at note 255
infra.
42 12 U.S.C. § 72 (1970).
43 See note 5 supra. Acquisitions by out-of-state groups may be limited by state bank
holding company acts, and limitations are currently being placed on out-of-state acquisitions
of local trust companies, see Editorial, Am. Banker, Feb. 3, 1972, at 4, but in no case are
these restrictions aimed specifically at aliens. The only such xenophobic limitation that I know
of is the requirement of the Edge Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 611 et seq. (1970) (permitting federal
incorporatiori of companies to engage in international or foreign banking), that a majority of
the shares of an Edge Corporation be at all times held and owned by citizens of the United
States or entities controlled by citizens. 12 U.S.C. § 619 (1970). The Patman bill, H.R,
11,440, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), however, if enacted in its present form, would have the
extraordinary effect of precluding ownership of more than 5% of the voting stock of a national
bank by foreigners, and would so hedge the operation and connections of a state-chartered
bank in which foreigners own more than 5% as to amount to a prohibition on such ownership.
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which may make direct entry, as opposed to entry by chartered
subsidiary, more desirable. There are certain practical advantages
to entry through an office of the parent bank, but the next two
peculiar characteristics of the American way of banking to be dis-
cussed, the "Glass-Steagall wall" and the concept of geographic
limitation, offer better clues to the popularity of direct entry. How-
ever limited the opportunities for such entry, direct entry offers
foreign banks freedom from Glass-Steagall and from confinement of
their places of business to one state. It is just these advantages,
however, that arouse the greatest cries of "unfair competition" from
the home front. The following discussion, therefore, is also con-
cerned with whether the limitations on domestic banking are more
myth than reality.
B. The "Glass-Steagall Wall"
One of the aims of the Banking Act of 1933, also known as the
Glass-Steagall Act,44 was to force a separation in the United States
between commercial banking, which can be described as the process
of intermediation of short-term funds, and the business known
broadly as "investment banking," which is in theory the process of
intermediation in the long-term capital markets. The history and
purpose of the relevant sections of the Glass-Steagall Act are lucidly
set out in the Supreme Court's decision in Investment Company
Institute v. Camp, 45 and need not be repeated here. For continental
bankers, however, the notion that anyone would attempt to make
such a separation is exceedingly strange and the ramifications of the
concept are not always fully understood. In most European coun-
tries the major banks also deal freely in the securities markets, not
only as fiduciaries for customers, but also as principals, underwrit-
ing and dealing in securities, and the lawyer advising the foreign
bank client must initially determine to what extent the client is
presently engaged in, or hopes to engage in, such business in the
United States. Such expectations may well determine the possible
forms of banking entry into the United States.
The statutory building blocks of the "Glass-Steagall wall" con-
sist of three sections of the Banking Act of 1933, and the three
sections are not identical in scope. The first component of the Act is
subparagraph (a)(1) of section 2146 (subparagraph (a)(2) of which
was examined above47). Section 2 1(a)(1) makes it a criminal offense
for any person or entity
44 Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. chs. 3 and 6).
45 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
46 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1970).
47 See text at notes 27-29 supra.
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engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or
distributing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate
participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other
securities, to engage at the same time to any extent what-
ever in the business of receiving deposits subject to check
or to repayment upon presentation of a passbook,
certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon
request, of the depositor .... 48
Thus, no entity which takes "deposits" may at the same time be in
the securities business. 49 The Board has assumed the policy of this
section to be such an inherent part of our ethos that it has forbidden
deposit-taking entities under its jurisidiction to indulge in the
wicked practice of combining banking and securities business
abroad.50 The Congress, in effect, applauded the Board's view of
the portability of Glass-Steagall policy in 1962. At that time a
provision was added to the Federal Reserve Act51 to authorize the
Board in its supervision of the foreign activities of national banks to
permit foreign branches of national banks "to exercise such further
powers as may be usual in connection with the transaction of the
business of banking in the places where such foreign branch shall
48 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1970). There is an exception for dealing in, underwriting or
issuing the kinds of securities (chiefly United States obligations and municipals) a national
bank may deal in, underwrite or issue. Id.
49 As noted in note 28 supra, the Board has refused to interpret this provision; thus it is.
not known what economic behavior constitutes the taking of deposits for the purposes of § 21.
50 The Edge Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 611 et seq. (1970), specifically gives the entities incorpo-
rated thereunder the power to "purchase and sell, with or without its indorsement or
guaranty, securities,... but not including shares of stock in any corporation except as herein
provided . . . ." 12 U.S.C. § 615 (1970). However, the Board, which is responsible for
administration of the Edge Act and supervision of entities incorporated thereunder, has
forbidden any Edge Corporation "engaged in banking" to engage in the business of underwrit-
ing, selling or distributing securities other than obligations of the national government or a
foreign country in which it has a branch or agency or securities which may be underwritten by
national banks. An Edge Corporation is "engaged in banking," as opposed to other interna-
tional financial activities, when its aggregate demand deposits and acceptance liabilities
exceed its capital and surplus. Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.2(d) (1973). Thus, the banking
Edge may not participate in the securities business either domestically or abroad. Regulation
K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(a) (1973). Note that § 211.5(b) forbids any Edge Corporation, whether
or not "engaged in banking," to engage in the securities business in the United States; a
nonbanking Edge may underwrite abroad.
Exactly where the line is drawn between buying and selling for its own account and
"underwriting" is a question which vexes the Board in its administration of the Edge Act and
the SEC in its administration of the Securities Acts, and gives corporate and banking lawyers
sleepless nights. The general language of "purchase and sell," enacted in 1919, would seem to
receive content from whatever is the banking business. The prohibition upon buying and
selling stock would seem, from the legislative history, to have been included from fear of
economic concentration. See, e.g., 58 Cong. Rec. 4956 (1919) (remarks of Sen. Gronna). The
floating of bond issues was, in 1919, a perfectly proper banking function.
s1 Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 409 (1970) and in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
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transact business. '52 The statute goes on sternly to warn: "Such
regulations shall not authorize . ..a foreign branch to engage or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the businesg of underwriting,
selling, or distributing securities. ' 53 If United States banks are bur-
dened with Glass-Steagall in their activities abroad, only too clearly
foreign banks with United States arms that are taking "deposits"
within the meaning of section 2 154 must refrain from participating
directly in the securities business in the United States. In this respect
the foreign bank must be considered to be in the same position as
any other United States depository bank.
Section 21(a)(1), however, directs itself only to the situation of
the combination of the two types of businesses within the confines of
any one entity. The other two sections of the Banking Act of 1933
that make up the "Glass-Steagall wall," sections 2055 and 32,56 are
much less extensive in scope. Prior to 1933 the major banks had
conducted their investment banking through affiliates. Section 20 of
the Banking Act of 1933 put an end to that practice for banks which
are members57 of the Federal Reserve System by forbidding
affiliation with organizations dealing in securities. Section 32 com-
pleted the "wall" by prohibiting interlocking directorates between
member banks and such organizations (with waiver discretion
granted to the Board). Since the sections apply only to member
banks, theoretically any nonmember bank that is not part of a bank
holding company 8 may have a sister corporation in the securities
business, if such affiliation is not a violation of the state law govern-
ing the bank. In practice, of course, since the 1970 Amendments to
s2 12 U.S.C. § 604a (1970).
53 Id.
-' 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1970). Section 2 1(a)(1) would clearly cover a New York "branch" and
a California "branch" receiving deposits from abroad. Its application to "agencies" with credit
balances is unknown; certainly New York investment companies which carry credit balances
participate in a sense in the securities business. See the discussion of French-American
Banking Corporation, in text at notes 268-79 infra. One must assume that the Justice
Department accepts the New York notion that such credit balances are distinguishable from
"deposits."
5s 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1970).
56 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
-1 All national banks are member banks; state-incorporated banks are eligible, and may
opt, for membership if they meet the conditions of § 9 of the Act, 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1970).
58 The Bank Holding Company Act, under § 3, regulates not only the acquisition of
"banks" (as that term is defined by the Act) by entities or groups, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1970), but
also prohibits the holding company from owning over 5% of the voting stock of any nonbank
except those specifically excepted under § 4 of the Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1970). Section 4(c)(8)
gives the Board considerable discretion in determining what types of business are "closely
related to banking" and therefore permissible to a bank holding company. The Board has
made clear that a securities affiliate (other than one dealing purely in securities in which a
national bank may deal) is not a permissible affiliate under § 4 of the Act, irrespective of the
status (member or nonmember) of the holding company's bank. See 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 149
(1972); 12 C.F.R. § 225.125 (1973).
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the Bank Holding Company Act extended the coverage of the Act to
the holding of one bank,5 9 almost any organizational structure
utilized to tie in the bank and the securities company would consti-
tute a "bank holding company" as presently defined in the Act and
would subject the bank and its affiliates to the standards of the
Act. 60 Thus, as Banco di Roma discovered to its sorrow, 61 separate
incorporation of a subsidiary will bring the Bank Holding Company
Act into play and the Board, the administrative authority under the
Act, will extend Glass-Steagall principles to the connection between
the new subsidiary bank and the foreign parent's interests in the
securities business in the United States.
A United States branch or agency of a foreign bank, however,
is not a "bank" for the purposes of the Act. Nor is a foreign branch
a member bank for the purposes of sections 20 and 32 of the
Banking Act of 1933. Therefore, although a foreign branch cannot,
under section 21, itself engage in the securities business, a foreign
bank may at the same time have a United States branch or branches
and a United States subsidiary 62 in investment banking, and a few
foreign banks do so operate. 63 The "privilege," however, results not
from lack of federal regulation of foreign branches, but from the
original limitations on the affiliate provisions of the "Glass-Steagall
wall." Congress in 1933 did not purport to separate all banks from
securities affiliates. The myth of Glass-Steagall has outgrown the
actual statutory provisions, but so far there has not been an author-
ity with jurisdiction to apply the myth to direct entry. More
significant, however, in countering the complaints of unfair advan-
tage, is the fact that the "privilege" exists only for those banks
wishing to conduct commercial banking in a state which offers the
opportunity to open a branch.
C. The "Branching" Problem (Herein of Bank Holding
Companies and Edge Corporations)
We have seen that the ability to operate both a deposit-taking
office and a securities business, that is, freedom from the Glass-
Steagall principle, is one purported advantage open to foreign banks
that enter the United States banking market directly. A second
purported advantage open to foreign banks that enter by branching
59 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1970).
60 However, Edge Corporations, see text at notes 91-92 infra, which are not "banks" for
the purpose of the Act, may still, in theory at least, be incorporated by groups which are
engaged in the securities business directly or through a sister subsidiary.
61 See text at notes 315-19 infra.
62 In view of the uncertain scope of § 21(a)(1), separate incorporation of the securities
arm would appear advisable.
63 See Klopstock, supra note 15, at 141.
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is the ability, to the extent that the states authorize the establish-
ment of a branch, to establish places of business in more than one
state at a time. Domestic banks have no such privilege, in theory. A
salient characteristic of United States regulation of banking is the
theory of limitation of offices for deposit gathering to a geographical
area defined by state lines (or if a state chooses, to a smaller area
within which its banks are permitted to branch if branching is
permitted at all). The United States has what is known as a "dual
banking system;" that is, depository institutions may be chartered
and supervised under either federal or state law. The federally
chartered institutions are "national banks," incorporated under the
National Bank Act,64 and the larger national banks (as well as the
largest state-chartered banks) participate in a national market for
loans and other services. However, unlike other United States in-
dustries serving national markets, and unlike most foreign banking
systems, our banks may not have physical locations coextensive
with the scope of their business. To the contrary, the restriction of
deposit gathering offices of any one entity or jointly-owned entities
to the area defined by the boundaries of the state of location of the
initial office is a tenet of United States banking regulation held as
religiously as the Glass-Steagall principle. Even if a state authorizes
banks chartered by it to open branch offices outside of the state, 65
most states. exclude out-of-state bank entry altogether as well as
limit the extent to which their banks may branch within the state. 66
The principle of limitations upon branching was so strongly held
that when Congress finally enacted legislation to permit national
banks to open offices in addition to their main offices,67 these
branching powers were limited to those authorized to state banks by
the law of the state in which the national bank in question is
located. The original legislation only authorized the addition of
branches in the same city or town; subsequently, the provision was
amended 68 to permit out-of-town branching, again with the state
law as a measuring rod, but the language of the amendment
specifically limited the new branches to locations within the bank's
"home" state. Thus, under present federal law, direct branching
across state lines is closed to both national banks and to state
64 Ch. 343, 18 Stat. 123 (1874) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 18, 19, 28 and 31
U.S.C.).
6S See, e.g., N.Y. Banking Law § 105(a) (McKinney 1971), which authorizes New York
banks and trust companies with capital of over $1,000,000, with the requisite supervisory
approvals, to open branch offices "in one or more places located without the state of New
York, either in the United States of America or in foreign countries."
66 See note 31 supra.
67 McFadden Act, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
68 Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 23, 48 Stat. 190 (1933).
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member banks, whose branching authorizations depend upon those
available to a national bank. 69 To an ingenious lawyer, however,
there are a number of ways to skin a cat: if the bank can't go across
state lines, why not have separately incorporated banks, each
owned by the same company? Senator Douglas recognized the pos-
sibilities for evading the time-honored restrictions on transstate
banking and added to the original decision by Congress in 1958 to
regulate bank holding companies by means of the Bank Holding
Company Act the so-called "Douglas wall": section 3(d) of the Act
-forbids the Board to approve any acquisition of a bank by a holding
company if the bank is located outside of the state in which the
operations of the holding company's banks are principally con-
ducted, unless the law of the state in which the bank to be acquired
is located specifically authorizes such acquisition.
70
The actual text of the "Douglas wall" forbade the Board from
approving out-of-state bank acquisitions; it did not say anything
about permissible locations of bank holding company "nonbank"
interests. 71 The norm of penning up banks within state lines was so
pervasive, however, that in one of the earliest divestiture decisions
72
under the newly enacted Act, First Bank Stock Corporation was
denied permission to retain the stock of First Bancredit Corporation
(Bancredit), a company in the business of buying and reselling
consumer paper with offices in a number of locations where the
holding company's subsidiary banks could not branch. In addition
to other reasons for determining that the business of Bancredit was
not a "proper incident" to the business of banking or managing or
controlling banks (the test under the 1958 Act for permissible non-
bank business of bank holding companies), the hearing examiner
found that to authorize retention of a company with branch offices
where the subsidiary banks could not branch "would be for the
Board to sanction a device enabling a bank holding company to
evade restrictions imposed upon it and upon its banking subsidiaries
in contravention of the statutory purposes . . . ..73 The Board
agreed with the hearing examiner's finding, holding that Bancredit's
69 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1970).
70 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1970). No such state laws presently exist, although enactment of
such authorizations on a reciprocal basis is presently a project of the New York State Banking
Department. We shall see subsequently, see text at notes 230-45 infra, how the Board has had
to struggle with this provision in its application to foreign bank subsidiaries.
71 Recall that the Board controls acquisitions of "banks" under § 3 of the Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1842 (1970); § 4 of the Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1970), sets out (with considerable discretion to
the Board) what "nonbank" business a bank holding company may retain or enter. See text at
notes 135-41 infra.
72 In re the Requests of First Bank Stock Corporation for Determinations under Section
4(c)(6) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 917 (1959).
73 Id. at 924.
FOREIGN PARTICIPATION IN UNITED STATES BANKING
activities failed to meet the "proper incident and purposes of the
Act" requirements of the Bank Holding Company Act, as it then
existed, on the grounds, inter alia, that Bancredit's activities "rep-
resent a type of corporate structure, readily available to a holding
company and relatively inaccessible to nonholding company banks,
which is likely to have effects of a kind which the Bank Holding
Company Act was intended to prevent. ' 74 It may be speculated that
the Bancredit decision was a determinative factor in the lack of
growth of multibank bank holding companies until the late 1960's.
5
The holding company corporate structure presumably lost a good
deal of its interest to innovative bankers when it could not be used
to avoid the marketing straitjacket of state lines.
Had the Board-and subsequently Congress-adhered to the
principle enunciated in the Bancredit decision-that nondepository
banking business must be restricted to permissible locations for
deposit gathering-the current complaints about the unfair competi-
tive advantage of foreign banks in being able to avoid the applica-
tion of both the Bank Holding Company Act and restrictions on
multistate banking by direct entry through branches in different
states might have greater cogency. But the Bancredit decision and
the initial Board resistance to exempting so-called "loan production"
offices from the branching restrictions 76 represented the high water
74 Id. at 928.
7- Until the 1970 Amendments, however, companies owning only one bank were not
subject to regulation under the Act. Why, then, did the banks with resources to form a
holding company and operate multistate nonbank subsidiaries not do so earlier than 1968, the
date of conversion of First National City Bank of New York into a one-bank holding
company? One reason may have been that the initial impulse for the extension of business
across state lines was satisfied, for the moment, for the major national banks by the
Comptroller's ruling on loan production offices, see note 76 infra. More important, perhaps,
was the fact that until the 1966 Amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act, Pub. L. No.
89-485, 80 Stat. 236 (1966), the Federal Reserve Act and the National Bank Act contained a
number of provisions concerning the relationship between a member bank and its affiliates
which had been enacted as part of the Banking Act of 1933. Included in the provisions were
§ 19 of the Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 61 (1970), requiring, inter alia, each "holding
company affiliate" (a term which included companies owning one member bank as well as
multibank holding companies owning a member bank) to hold readily marketable assets other
than bank stock and to reinvest a prescribed amount of net earnings in such assets until they
equaled 25% of the par value of the bank stock controlled by the affiliate. From the point of
view of formation expense (possible incurring of realized gain on transfer of assets, stock issue
taxes, etc.), to say nothing of the point of view of stockholders whose holding company
dividends might be restricted by the reinvestment provision, it is quite one thing to organize a
holding company whose sole asset is the bank stock it is organized to hold and quite another
to inject into the top shell a sufficient amount of marketable assets to comply with the
provision. Fortunately for expansion-minded banks, the 1966 Bank Holding Company Act
Amendments, apparently simply as a technical legislative matter without any realization of
the real effects, repealed this provision, and the rush to one-bank holding company structure
followed after First National City Bank's lawyers had seen the new light.
76 The Comptroller in 1966 had issued a new ruling interpreting the National Bank Act
so as to permit national banks to establish "loan production" offices at locations at which,
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mark of adherence to the myth of local banking. Economic pres-
sures for change in banking structure joined hands with creative
lawyering and the business was expanded under another label. Just
as the Comptroller of the Currency had discovered that an out-of-
state office could be a "loan production" office and not a branch, so
creative lawyers discovered that there was a provision in the Bank
Holding Company Act under which a holding company could estab-
lish out-of-state offices. Section 4(c)(1)(c) (now section 4(a)(2)(A))
permitted bank holding companies to hold the shares of corporations
"furnishing services to or performing services for such bank holding
company or its banking subsidiaries.1 77 The Board was persuaded
to rule in 1967 that a bank holding company could acquire under
this provision the stock of a mortage company that "would solicit
mortgage loans on behalf of a bank in the holding company system,
assemble credit information, make property inspections and ap-
praisals and secure title information. ' 78 This was only the crack in
the wall; the company was not itself to make the loans or even to
service them on a fee basis, but significantly, the ruling did not
mention any particular location for the offices of the mortgage
company. 79 Thus, so long as a holding company could arrange for a
subsidiary to provide various financial services, without performing
"as principal any banking activities . . . in other words, if the
[subsidiary] is to act merely as an adjunct to a bank for the purpose
of facilitating the bank's operations," 80 the offices of the subsidiary
could be located in another state.
81
The 1970 Amendments to the Act gave the coup de grdce to the
old religion. Curiously enough, the blow was delivered in almost
under 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970), a branch could not be opened. The Board responded by ruling
that so far as its power to interpret § 36 for state member banks was concerned, it considered
an office soliciting borrowers, negotiating terms and processing loans a "branch." 53 Fed. Res.
Bull. 1334 (1967).
71 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2)(A) (1970).
78 53 Fed. Res. Bull. 1911 (1967).
79 See id. at 1911-12.
80 Id.
81 This mortgage company subsidiary decision was subsequently to force the Board to do
some categorical rethinking about its ruling, see note 76 supra, on loan production offices.
With this decision, the Board was in the position of permitting bank holding company banks
to have sister corporations performing virtually the same activities under the guise of "service"
corporations that the Board had forbidden nonholding company banks to perform at non-
branch locations through "loan production" offices which typically are structured never to act
as "principal." The competitive edge to a holding company structure, the result the Board
stressed as undesirable in the Bancredit decision, was apparent and the Board reversed
itself-not by moving backward, but by finally recognizing the irresistible thrust of change
away from isolated local banking. In effect, the Board accepted the Comptroller's viewpoint
on "loan production" offices and now declared that, since "the purposes of the branch banking
laws and the servicing exemption are related . . . an office that only performs servicing
functions should not be considered a branch." 54 Fed. Res. Bull. 681 (1968); 12 C.F.R.
§ 250.141 (1973).
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total silence. While intense debate raged over whether there should
be a statutory "laundry" list of activities prohibited to bank holding
companies and over what should be the content of a public interest
standard if the Board were to be given discretion in determining
permissible types of nonbank subsidiaries, 82 no member of Congress
noticed (publicly at least), and presumably the companies concerned
were careful not to point out, that the requirements of the new
section 4 standard for judging the retention or acquisition of non-
bank subsidiaries (that decreased competition should be weighed as
an adverse effect and that there could be differentiation between
activities commenced de novo and activities commenced by acquisi-
tion of a going concern)8 3 would favor the establishment of non-
banking subsidiaries in markets in which the banks in the holding
company were not present. Such an interpretation would in one
stroke wipe out forever Bancredit's ghost.
The Board did not hesitate in so reading the new statute. The
announcement of the new regulations under the revised section
hinted broadly: "The regulatory amendments do not limit the loca-
tion of a permissible activity to any State or other geographical area
but limitations may be imposed by order in individual cases. '8 4 The
companies did not fail to take the hint and acquisitions by the major
companies of nonbank subsidiaries in areas far from the state of
location of the subsidiary banks were quickly arranged. In a scant
three years since the enactment of the 1970 Amendments, business
that is "so closely related to banking or managing or controlling
banks as to be a proper incident thereto" 85 is business that is
nationwide in scope. Whatever may be the concerns of counsel to a
bank holding company in advising on a prospective out-of-state
acquisition, it is no longer necessary to worry whether the proposed
subsidiary can be pushed and pulled into the skin of a "services"
corporation. Anything (anything, that is, except the activities which
would constitute the subsidiary a "bank" subject to acquisition
under section 3 of the Act, i.e., accepting deposits that the depositor
has a legal right to withdraw on demand and making commercial
loans8 6), roughly,8 7 that the subsidiary banks can do can bk done
82 Blaine, Registered Bank Holding Companies and the One-Bank Holding Company,
26 Bus. Law. 9, 12 (1970).
83 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1970).
84 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Circular No. 6739, May 28, 1971.
8s 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1970).
86 Bank Holding Company Act § 2(c), 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1970). See also the Board's
proposed amendment to Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(4) (1973), concerning deposit
taking by trust companies acquired under § 4 as nonbank subsidiaries, Fed. Res. Press
Release, July 3, 1973, discussed in note 248 infra.
87 The qualification "roughly" is added because some state banks may be authorized by
state law to perform activities which are not, in the Board's view, activities permissible to
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out-of-state by the nonbank subsidiaries. It can, of course, be ar-
gued that the activities contained within the parentheses above are
the heart of the matter: that it is access to funds in the local market
for deposits that matters. When it is a question of competition
between local banks and out-of-state bank holding company sub-
sidiaries, that argument has great force. But to complain that
foreign banks have access to local deposits in more than one state is
to complain in the face of what is known of the economic facts: even
in the five states that permit some form of local deposit taking, a
branch of a foreign bank cannot offer federal deposit insurance and
appears to be competitive only for deposits of particular ethnic
groups, or deposits of customers for international services, or de-
posits related to transactions in the international money markets. 88
Thus the "privilege" seems to be one of doing business in more than
one state at a time, and this privilege domestic banks now have
through a holding company structure.
Indeed, the major domestic banks not only do multistate busi-
ness through a holding company structure, but they have found a
way to participate in international banking business (including de-
posit receipt) on a multistate basis, through utilization of Edge
Corporations. At the same time that the 1970 Amendments were
creating a new world of what the Board calls "multi-state
operations"8 9 for bank holding companies and their banks, the
major domestic banks with active international departments9" were
discovering what First National Bank of Boston and Bank of
America had known and utilized for many years-an esoteric but
effective route to an out-of-state office. An understanding of the
particulars of this route is necessary both to evaluation of com-
plaints about the "advantages" of foreign banks and to comprehen-
sion of the Board's choice of standards in regulation of transnational
banking under the Act. As noted previously, 91 the Edge Act
92
bank holding company subsidiaries under § 4(c)(8) of the Act. For example, the leasing powers
of New York State banks under N.Y. Banking Law § 96(12) (McKinney 1971), and the
leasing powers of a leasing subsidiary under Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(6) (1973), are
not coextensive.
88 Joint Economic Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess., Foreign Banking in the United States
11-12 (Economic Policies and Practices, Paper No. 9) (Comm. Print 1966).
89 Fed. Res. Press Release, July 3, 1973, on proposed amendment to Regulation Y, 12
C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(4) (1973), concerning deposit taking by subsidiary trust companies. See note
248 infra.
90 Wash. Fin. Rep. at X-2 (Aug. 20, 1973) shows as of that date four new Edge
Corporation formation applications to the Board: Continental Illinois National Bank (head
office in Chicago), in Houston; Bankers Trust of New York, in Chicago; Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Company of New York, in Los Angeles; and Morgan Guaranty of New York,
in Houston.
91 See note 43 supra.
92 12 U.S.C. §§ 611 et seq. (1970).
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permits federal incorporation of companies to do an international
banking business. The Act specifically provides that only such busi-
ness "as, in the judgment of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, [is] incidental to its international or foreign busi-
ness" may be carried on by these Corporations in the United
States, 93 but no restriction is placed on the location of the home
office. National banks and many state banks are authorized to
invest in the stock of these Corporations, without restriction by
location. 94 Therefore, a bank may own an Edge Corporation with
its home office in a location where the bank itself could not branch.
In 1918 the Board approved the entry of First National Bank of
Boston into the New York market by establishment of an Edge
Corporation,9" and for many years the giant Californian, Bank of
America, has been present in New York through its Edge sub-
sidiary. Unlike most non-bank holding company subsidiaries, these
Edge companies can and do take deposits and, therefore, may
compete with local banks for a limited segment of the market. The
scope of presently permissible domestic business for Edge Corpora-
tions is spelled out in the Board's Regulation K.96 This business
includes the right to accept time and demand deposits from foreig-
ners and deposits otherwise linked to the Corporation's international
and foreign business, including proceeds of extensions of credit by
the Edge Corporation. Despite very careful delineation by Regula-
tion K of the boundaries of permissible domestic business so as to
insure that these federal corporations do not compete in the domes-
tic markets with local banks, 97 the scope allowed to Edge Corpora-
tions for service to customers involved in international trade and
business is considerable. Governor Brimmer of the Board has noted
that the applications by banks to open Edge offices outside of New
York "engendered protests in almost every case from one or more
local bankers who were apprehensive about the effects of increased
competition which the newcomers would bring. 98 Nevertheless,
93 12 U.S.C. § 616 (1970).
94 12 U.S.C. § 618 (1970).
95 Brimmer, American International Banking Trends and Prospects 38 (paper presented
by Andrew F. Brimmer to the 51st Annual Meeting of the Banker's Association for Foreign
Trade, Boca Raton, Fla., April 2, 1973).
96 12 C.F.R. § 211.7 (1973).
97 The competition for domestic deposits is made more equal by the requirement of
Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.7(c) (1973), that these United States-received deposits are
subject to the reserve requirements imposed against deposits in member banks. Moreover,
competition against local banks is limited in that, under the terms of 12 C.F.R. § 211.7(c)(2)
(1973), the Edge Corporation cannot hold, for example, the payroll account of an export
corporation.
98 Brimmer, supra note 95, at 40. The Board has not been unaware of the fact that such
out-of-state Edge offices are a transgression of a cherished myth. Brimmer goes on to say that
"[i]n dealing with these applications--and without formally enunciating it-the Board seems
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presumably in the interest of furtherance of growth of international
banking, the Board has permitted this form of out-of-state office.
In evaluating the complaints that foreign banks may branch
into more than one state at once, complaints that, given the history
of domestic banking structure just outlined, seem to be predicated
on what is now only a paper tiger of geographical restriction, it may
also be noted as a final point that the Edge route of multistate
operations is not open to foreign banks. In what seems to have been
a pure exercise in xenophobia, 99 the Edge Act was drafted (and/or
amended on the House floor) to provide that all of the directors of
an Edge Corporation must be citizens of the United States' 00 and
that a majority of the shares must at all times be held and owned by
citizens of the United States or by corporations "the controlling
interest in which is owned by citizens of the United States."10' It
would seem that the "privilege" of multistate depository banking is
given in different ways to different people, for historical and not
instrumental reasons.
D. Bank Entry and Antitrust Standards
No contour map of United States regulation of banking would
be complete without mention of the prominent part that American
antitrust concepts and standards have come to play, since 1960, in
what was originally a protected and deliberately anticompetitive
economic environment. The basic concepts of antitrust regulation
are no longer foreign to any banker or lawyer originating from a
country adhering to the Treaty of Rome with its Articles 85 and
86.102 The process of the injection of antitrust standards into the
regulation of the banking industry in the United States has, how-
ever, left a number of presently unresolved issues, issues stemming
not only from the interplay of the antitrust laws and the special
bank merger statutes, but also from the natural tension between a
complex of laws whose ultimum bonum (in theory at least) is the
to have evolved a policy under which a bank has been able to open at least one out-of-state
international banking office in Miami. . .," another along the southern border, one along the
northern boundary and one or two on the West Coast. Id. In this ambiguous situation,
Brimmer warns, "it is of crucial importance that the banks abide by the spirit as well as the
letter of the regulations restricting their activities to international banking." Id. One suspects,
however, that however willing the spirit, the executive flesh is weak, and that the new wave
must be considered as one more phenomenon of the nationalization (in quite another sense) of
banking.
99 See 58 Cong. Rec. 4963-66 (1919), particularly at 4965 (remarks of Sen. Gronna): "We
ought to make it definite and certain that this is an American institution owned and operated
by American citizens and controlled by American citizens."
100 12 U.S.C. § 614 (1970).
101 12 U.S.C. § 619 (1970).
10 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3.
FOREIGN PARTICIPATION IN UNITED STATES BANKING
maximum competition leading, presumably, to the demise of the
unfit, and an industry into which entry is limited by licensing so as
to restrict the number of competitors and to prevent failures. 1 0 3 The
history of banking and antitrust regulation has been fully recounted
elsewhere' 0 4 and need not be repeated here. It is sufficient simply to
note that among the unresolved issues are such questions as the
application of the doctrine of potential competition'0 " to proposed
combinations in banking, and the extent to which the two major fora
in which issues of banking and competition are presently raised, the
Board in decisions under sections 3 and 4 of the Bank. Holding
Company Act, 10 6 and the courts in response to action by the De-
partment of Justice, will develop a cohesive set of principles or will
apply conflicting standards, leaving potential entrants to divination,
rather than rational prediction, of the possibility of challenge of the
transaction on competitive grounds.
In the case of foreign bank entry, there has been little opportun-
ity to date for the working out of these principles in their relation-
ship to transnational banking,10 7 since entry has in most cases been
103 Note the title of the Comptroller's Address cited in Kintner & Hansen, A Review of
the Law of Bank Mergers, 14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 213, 250 n.189 (1972): "Financial
Competition in a Regulated Environment." The tension is also well illustrated in Mr.
Hansen's recounting of the testimony in the trial in United States v. First National Bancorpo-
ration Inc., in Hansen, Greeley Bank: Some Speculations, 90 Banking L.J. 578 (1973).
Clearly the doctrine of "potential competition" is skewed when the theoretical entry depends
on governmental licensing. The gravamen of the Government's case against the acquisition of
First National Bank of Greeley by Bancorportion was that the acquisition would eliminate
Bancorporation as a potential entrant (presumably by formation of a de novo bank or
acquisition of a smaller bank than Greeley); the Comptroller's Regional Administrator of
National Banks testified that the approval of a new national charter in Greeley for the next
five years was "unlikely." Id. at 587.
104 See Kintner & Hansen, supra note 103.
tos This doctrine, described in Kintner & Hansen, supra note 103, at 252-55, may be
described as the analog in antitrust law to the notion of a "chilling effect" in constitutional
law. If the proposed combination goes through, will the resulting business be so fearsome as
to keep other potential entrants away?
106 The Bank Holding Company Act requires the Board to judge, in the case of bank
acquisitions under § 3, whether any "anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are
clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting
the convenience and needs of the community to be served," 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (1970); in
the case of nonbank acquisitions under § 4(c)(8), whether "undue concentration of resources,
decreased or unfair competition" are outweighed by public benefits, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)
(1970). The jurisprudence of the Board in this area is only emerging. To my knowledge, a
thorough analysis of the Board's decisions under the statutory standards of the 1970 Amend-
ments has not yet appeared.
107 Nothing, of course, in either the antitrust statutes or the Bank Holding Company Act
mandates differential treatment of a transaction involving nonnationals insofar as the question
of the effect on competition is concerned. Indeed, one decision of the Board, concerning the
application under § 3(a) of the Act of an English company to acquire, through a tender offer,
51% of a smaller national bank in New York, suggests that the foreignness of the applicant
under § 3 is irrelevant. Order of the Board in Cedar Holdings Limited, Bankers, Fed. Res.
Press Release, Dec. 10, 1973. The Board does not discuss in the Order the fact that this was a
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by establishment of a new branch or by formation of a new sub-
sidiary bank, a situation in which, as the Board has noted, "the
addition of [the new bank] will provide increased banking facilities
and competition.' 08 However, in three recent instances (the acquis-
ition of Inter National Bank, Miami, Florida, by the Royal Trust
Company, Montreal, Canada; the proposed acquisition of Long
Island Trust Company, New York by Barclays Bank Limited; and
the proposed acquisition of First Western Bank and Trust Com-
pany, Los Angeles, California by Lloyds Bank Limited), the method
of entry has been by acquisition (or proposed acquisition) of control
of an existing bank. In one case the acquisition involved one bank
too small to raise antitrust questions. Although the Canadian bank
that acquired Inter National Bank was, as of December 31, 1971,
the largest trust company in Canada, Inter National Bank itself
was, with only forty-three million dollars in deposits-1.26 percent
of the total amount of deposits in commercial banks in Florida-too
much of a minnow to inspire discussion of the effect of the transac-
tion on the competitive pond. On the other hand, however, the
Barclays' and Lloyds' proposals can be seen as raising a number of
questions concerning the application of doctrines of competition in
banking to foreign bank entry, particularly questions concerning the
doctrine of potential competition.' 0 9 The- Barclays-Long Island
Trust Company proposal has run aground on the dual banking
system (although, as will be seen, the shoal was camouflaged with
tortured antitrust doctrine) and the Board will not give itself the
opportunity to consider the matter. While Barclays' attempted ac-
quisition has been defeated in New York, Lloyds has successfully
acquired an existing California bank. The Board's decision' 10 on the
Lloyds-First Western Bank proposal suggests that, for the moment
at least, if the proposal is not attacked on competitive grounds by
the state authorities, as was Barclays' plan, the foreign entrant,
whatever its size and the size of its acquisition, need not overly
concern itself with competitive factors. Lloyds, with total consoli-
transnational acquisition except to note that since "Applicant does no business in the United
States, it is clear that consummation of the proposal would eliminate no existing or likely
potential competition between Applicant or Bank." Id. at 2.
108 Banque Nationale de Paris, Paris, France, 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 371 (1972).
109 While Barclays has business in New York through two subsidiaries, see text at notes
238-39 infra, that business does not compete, except on a de minimis basis, with the Long
Island Trust Company. Lloyds does not have an operation in California at all. Thus both
proposals represent what is classified in antitrust lore as a market extension acquisition. See
Kintner & Hansen, supra note 103, at 251. The issues raised by the Barclays proposal are
discussed at length in the next section.
110 Statement of the Board on Lloyds Bank Limited and Lloyds First Western Corpora-
tion, Dec. 10, 1973, 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 125 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Statement of the
Board].
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dated assets on December 31, 1972 of over thirteen billion dollars, is
the fourth largest commercial bank in Great Britain. The New York
branch of its wholly-owned subsidiary had, as of December 31,
1972, approximately 362 million dollars in deposits."' Furthermore,
with ninety-five offices and 1.4 billion dollars in assets, First West-
ern is more than a "toehold" in California. The Board did take note
of the fact that "Lloyds Bank could enter any of the local banking
markets in California served by Bank either de novo or through the
acquisition of a smaller bank," but it concluded (without reciting its
data for the conclusion) cheerfully:
[T]he acquisition of Bank [First Western] by Lloyds Bank
would not have an adverse effect on potential competition
because consummation of the proposal would not give
Lloyds Bank a dominant share of the banking resources in
any market served by Bank, nor would it appear to fore-
close the entry of other banking organizations into any
such markets. 112
The "if' concerning state challenges on competitive grounds,
however, is a large one. Barclays had impressively briefed its case
on competitive factors to the Board 1 3 in its Bank Holding Com-
pany Act application for federal permission to acquire the Long
Island Trust Company; it failed miserably in persuading the New
York authority to permit the acquisition. Had the Board seen itself
as the appropriate authority to make the ultimate decision on
whether or not the English bank should increase its depth of entry
into the New York metropolitan market, one may assume from the
Lloyds decision that the Board would have approved the acquisi-
tion. The Board, however, did not give itself the opportunity to
make the decision"1 4 and its deference to New York and New
York's appreciation of the competitive factors, no doubt puzzling to
foreign observers, must be understood as a consequence of the last
special characteristic of American regulation of banking: the so-
called "dual banking system."
II Id. at 2.
112 Id. at 3.
113 Exhibit G., Application to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System of
Barclays Bank Limited and Barclays Bank International Limited under § 3(a)(3) of the Bank
Holding Company Act [hereinafter cited as Application to the Board].
114 The Board has issued a ruling, 37 Fed. Reg. 5084 (1972), dated Feb. 25, 1972, that in
the case of applications for the acquisition of voting shares of a bank by a bank holding
company "in circumstances where approval by the appropriate State banking authority is
required but has been denied, such disapproval precludes consummation of the proposed
acquisition." Thus, the Board will regard the application to it as moot, and will dismiss it
without prejudice. Presumably this is what was done in the case of Barclays' application to
the Board.
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E. The Dual Banking System
The final myth of banking regulation in the United States is the
importance of preserving the system under which both the states
and the federal government are chartering authorities for banks and
where both have examination and supervisory functions.11 One
rationale for limitation of the branching powers of national banks to
those permitted to state banks in the state where the national bank
in question is located1 16 is that to permit broader powers to national
banks would cause the state banks to convert to national charters
and so, effectively, deprive the states of their chartering rights.
Thus state regulation of banking is given great deference by Con-
gress, and derivatively, by the Board, following the injunction of
the Act that its enactment "shall not be construed as preventing any
State from exercising such powers and jurisdiction which it now has
or may hereafter have with respect to banks, bank holding com-
panies, and subsidiaries thereof." 117 The Board seems to have as-
sumed, as indicated by its dismissing applications under the Act
where state supervisory approval is denied, 118 that this command
115 It cannot, however, be stressed too often to a foreign client that the two systems are
not dichotomous, and that the obtaining of a state charter does not mean an absence of
overlapping federal supervision. If a state-incorporated bank is not a "subsidiary" of a "bank
holding company" as those terms are defined in the Bank Holding Company Act, if it has not
chosen to become a- member bank of the Federal Reserve System or to have its deposits
federally insured, it will in fact be only state-supervised, although, of course, it may still
bump into federal regulation of some of its activities. Prior to the 1970 Amendments, it was
possible for a foreign bank entering through creation of a state bank subsidiary (assuming the
state chartering authority would grant a charter to foreigners) to fulfill these qualifications,
Now that the foreign bank is a "company" as defined in the Bank Holding Company Act
§ 2(b), 12 U.S.C. § 1841(b) (1970), the acquisition of a controlling (again as therein defined)
interest in the locally incorporated bank is subject to the supervision of the Board, the foreign
bank by virtue of becoming a "bank holding company" is subject to the Board's supervision
under the Act, and, finally, the subsidiary bank itself becomes subject to the supervision of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act because
the 1970 Amendments amended the Bank Holding Company Act to require that every holding
company subsidiary bank "become and remain an insured bank as such term is defined in
Section 3(b) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act." 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1970). Thus, the single
act of entry by obtaining a state banking charter brings two separate federal regulatory
agencies into the picture.
116 See text at note 67 supra.
17 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1970). The possibilities for interplay between this provision and the
command of the treaties of commerce that state legislation not violate their promises are
evident. I would assume that the way out of this dilemma is to assume that whatever
jurisdiction the states may have to regulate the acquisition of banks within their territory, that
jurisdiction may not treat a foreign (non-United States) acquisition differently than a sister
state acquisition. The question, however, of just how far the states can go in excluding
out-of-state acquisition of interests in certain types of companies (for example, trust com-
panies) before coming into conflict with the commerce clause of the United States Constitution
is surfacing today with bank holding company nonbank expansion.
11s See note 114 supra.
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includes not only state legislation, but also the decisions of state
administrators. 119 Thus the foreign bank entrant is subjected, in our
dual banking system, not only to exclusive jurisdiction of the states
over direct entry and over the initial grant of a state charter for
entry by formation of a new subsidiary, but also to state approba-
tion of the acquisition of stock of an existing bank, and even,
presumably, if the state legislation includes, as does New York's,
asserted jurisdiction over acquisition of stock of a national bank
located within the state, to state approbation of acquisition of a
national bank charter.
The practical result of the system for a foreign bank entrant is
well illustrated by the history of Barclays' attempt to purchase the
stock of the- Long Island Trust Company, a history which also
illustrates the dangers of granting, in effect, exclusive appreciation
of competitive and public interest factors to a state authority with a
particular constituency. At the end of 1972 Barclays Bank Limited
of London, the largest British bank with total assets of approxi-
mately twenty-four billion dollars, was operating in New York
through two foreign branch offices of its subsidiary, Barclays Bank
International Limited (BBIL), and a separately incorporated New
York bank, Barclays Bank of New York (BBNY). These offices and
BBNY together represented approximately 289 million dollars of
assets in New York. BBNY, under the New York law then govern-
ing commercial bank branching, could not branch out into rapidly
growing Suffolk County at the end of Long Island and could only
apply for a limited number of new branches each year in Nassau
County, considered by New York City banks as part of the greater
metropolitan area. The BBIL branches and BBNY were carrying
on a largely internationally linked business 120 and Barclays' man-
119 It is not at all clear from the legislative history of § 7 of the Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1846
(1970), that Congress meant to include within the protection of this section discretionary
decisions of state supervisory authorities as well as positive state legislation. The House bill
contained a provision granting to the bank supervisory authorities (state authority or the
Comptroller of the Currency, as the case might be) the power to veto any acquisition,
regardless of the opinion of the Federal Reserve Board. The Senate bill, S. 2577, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1956), rejected this view, substituting the present provision of the Act (§ 3(b)) that
the Board obtain the views and recommendations of the supervisory authority, hold a hearing
if the supervisory authority disapproves, and after the hearing, approve or disapprove the
acquisition by formal order. See 102 Cong. Rec. 6751 (1956) (remarks of Sen. Robertson). As
stated by Sen. Robertson: "This procedure should afford an opportunity for developing the
true merits of each case and also assures adequate recourse to court review for the aggrieved
party." Id. It is hard to reconcile the procedure mandated under § 3(b) of the Act and the
ruling of the Board, supra note 114, that disapproval by the state authority precludes
consummation of the proposed acquisition.
120 The Application to the Board, supra note 113, at 27, notes:
The ethnic and international associations, while perhaps not as numerous on the
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agement determined to enter the potentially profitable local retail
banking market by acquisition of an existing bank with a wide-
spread set of retail branches. The proposal was to have BBIL
acquire for cash one hundred percent of the voting shares of the
Long Island Trust Company (LIT) with total assets of 508 million
dollars and thirty-two offices throughout Nassau and Suffolk
counties. 121 The acquisition would require the approval not only of
the Board under section 3(a)(3) of the Act, 122 but also of the New
York State Banking Board under section 142 of Article III-A of the
New York Banking Law, 123 the New York Bank Holding Com-
pany Act. The New York provisions well reflect the
schizophrenia 124 of competitive standards in banking. Section 142
requires the State Banking Board to take into consideration in
determining whether or not to approve an application under the
section:
(i) the declaration of policy contained in section ten of the
chapter, (ii) whether the effect of such action shall be either
to result in the formation of a bank holding company or to
expand the size or extent of the resulting or acquiring bank
holding company beyond limits consistent with adequate
or sound banking and the preservation thereof, or result in
a concentration of assets beyond limits consistent with
effective competition, (iii) whether such formation, merger,
consolidation or acquisition may result in such a lessening
of competition as to be injurious to the public or tend
toward monopoly, and (iv) primarily, the public interest
and the needs and convenience thereof.
125
However, the "policy" stated in section 10 was enacted in 1935
and reflects the anticompetitive spirit of the period: section 10 di-
rects the Banking Department to regulate banking organizations so
as "to eliminate unsound and destructive competition among such
banking organizations and thus to maintain public confidence in
such business and protect the public interest and the interests of
consumer level as in the case of the New York operations of the Puerto Rican banks,
do play a role in the composition of BBNY's accounts. In fact, over 43% of its New
York State commercial and industrial accounts are U.S. affiliates of traditional
customers of BBIL elsewhere in the world.
121 Recommendation of the Superintendent of Banking to the Banking Board with
respect to the Application of Barclays Bank Limited and Barclays Bank International Limited
pursuant to Section 142 of the Banking Law of the State of New York 6 [hereinafter cited as
Recommendation].
122 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(3) (1970).
123 N.Y.Banking Law § 142 (McKinney 1971).
124 See text at note 103 supra.
125 N.Y. Banking Law § 142(l) (McKinney 1971).
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depositors, creditors, shareholders and stockholders. ' 126 Thus New
York's Bank Holding Company Act simultaneously directs the
Banking Board to ensure that the proposed action will neither cause
"unsound competition" nor result in a "lessening of competition so
as to be injurious to the interest of the public." Presumably, under
these standards, the ideal acquisition would be the competitively
neutral one.
Barclays argued to the Board, and presumably also to the New
York Banking Board, that its proposed acquisition of LIT could
eliminate neither existing competition (there being none between
LIT's retail business and Barclays' internationally oriented New
York outlets) nor potential competition. In short, Barclays presented
itself as the foreign underdog, able to stir things up around the New
York City and Long Island banking markets only by acquisition of a
bank with a branch network like that of LIT. 127 Certainly the
proposition represented a conglomerate merger in the sense that LIT
and BBNY are presently not only in separate geographic markets,
but are also in what could be found to be separate lines of
commerce-international banking and Long Island retail consumer
banking. Analyzed in this way, the proposal would seem to fit the
apparent reluirements of section 142 of the New York Bank Hold-
ing Act of a competitively neutral acquisition. If the owners of LIT
wish to cash in on suburban growth by selling out, better Barclays
as the buyer than any of the domestic giants with the resources to
pay forty-seven dollars a share (the offer to LIT contained a consid-
erable premium). This would seem to have been the Board's conclu-
sion with respect to Lloyds' acquisition of First Western in
California. 128
The Superintendent of Banks of New York, however, took a
novel tack, one for which the statutory authority in the New York
Bank Holding Company Act is not exactly visible: the application
was to be judged not on antitrust grounds, 129 but from the point of
126 N.Y. Banking Law § 10 (McKinney 1971).
127 One may note that this is exactly the argument that the Board bought for the
Lloyds-First Western acquisition: "Moreover, it appears that consummation of the proposal
may increase competition, as application with Lloyds Bank should make Bank a stronger and
more vigorous competitor of other California banks in local banking markets throughout the
State." Statement of the Board, supra note 110, at 3.
128 See text at notes 110-12 supra.
129 This statement is somewhat unfair to the Superintendent: the Recommendation,
supra note 121, at 16ff., does indeed discuss "Competitive Aspects," but from a perspective
that is hardly traditional antitrust analysis. The analysis admits that Barclays' entry into the
Long Island retail market by the acquisition of the Long Island Trust Company "would not
eliminate any significant existing competition between LIT and the Barclays group nor would
it materially increase the concentration of bank deposits or offices in any relevant market in
this State." Id. at 16. Moreover, if Barclays for the purpose of the analysis is regarded as a
"$289 million [the total of Barclays' assets in New York] bank, ... the potential competition
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view of "reciprocity." After stressing the importance of that concept
to New York State,130 the Superintendent proceeded to redefine the
term. Some people think, the Superintendent noted, that reciprocity
means that you treat a foreign bank the way its home country treats
your banks. "I do not accept this definition of reciprocity.'
31
Rather, "reciprocity" means "for purposes of expansion by merger or
acquisition, foreign banks in New York should be treated in a
'non-discriminatory' manner, that is, the same as other banks head-
quartered in New York."' 32 Since a New York bank of Barclays'
size (that is, its total size, not just its New York size) would not,
because of the impact on competition, be permitted to acquire LIT,
even though the acquisition by Barclays would admittedly not have
the same impact, "to approve the application would be manifestly
unfair to the major New York banking organizations of comparable
size to Barclays."'
33
This approach might be characterized as the "dog in the man-
ger" theory of competition. It has, at least, the virtue of frankness.
Certainly it can be argued that if the Superintendent's definition of
"reciprocity" would not be yours or mine, he has nicely put the case
that Barclays has received the "national treatment" required under
the United States-Great Britain treaty.
134
The real question is what the decision portends for the future of
foreign bank entry into the United States: the foreign lawyer looking
at the decision would reason that all the foregoing exposition of the
eliminated by this application would not be significant." Id. at 18. The Recommendation even
gives credence to Barclays' persuasive presentation (one assumes that the New York and the
federal applications made relatively the same arguments) that "there is an important differ-
ence between the ability of the large New York City banks to compete for retail banking
business on Long Island and the ability of Barclays, headquartered in London, to compete in
that same market." Id. Nevertheless, in judging the effect of the proposition on potential
competition, the Recommendation stated that "just as banking authorities in the United
Kingdom would most likely regard the London operations of our biggest banks as strongly
backed by the resources of the U.S. parent, we must take the same view of the Barclays
group," id. at 19 (a unique measurement of indirect impact: how a foreign authority would
view United States bank entry). On this theory "Barclays' New York 'presence' considering
the overall resources of the Barclays group [is] at least comparable to the New York 'presence'
of several of our major New York holding companies." Id. Potential competition, therefore,
would be significantly lessened. Id. at 20. The "therefore" is a bit hard to follow: the simple
statement, id. at 17, that "the Barclays group, with $24 billion in assets, clearly has the
financial capability to enter the Nassau-Suffolk area through a smaller acquisition," would
seem to be the pivot of the analysis. Barclays' capacity for competitive effect is judged on its
world-wide size. The real gravamen of the decision would seem to be simply that Barclays is
not to be permitted to do what would be forbidden to its global competitors, the New York
City multinational banks. "To do otherwise, would result in an unfair 'double standard'
favoring foreign banks." Id. at 13.
130 Id. at 11.
131 Id. at 12.
132 Id. at 13.
133 Id. at 22.
134 See note 22 supra.
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bases of United States regulation of banking was useless. What he
really needs to know to advise his client, in a dual banking system
in which state law seems to rule supreme, is the degree to which the
state supervisory authority, whatever its previous proclamations
about the values of trade and exchange in an interdependent world,
is determined to protect its domestic constituents from competition.
What we, as United States policy makers, must concern ourselves
with is the harm to be done to national economic policy by the
present system of carte blanche to the state authorities to determine
the fate of foreign bank entry. The Superintendent, for the purpose
of assessing the impact of the acquisition, chose to treat Barclays as
if it were a bank, if not of its world size, at least of some undefined
"presence," headquartered in New York. But from the point of view
of national policy toward banking structure, Barclays is not a New
York bank and protection of the dual banking system does not
demand that it shall be so treated. Foreign banks doing business in
the United States are just that-unique beasts-and, after a brief
description of the policy of the bank holding company legislation,
we shall turn to the question of how the federal regulatory system
has dealt, and in the future might deal, uniquely, with them.
F. Separation of "Banking" and Commerce
The prominence of the federal bank holding company legisla-
tion in the regulation of banking in the United States is evident from
the number of references to the Bank Holding Company Act already
made in this article. Discussion of the policy of the Act, however,
has been saved for last because, unlike the other concepts of bank-
ing regulation previously discussed, the notion that joint ownership
of the suppliers and the users of credit is an evil which must be
forbidden per se is a relatively recent one, and one which Congress
has only fully articulated in the 1970 Amendments. The 1930's
banking legislation evinced concern over the nature of ownership of
member banks by requiring those owning or acquiring control over
a member bank to obtain a voting permit from the Board 135 and
concern with the nature of other holdings of those controlling
member banks by permitting the regulatory authorities to require
reports on such affiliates. 136 Although the Board repeatedly sug-
gested to Congress more thorough control over bank ownership and
the growing phenomenon of bank holding company ownership of
banks, 137 it was only in 1959, with the original enactment of the
13S Pub. L. No. 89-485, 80 Stat. 243 (1966).
136 12 U.S.C. §§ 161, 334 (1970).
137 See, e.g., 41 Fed. Res. Bull. 260 (1955).
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Bank Holding Company Act, that concern with joint ownership of
banking resources and users of credit was translated into a partial
federal policy 1 38 of separation of banking and commerce.
The focus of the 1959 legislation was twofold, and the
dichotomy remains in the present structure of the Act. One concern
was to submit the possibilities for concentration in banking by the
addition of formerly independent banks to a holding company sys-
tem to scrutiny by the Board: thus section 3 of the Act required, and
still requires, the permission of the Board before a bank holding
company may become a bank holding company or acquire more
than five percent of the voting shares of an additional bank or
banks.1 39 With the extension of the Act in 1970 to the one-bank
situation, this prior permission requirement of section 3 applies to
the acquisition by any group meeting the definition of "company" of
twenty-five percent or more of the voting shares of an entity meeting
the definition of "bank," and is the source of the extension of the Act
to foreign bank entry by means of incorporation of a separate
United States subsidiary bank.
Section 4 of the Act was, and still is, directed at the separation
of "banking" from commerce by its prohibition upon the ownership
by a bank holding company of more than five percent of the voting
shares of any nonbank unless the company in question can be
qualified under a specific exception to the general prohibition of
section 4. Section 4 also prohibits bank holding companies from
doing directly what they could not do indirectly through stockhold-
ings. The original Act thus required bank holding companies cov-
ered by it to divest their nonqualifying business, and as we have
seen, the finance company, Bancredit, was deemed nonqualifying
under the Act as it was then interpreted because of its multistate
locations. 140 As the Act was amended in 1970, it is section 4(c)(8) of
the Act that sets the general standard for what nonbanking business
and holdings are permissible to any holding company covered by the
Act.1 41 However, in the 1970 Amendments, Congress provided in
136 The political difficulties of enactment of the policy resulted in its application in 1959
to the situation of multibank ownership. An industrial system with a single bank affiliate was
not covered until the 1970 Amendments, and even so, a grandfather clause protects ownership
of single banks under a certain size. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(d) (1970) (§ 4(d) of the Act as amended).
The clause includes a good statement of the separation policy: the banks whose systems may
be exempted are those that are
so small in relation to the holding company's total interests and so small in relation
to the banking market to be served as to minimize the likelihood that the bank's
powers to grant or deny credit may be influenced by a desire to further the holding
company's other interests.
139 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1970).
140 See text at notes 72-74 supra.
141 Section 4(c)(8) authorizes the Board to exempt from the prohibition
shares of any company the activities of which the Board after due notice and
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section 4(c)(9) for a special standard for judging the nonbanking
business of foreign bank holding companies and it is under this
provision of section 4 that the present federal jurisprudence on the
application of the separation policy to foreign holders of stock of
United States banks has been developed. However, before discus-
sing the history of section 4(c)(9) and developments under it, we
shall first take a brief look at the congressional efforts at direct
regulation of foreign bank entry and the application of the general
tenets of banking regulation to foreign entry proposed by those
efforts.
III. THE 1966 AND SUBSEQUENT INITIATIVES
FOR DIRECT REGULATION
The first response to Professor Zwick's study for the Joint
Economic Committee was the introduction on August 25, 1966, in
the Eighty-ninth- Congress of S. 3765 by Senator Javits. 142 The bill
was intended to provide for exclusive federal control over foreign
banking corporations operating within the United States. Thus, it
would have ended the dual banking system, not only with respect to
state licensing of direct entry, but also for any state bank in which a
foreign banking corporation owned or purchased a sufficient interest
to have actual control.143 The bill's solution to the problem of
geographical limitations on branching was most interesting: the
federally licensed branches within one state were to be at locations
permissible to a national bank, but branches could be authorized in
states other than the state of initial entry if the laws of the additional
opportunity for hearing has determined (by order or regulation) to be so closely
related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident
thereto.
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1970). The Board in Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (1973), has set
out a list of activities which, prima fade, it considers to be a "proper incident" under
§ 4(c)(8). The general effort seems to be to draw a line between "financial" and "commercial"
business, a line which as we shall see in connection with Lloyds' application to retain an
export management company is not so simple to draw. See note 310 infra.
141 S. 3765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The bill was apparently hastily drafted and,
inadvertently, would have raised a number of problems through poor draftsmanship. For
example, the interplay between the definitions of "foreign banking corporation" and "control-
led subsidiary" would have resulted in having the special controls set up by the bill apply to
any banking subsidiary of a United .States holding company controlling a foreign bank.
143 Since the bill did not provide for special federal incorporation of the entities, it would
have created an anomalous situation in which a foreign banking corporation desiring to do
business in the United States through a separate corporation rather than a direct branch or
agency would have to obtain either a national or state bank charter but then be subject to
exclusive federal regulation under the Act. Thus, the bill, while on the one hand solving the
problem for foreign banks of the limitations on entry by direct branching, would have
discriminated against foreign banks by closing to them the option (available at that time) of
avoiding federal regulation by incorporating a subsidiary bank under state law without opting
for FDIC insurance or Federal Reserve membership.
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states did not prohibit the "transaction of business by a foreign
banking corporation." The bill, however, was never reported out of
committee.
The following session of Congress saw two new bills 144 to
regulate foreign bank entry introduced into the House, both of
which also died in committee. In the meantime, Senator Javits'
office apparently had been rethinking the issue, for on May 10,
1967, the Senator introduced S. 1741.145 This new legislation, like
its predecessor S. 3765, was intended to provide federal control over
foreign bank entry, but this time substantial provision was made for
state regulation. Instead of making the federal licensing mandatory,
as S. 3765 would have done, S. 1741 would have permitted a
foreign banking corporation to obtain approval for its agency,
branch or controlled subsidiary from the state banking authority
concerned, provided that the state authority submitted information
with respect to the application to the Secretary of the Treasury, who
could then determine that the new facility would not be in the
"national public interest" as defined in the bill1 46 and thereafter
deny approval of the application. The states would also have been
given a veto power over federal licensing of foreign bank entry since
the Secretary was forbidden to approve a federal license for an
agency, branch or controlled subsidiary "if under the laws of [the]
State [where the operation is to be located] an agency, branch or
144 H.R. 5411, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), introduced by Rep. Fino on Feb. 15, 1967,
would have responded to the Canadian limitations on alien interests in Canadian banking by
amending the Bank Holding Company Act and the Federal Bank Merger Act to prohibit the
regulatory authority concerned from approving acquisitions, mergers or consolidations which
would result in a holding company or bank, more than 25% of which was owned "by persons
other than residents or citizens of the United States," from acquiring or combining with
another bank if the country of origin of the shareholders or of the foreign company would not
permit a similar transaction by a United States person, bank or holding company. Since at the
time no reporting of nationality of shareholders was required under any banking or SEC
regulations, it is hard to see how management of the banks or companies concerned was
supposed to comply with this theoretically retaliatory legislation. H.R. 6856, 90th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1967), introduced by Rep. Patman on March 8, 1967, was a much more broadly based
bill intended to require federal licensing of foreign bank branches, agencies and controlled
subsidiaries. However, unlike the Javits bill discussed in the text, the Patman bill made no
attempt to make federal law exclusive. Moreover, the latter would have limited a foreign
banking corporation either (depending upon how one reads the unclear drafting) to one place
of business or subsidiary in the United States or else to one per state.
145 S. 1741, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
146 S. 1741, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b) (1967). The Javits bill definition is of interest in
view of the Board's present interpretation of the "public interest" in the application of section
4(c)(9) of the Act. Section 2(b) defined the "national public interest" as being
to encourage the legitimate activities of foreign banks in the United States, to
encourage other nations to grant reciprocal privileges to banks chartered in the
United States which operate or wish to operate abroad, and to promote the foreign
commerce of the United States.
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subsidiary of such corporation would not be permitted to carry on
the business of banking. 
' 147
S. 1741 would have made a desirable innovation in requiring
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to submit to Congress a
proposal for amendment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act so as
to include branches of foreign banking corporations within its
coverage. The bill, however, like its predecessor and its House
counterparts, never got out of committee.
These initial attempts at direct federal regulation of foreign
bank entry, while dealing with the questions of multiple locations
and dual regulation, made no attempt to regulate non-bank holdings
of foreigners entering the banking business in the United States.
Since at the time the separation policy was only applied to holding
systems owning two or more banks, the omission is not surprising.
However, Representative Patman, the author of the first and most
stringent of the bills that ultimately resulted in the 1970 Amend-
ments, has more than made up for the omission by introducing H.R.
11,440 in November 1973. 14s The bill, which according to its title is
"[t]o provide for Federal control over foreign banks and other
foreign persons establishing, acquiring, operating, or controlling
banking subsidiaries in the United States . . . ," is so stringent that,
if enacted in its present form, it would amount to a virtual prohibi-
tion on foreign interests in United States banks. H.R. 11,440 would
solve the problem of the lack of federal regulation over direct entry
by forbidding any foreign person to directly or indirectly engage in
"banking" (a term undefined by the bill) in the United States except
pursuant to the proposed legislation and then making no provision
for the licensing of direct operations, other than representative
offices (section 25). Section 22 would give presently existing opera-
tions two years in which to obtain the licenses required by the bill or
else to close up. Foreign persons qualifying under other stringent
requirements of the bill 149 would have (apart from representative
offices) two options: either a federal charter for a company with
powers copied from the Edge Act to do an international banking
business or a state banking charter. Both the federal and state
charters would require the consent of the Secretary of the Treasury,
operating under guidelines limiting the total amount of foreign
147 Id.
148 H.R. 11,440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (introduced on Nov. 13, 1973).
149 Section 4(b) would not permit licensing if the foreign person owns, or any of its
affiliates own, more than 5% of any company engaged in any activity other than activity
incidental to its international or foreign business. Section 4(b) of the bill contains other
restrictions on licensing, but § 4(b)(3) is drafted in such a manner that it is not even possible to
make out the intent of the provision. It may be aimed at preventing multistate operation.
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banking in the country (a quota system, in effect), and would be
valid only for five years. Since one of the conditions for licensing in
section 4 is that no United States person own more than five percent
of a banking organization licensed under the bill, and section 18
forbids purchase of shares by a United States person in any entity
licensed under the bill, sale of the shares in the event of denial of
renewal of the charter could only be made to another foreign group
capable of obtaining a license. This sword of Damocles is hardly
likely to encourage foreign entry. The federally incorporated entities
would be subject to all the restrictions on affiliation with other
business in the United States (restrictions far more severe than are
imposed on domestic banks and their Edge subsidiaries by the Bank
Holding Company Act), could only take deposits "as may be inci-
dental to or for the purpose of carrying out international banking
transactions, "150 and would be required to carry on such restricted
deposits the same amount of reserves as domestic banks that are
members of the Federal Reserve System (but the option of System
membership for whatever advantages such membership may confer
would be denied). The only reason for application for such a federal
charter would be that the bill would limit a foreign person to "one.
subsidiary which has been granted a State charter under this Act by
more than one State" '151 while permitting up to five subsidiaries with
federal charters. Presumably these federal international banking
subsidiaries are intended as a substitute for the New York, Illinois,
California and other port area branches. which may no longer be
retained or established. Since the federally chartered subsidiaries
would be limited in their deposit taking to internationally connected
deposits, the possibility of multistate location of such subsidiaries is
an interesting response to the problem of multistate branching and
the Edge option available to domestic banks, just as the option of
state chartering subject to federal permission is a response to the
problem of the dual banking system. '5 2 However, the bill makes no
150 H.R 11,440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(a)(2)(H) (1973).
Is' H.R. 11,440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 13(a)(1) (1973).
152 The accommodation to the dual banking system, however, is one which imposes
extraordinary hurdles on foreign entry. The effect of the bill is to permit full service banking
only through the obtaining of a state charter which can be denied for any reason; there is no
room under the bill for organization of a national bank and, indeed, the effect of the bill
would be to prohibit over 5% of a national bank to be owned by foreigners. However, the
states' power to incorporate banks would be severely limited by the requirement of federal
approval under §§ 4 and 5 of the bill for any "bank" with more than 5% foreign ownership.
The bill even contains a provision, § 5, that any bank presently controlled by "any foreign
person or group of foreign persons" is subject to the licensing provisions (and thus possible
forfeiture of the stock interest) and a bank more than 5% of which is owned by foreigners may
be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to be subject to the act and to the licensing
requirements.
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attempt to face up to the problems which have been raised by the
application of the Bank Holding Company Act to foreign entry;
instead it would make the conditions for federal approval of a state
charter so stringent with respect to the holding of other interests by
the foreign entrants as to make the present Bank Holding Company
Act regulation seem positively lavish. The Patman bill in effect
attempts to solve the issues of foreign bank entry by simple-and
simple-minded-prohibition.
IV. BACKHANDED REGULATION UNDER THE 1970 BANK
HOLDING COMPANY ACT AMENDMENTS
A. Historical Perspectives and Section 4(c)(9) of the Act
With the 1966 and 1967 direct regulation tentatives dying in
committee, the regulatory picture for foreign banks in the United
States remained stable until the introduction of one-bank holding
company legislation, H.R. 6778,153 by Representative Patman on
February 17, 1969. Patman's bill was designed both to include
one-bank holding companies within the ambit of the Bank Holding
Company Act' 5 4 and to revise the Act to make it even more restric-
tive than it had been in relation to multiple bank holding com-
panies. Since, prior to 1970, foreign banks were regulated under the
Act only if they established or gained control (as defined in the Act)
of two or more separately incorporated "banks," the Patman bill (as
well as the competing one-bank holding company bills that
promptly followed it), by bringing companies owning only one
"bank" under the Act, would necessarily have imposed federal regu-
lation upon those foreign banks entering by means of one indirect
subsidiary.
The increased potential for federal control over foreign banking
entities provided by H.R. 6778 and its competitors carried with it
the seeds of controversy over the proper scope of such regulation.
Apart from limited exceptions, 1 5 5 the Act as originally promulgated
in 1956 contained neither recognition of the problems of transna-
tional banking nor any recognition of the extent to which the Act, if
Is3 H.R. 6778, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
154 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1970). The initial impetus to the legislative intervention that
resulted in the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 was the sudden conversion
of significant numbers of major banks into the holding company form of corporate structure
and the moves by these companies to acquire nonbank subsidiaries. In 1965, there were 550
one-bank holding companies, controlling mainly small local banks, with only 4V2% of all
commercial bank deposits in the United States; by 1969 there were 890 one-bank holding
companies, with 43% of all bank deposits in the country. See Blaine, Registered Bank
Holding Companies and the One-Bank Holding Company, 26 Bus. Law. 9,. 10 (1970).
155 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(9) (1970).
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made applicable to foreign bank holding companies, would extend
United States concepts of banking structure and regulation to the
foreign activities of foreign companies. In 1956, the Act's lack of
recognition of the problem of foreign bank entry was hardly crucial:
the multinational banks that had entered the United States markets
by the subsidiary route had chosen to do so only in New York,
California and Illinois.156 Apparently, only the international trade
and money market centers were of interest as markets to potential
foreign banking entrants, so the Act's virtual prohibition of future
multistate banking did not then appear significant. Those few
foreign banks covered by the pre-1970 two-bank test'5 7 did not have
nonbank subsidiaries which would not fall within an exception to
the apparent application of section 4 to foreign subsidiaries. 158 The
Canadian banks that had both commercial bank subsidiaries and
trust companies to do corporate finance work registered under the
Act without difficulty; the Societe Generale, a Belgian bank, which
had both a subsidiary incorporated under the New York law apply-
ing to commercial banks and an investment company subsidiary
incorporated under Article XII of the New York Banking Law 15 9
convinced the Board that the investment company was not a "state
bank, savings bank or trust company"'160 and consequently was not
registered under the Act.
These registrations and applications for rulings on the status of
subsidiaries by the foreign banks must have alerted the Board,
however, to the problems inherent in the extraterritorial application
of the Act, for the Board's1966 bill to amend the Act by extending
it to one-bank holding companies, S. 2353, contained an interesting
new provision:
1-6 The Zwick study-Joint Economic Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess., Foreign Banking
in the United States 3 (Economic Policies and Practices, Paper No. 9) (Comm. Print
1966)-indicates that foreign bank subsidiaries existed only in those three locations in 1966.
1S7 As of Dec. 31, 1965, only three foreign companies were registered under the Act:
Bank of Montreal, Canada; Imperial Bank of Commerce; and The Bank of Tokyo, Ltd.
158 One foreign bank had a representative testify in the Senate Hearings on the various
proposed 1966 schemes of amendment to the 1956 Act. Louis Van Damme, Chairman of the
Board of Belgian-American Bank and Trust Company, a subsidiary of the Socit6 G6n6rale
de Banques, a Belgian commercial bank, indicated that inclusion of the Soci& G6n6rale
under the amendments as a bank holding company would not cause the Soci~t6 difficulty with
§ 4 because "Belgian law ... contains a section prohibiting banks from investing not only in
stocks but also in bonds of non-banking organizations." Hearings on S. 2353, S. 2418, and
H.R. 7371 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. I, at 256 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Hearings]. (The Soci6t6 G6n~rale had
other difficulties with inclusion, notably the then § 6 of the Act on financial relationships
among bank holding companies and their subsidiaries, a section which was repealed by the
1966 Amendments.)
139 N.Y. Banking Law art. XII (McKinney 1971).
160 1966 Hearings, supra note 158, at 261.
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The application of this Act and of section 23A of the
Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. § 371), as amended, shall
not be affected by the fact that a transaction takes place
wholly or partly outside the United States or that a com-
pany is organized or operated outside the United States:
Provided, however, that the prohibitions of section 4 of
this Act shall not apply to shares of any company or-
ganized under the laws of a foreign country that does not
do any business within the United States, if such shares are
held or acquired by a bank holding company that is prin-
cipally engaged in the banking business outside the United
States.161
Curiously, Governor Martin of the Federal Reserve Board did
not comment upon this provision in his statement before the Senate
subcommittee then holding hearings on S. 2353. Presumably, the
new section was deemed to constitute a fair trade-off. The domestic
companies that would now be covered as one-bank holding com-
panies could not escape through foreign incorporation; but the
treatment of fully "foreign" nonbank holdings of genuine foreign
banks was to be left to foreign law. The limitation in the provision,
however, should be of special note; in order not to have section 4 of
the Act apply to foreign holdings, the foreign holding company itself
must be "principally engaged in the banking business outside of the
United States." It is impossible to tell, and the legislative history
gives no clue, whether this limitation was a deliberate policy choice
on the part of the draftsmen of S. 2353 or simply a lack of recogni-
tion that any genuinely foreign nonbanking corporation (that is, a
corporation beneficially owned by non-United States persons) might
own or acquire a sufficient interest in a United States bank and be
required by the terms of the Act to divest its impermissible foreign
holdings. The extension of the United States notion of the necessary
separation between banking and industry162 to foreigners' foreign
holdings on the basis of a single purchase of a minority interest in a
United States bank is a rather extreme assertion of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. On the other hand, S. 2353 also contained a repealer of
the provisions of the Banking Act of 1933 requiring holding com-
pany affiliates of member banks to acquire voting permits from the
Board to vote stock. 163 This would indicate that perhaps the asser-
161 S. 2353, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(h) (Aug. 3, 1965), introduced by Sen. Robertson at
the request of the Board of Governors. This provision is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(h) (1970)
with minor changes.
162 See text at notes 135-39 supra.
163 See text at note 135 supra.
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tion of another form of control over foreign bank holding companies
was deliberate.1 64 Under such a policy, foreign banks would be
exempted from the limitations on their foreign holdings on the
theory that almost every jurisdiction scrutinizes to a certain extent
the asset holdings of its banks, and that United States regulation
could rely on and defer to the foreign regulation in this regard.
165
In any event, whatever the reasons behind the choices appar-
ently made by the draftsman of the new section 2(h), the provision
was carried over into the final 1966 enactment without explanation.
No foreign bank commented on it in the Senate hearings, no con-
gressman mentioned it in debate, and the Senate report on the bill
offered no rationale. No matter, for the Senate Committee had
removed S. 2353's real stinger-the provision for extension of
the -Act's coverage to one-bank holding companies. Thus, the
peculiarities of section 2(h) could await notice until the next time
that issue came before the House, with the introduction by Rep-
resentative Patman of H.R. 6778 before the Ninety-first Congress.
In the lengthy, cliff-hanging, and often bitter progress of the
one-bank company legislation, a number of competing definitions of
"bank holding company" appeared in the series of House and Senate
bills introduced to extend the Act to the one-bank situation. How-
ever, all of these definitions would have subjected a foreign group
holding or acquiring control of a commercial bank doing business in
the United States, as in some bills,166 or of a United States chartered
164 The subjection of "nonbank" foreign subsidiaries to the tests of § 4 did not include a
foreign company's foreign bank holdings even though such a foreign bank was not a "bank"
for the purposes of § 3 of the Act. In order to insure that United States bank holding
companies could invest abroad in bank stock without prior approval of the Board of Gover-
nors, the Act both in its original form and after the 1966 Amendments exempted from § 4
shares of a company "organized under the laws of a foreign country and which is or is to be
engaged principally in the banking business outside the United States." Pub. L. No. 89-485,
§ 8(c)(9), 80 Stat. 239 (1966). The parallelism of this language and that of S. 2353's proposed
§ 2(h) proviso make one suspect that the draftsman of S. 2353 failed to distinguish between
foreign bank holding companies and foreign bank subsidiaries.
165 Section 2(h) contains other drafting conundrums: Just what exactly is meant by a
company "that does not do any business within the United States"? Is a foreign company
doing business in the United States if it has such contacts that it would be subject to United
States process (under United States constitutional notions of the jurisdictional requisites for
due-process)? To taxation? To state qualification requirements? Or does "business" mean an
office, an establishment as that term is usually defined in tax treaties? Is a foreign company
doing business in the United States through a separately incorporated subsidiary doing
business so as to make it a company which must be qualified under § 4? As will be seen, once
the Act was broadened to take in one-bank holding companies, the Board of Governors had to
struggle with all the problems of inclusion and exclusion-and the policy that should be
applied-that were raised by § 2(h).
166 Some of the bills, by leaving intact the definition of "bank" in the Act as amended in
1966, would have ended up covering certain foreign banks with a United States branch,
Between its enactment in 1956 and the enactment of the 1966 Amendments, the Bank
Holding Company Act defined "bank" as "any national banking association or any State
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commercial bank, as in others, to regulation under the Act without
distinction from a domestic bank holding company, except to the
extent already provided for in section 2(h) of the Act. 167 The impli-
cations of the proposed legislation for foreigners holding interests in
banks doing business in the United States would seem not to have
been immediately apparent to the foreign groups: the House
hearings 168 on H.R. 6778, held in April 1969, do not contain a
single statement by a representative of a foreign group. While H.R.
6778 as it emerged in July 1969 from the House Banking and
Currency Committee was a different bill than had gone to the
Committee, 169 no provision for the effect on foreign interests of the
proposed amendments had been made.
170
bank, savings bank, or trust company," ch. 240, § 2(c), 70 Stat. 133 (1956), so that a foreign
bank regardless of its corporate structure could not become a "bank" under the Act by
establishing a branch in the United States. The definition also specifically excluded "any
organization that does not do business within the United States" so as not to cover American
Express International Banking Corporation, which is incorporated as a Connecticut bank.
However, the 1966 Amendments changed the definition to "any institutioh that accepts
deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand," Pub. L. No. 89-485,
§ 3, 80 Stat. 236 (1966), without any recognition that the new definition would include any
commercial bank in the world that could not escape under the American Express provision.
Whatever might be the full extent of the meaning of "that does not do business within the
United States," a direct branch could not be ignored and Barclays Bank Limited, owning a
California bank subsidiary and Barclays D.C.O., its foreign banking subsidiary, with
branches in New York, suddenly found itself a two "bank" holding conipany subject to the
federal Act. The result was the jurisdictionally unedifying spectacle of the Board passing on
the acquisition abroad by Barclays of shares of the Bank of London and South America
Limited, another English bank, because that bank also was a "bank" under the Act because
of its New York branch. See In re the application of Barclays Bank Limited, London,
England, for approval of the acquisition of 1,336,633 voting shares of the Bank of London
and South America Limited, 56 Fed. Res. Bull. 734 (1970). Fortunately for groups holding
interests in foreign banks with United States branches, the definition of "bank" in H.R. 6778
as it emerged from the Senate Banking and Currency Committee markup was that of the
present Act, i.e., a definition not only in terms of function, but also in terms of place of
incorporation.
167 See text at notes 160-66 supra.
168 Hearings on H.R. 6778 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
169 See H.R. Rep. No. 387, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
170 The Committee of Foreign-Owned Banks, in its comments to the Board on proposed
administrative regulations implementing the special section on foreign bank holding com-
panies that ultimately was adopted as part of the 1970 Amendments (see text at notes 216-26
infra), claims that following informal consultations with the staff of the Federal Reserve
Board, it proposed a modification to the House bill "designed to avoid undue extraterritorial
regulation" which was communicated to the staff of the House committee. See Committee of
Foreign-Owned Banks, Comments on the Proposed Regulations under Section 4(c)(9) of the
Bank Holding Company Act (Aug. 5, 1971) (paper in the files of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System). According to the Committee of Foreign-Owned Banks, "[tihe
House Committee gave broad exemptive authority to the Board." Statement of the Committee
of Foreign-Owned Banks [hereinafter cited as FOB Statement], reprinted in Hearings on S.
1052, S. 1211, S. 1664, S. 3823 and H.R. 6778 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1323-25 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. How-
ever, I have been unable to find such a provision in H.R. 6778 as it emerged from the House
Committee.
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Apparently, however, by that time there was substantial aware-
ness on the part of both the foreign banks and the Federal Reserve
Board of the unalleviated scope of the proposed amendments, and
when the bill came to the House floor on November 5, 1969, two
separate floor amendments were offered which in part dealt with the
situation. As soon as the debate opened, Representative Bevill of-
fered an amendment containing a new exception to section 4 of the
Act:
(12) shares held or activities conducted by any company
organized under the laws of a foreign country the greater
part of whose business is conducted outside the United
States, if the Board by regulation or order determines that,
under the circumstances and subject to the conditions set
forth in the regulation or order, the exemption would not
be substantially at variance with the purposes of this Act
and would be in the public interest by directly or indirectly
facilitating the foreign commerce of the United States.
17 1
Representative Bevill did not discuss this portion of his
amendment, nor did the debate touch on it at all, but its origin was,
presumably, either the foreign banks or the Board, and, given the
grant of discretion to the Board, one suspects it was the latter. The
significant point about the provision was that the grant of discretion
to the Board is very large: the holding of any shares, or the conduct
of any activities, whether domestic or foreign, might be authorized
if the company holding the shares or conducting the activities is
chiefly foreign; the exemption would not be substantially at variance
with the purposes of the Act; and it could be seen-note the lan-
guage "directly or indirectly"-as facilitating foreign commerce. It is
important to note that the exemption is not by its terms restricted to
foreign holdings or activities of foreign companies. Under it, a
foreign company could hold a sufficient number of shares in a
domestic bank to be subject to regulation under the Act but be
exempted from the application of its section 4 to the company's
nonbank subsidiaries upon the finding that such an exemption
would be in accord with the purposes of the Act, and would facili-
tate United States foreign commerce. Thus, under the Bevill
amendment, the Board was afforded a flexibility, not previously
provided by the Act, to determine whether it would be in the public
interest not to extend United States concepts of the separation of
banking and commerce to foreign companies holding interesfs in
United States banks.
171 115 Cong. Rec. 33,125 (1969).
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The second floor amendment affecting the coverage of foreign
banking interests was offered by Representative Ashley. The
amendment had two parts, the second part giving the Board discre-
tion to exempt from the Act the peculiarities of corporate structure
under which American Express conducts its international
business. 172 The first portion of the amendment responded to the
problem for foreign banks inherent in the way the Act at that time
defined "bank" 173 and would have permitted the Board to exempt
from the Act ownership of a bank organized under the laws of a
foreign country "the greater part of whose business is conducted
outside the United States. ' 174 While the combination of the broad
definition of "bank" and discretion in the Board to continue or
discontinue coverage under the Act for foreign banks entering di-
rectly was not an ideal way to provide for federal regulation of
foreign bank entry, 175 it had the advantage of avoiding the anomaly
of the present Act that foreign bank entry is covered only if entry is
by means of acquisition of a United States chartered bank. How-
ever, when H.R. 6774 reached the Senate, the definition of "bank"
was changed to include only United States chartered banks and
although the Senate committee bill included the Ashley provision for
American Express, the first part of the amendment was omitted,
presumably as no longer necessary.
Both the Bevill and the Ashley amendments were accepted by
the House, and thus H.R. 6778 as it passed the House would have,
in each case subject to Federal Reserve Board determination that
the action would be in the public interest (defined as facilitating the
foreign commerce of the United States), permitted exemption from
section 4 for activities and subsidiaries of foreign holding companies
and exemption from section 3 for the holding of shares of foreign
banks with United States business.
Both of these provisions received the support of Chairman
Burns of the Board in his testimony before the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency which held hearings in May 1970 on the
House-passed bill and the other one-bank holding company bills.176
Burns in his testimony stated clearly what Representatives Bevill
and Ashley had not stated in offering their amendments--the prime
172 Id. at 33,141. However, American Express was not satisfied with this provision. It
preferred not to be covered by the Act at all and so submitted a statement to the Senate
hearings. See Senate Hearings, supra note 170, at 1281ff.
173 See note 166 supra.
174 115 Cong. Rec. 33,141 (1969).
175 It is not ideal because initial application of the Act would depend not on the fact of
United States entry, but on whether or not the foreign bank was controlled by a holding
company.
176 See Senate Hearings, supra note 170.
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issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the assertion by the United
States of control over foreign activities of foreign banks or other
groups on the basis of their participation in United States banking.
He first explained why, literally, the Act would apply, and then
added:
We do not believe Congress intended the Act to be
applied in such a way as to impose our ideas of banking
upon other countries. To do so might invite foreign retalia-
tion against our banks operating abroad, to the detriment
of the foreign commerce of the United States. The provi-
sions of the House-passed bill authorizing the Board to
grant exemptions in this area would be most useful in
dealing with these problems.
1 77
Burns thus made clear that, in the Board's view, "facilitating
the foreign commerce of the United States" meant not so much
whether or not the United States business of the foreign entity was
itself directly connected with international commerce, but whether
the regulation of the entity under the Act might invite retaliation
abroad so as to impede United Stated foreign trade and investment.
If Chairman Burns was not propounding a theory of jurisdictional
self-restraint, at least he was articulating a notion of the importance
of comity to multinational banking. We begin to see here the first
glimmerings of the idea that perhaps multinational banking requires
separate treatment, a realization that our particular domestic no-.
tions of the structure of banking regulation need not be gospel to be
spread throughout the world community. We shall see just how far
the Board ultimately was willing to carry this approach which, in
the form of the Bevill amendment, was accepted by the House and
then articulated by Chairman Burns.
The other strand of thought in regulation of foreign bank
entry-the fear of foreign competition-was also raised in these
hearings, albeit by a very brief reference. Senator Bennett ques-
tioned the representatives of the United States banks with extensive
foreign interests testifying before the Committee as to whether
foreign-owned banks operating in the United States were subject to
the holding company laws. Upon being assured that subsidiaries
were "subject to the same law and regulation as any other bank
which operates in New York State,"'178 Senator Bennett said: "I am
glad to get that straightened out. I want to be sure that foreign
corporations cannot unfairly compete in this respect with U.S.
corporations."'1
79
177 Id. at 145-46.
178 Id. at 797.
179 Id.
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By this time, the foreign companies with banking business in
the United States, or at least in New York, were following closely
the pending legislation and had organized themselves into a lobby.
The Committee of Foreign-Owned Banks, representing twenty-one
foreign-owned banks located in New York, engaged counsel and
submitted written "comments" (the Statement) on the bills and the
testimony at the hearings to the Senate committee. 1 8 0 The Statement
presented a number of concerns which ultimately were reflected in
the Board's regulation 81 issued under the Bevill amendment as
enacted in section 4(c)(9) of the Act as amended in 1970. The
Committee pointed out that coverage of one-bank holding com-
panies would bring several dozen foreign-controlled bank holding
companies under the law, unless exemption were provided. It
stressed the problems that would be caused if foreign holdings of
foreign companies could not be exempted, in particular the problem
of disclosure of information concerning the foreign holdings.182
While supporting the Bevill and Ashley amendments, the Commit-
tee of Foreign-Owned Banks noted that "there is virtually no legisla-
tive history in the House to explain the intent of this rather elabo-
rate language" and urged that the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee include in its report "its anticipation of how the author-
ity might be used .... ",183 By this the Committee meant that the
Board should be required to issue "regulations of general application
as soon as practicable after enactment of the law," and that the
regulations should provide for freedom from extraterritorial regula-
tions "in reliance on the power granted to the administering agency
to reassert such regulation as may be necessary if and when abuses
180 FOB Statement, supra note 170.
Is' The Board's regulation issued under authority of § 4(c)(9) is Regulation Y § 225.4(g),
12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g) (1973).
182 The Bank Holding Company Act in § 5 requires all holding companies covered by
the Act to register and to file such reports and to submit to such examinations as the Board
may require. The Board at present has elaborate forms requiring full financial disclosure for
both registration and annual reports (Forms F.R. Y-5, F.R. Y-6). In response to the special
disclosure problems of foreign bank holding companies, the Board has provided a separate
form for annual reporting by such companies (Form F.R. Y-7).
The Statement pointed out that stockholding by banks is a different affair in
foreign countries which
have not found it necessary to separate commercial and investment banking by law.
Competitive conditions in these countries require banks to take investment positions
with respect to non-banks in connection with underwriting. investment banking and
merchant banking activities. This country has too great an economic stake overseas
to say directly or indirectly to foreign banks that the price of doing a banking
business in the United States is to make over their banking business at home in the
image of the bank system in the United States.
FOB Statement, supra note 170, at 1323-24. The iron fist of retaliation was ever so clearly
being raised in the polite glove of the Statement's measured form.
183 Id. at 1324.
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resulting from overseas activities might develop. 18 4 Interestingly,
the Statement did not point out the possible broad scope of the
Bevill amendment and did not urge any special treatment of the
United States business of the Committee's member banks; pre-
sumably the Committee was aware of the fear which had been
expressed in the Senate Hearings by Senator Bennett" that foreign
banks might have competitive advantages through freedom from
domestic regulation and decided that the course of political wisdom
would be to leave that slippery topic alone.
The hearings were held in May. After intensive lobbying and
two Committee Prints, the Senate Banking and Currency Commit-
tee reported out its version of H.R. 6778 on August 10, 1970. The
lobbyists for institutions engaged in international banking had also
been busy. The Senate committee bill preserved the second part of
the Ashley amendment so as to permit the Board to exempt from
regulation under the Act a bank holding company owning or con-
trolling a bank operated in the United States principally for the
purpose of conducting or facilitating transactions in foreign
commerce. 186 Although as added to the House bill by Representa-
tive Ashley, the provision was intended as an exemption for Ameri-
can Express, the Senate Committee Report explained the purpose of
this exemption, which easily could be given a very narrow construc-
tion:
to insure that there be no attempt to regulate the activities
of a company located in a foreign country, doing business
in foreign countries, so long as the Board finds that this
exemption would not be substantially at variance with the
purposes of the Act and would be in the public interest. To
do otherwise might incur similar attempted foreign regula-
tions of American companies doing business in other
countries. 187
Presumably what the draftsman of the Senate Report meant to refer
to was the provision in the Senate committee bill186 paralleling the
Bevill House amendment providing for exemption from the prohibi-
tions of section 4 of the Act for activities and holdings of foreign
bank holding companies, which ultimately became the present sec-
tion 4(c)(9). However, unlike the Bevill amendment, the provision in
184 Id.
185 See text at notes 178-79 supra.
186 Section 101 of H.R. 6778, adding § 2(a)(5)(D) to the Act. 116 Cong. Rec. 31,816
(1970).
187 S. Rep. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5540 (1970).
188 Section 103(5) of H.R. 6778, 116 Cong. Rec. 31,817 (1970).
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the Senate committee version did not contain the definition of public
interest as facilitating the foreign commerce of the United States.
No changes in these provisions of the committee bill were made
on the Senate floor when the bill was debated on September 16,
1970, and the Senate passed the bill the same day. As H.R. 6778
emerged from conference, all of the Ashley amendment provisions
had disappeared, 189 but American Express retained the nondis-
cretionary exemption it had preferred and had gotten into the new
Senate definition of "bank."'190 Representative Bevill's exemption for
nonbank holdings and activities of foreign corporations was retained
in the Senate bill form-that is, without the definition of public
interest as facilitating the foreign commerce of the United States-as
Section 4(c)(9) of the Act.
It should be recalled at this point that, so far as foreign banks
are concerned, the new section 4(c)(9) is necessary only to exempt
shares held in companies incorporated in or doing business in the
United States, since under section 2(h) of the Act, untouched by the
1970 Amendments, foreign subsidiaries (of foreign banks) that do no
business in the United States are already home free. The notable
point about the language of section 4(c)(9), as was true of the Bevill
amendment, is that it can apply to either foreign or United States
nonbank subsidiaries of foreign bank holding companies, if the
Board sees fit, in accordance with the public interest, to exempt
them. But here the question is, what is the public interest? The
initial guide to this question, contained in Representative Bevill's
amendment-that is, the facilitation of the foreign commerce of the
United States-had been removed in the final incorporation of
the provision into the Act. Neither the Senate committee report nor
the conference report 91 offers any explanation of the deletion of the
phrase.
The draftsman of the conference report did not appear to
189 It is some indication of the staff's problems when legislation as complicated as this is
negotiated and renegotiated to passage that the Statement of the Managers on the Part of the
House, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5561 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Statement of the
Managers], refers to the Ashley exemption although it was no longer in the conference bill
agreed to by the House and Senate. 116 Cong. Rec. 41,483-89 (1970).
190 This was the exemption from the definition of "bank" of "any organization which
does not do business within the United States except as an incident to its activities outside the
United States," § 2(c) of the Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1970). The American Express language
conceivably could be used by an incorporated branch of a foreign bank to argue for an
exemption from the Act if the subsidiary bank could show that all of its business was linked
("an incident') to the parent's international or foreign business. Presumably, because it is as
easy to apply for authorization under § 3 as it is to get a ruling as to exemption under this
provision, no foreign bank, to my knowledge, has made this argument, but the argument
would be a useful one to circumvent § 3(d), prohibiting multiple-state "banks."
191 Conference Report on H.R. 6778, H.R. Rep. No. 1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970),
reprinted in 116 Cong. Rec. 41,481-83 (1970). Statement of the Managers, supra note 189.
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understand the effect of the foreign-related provisions, since the
report stated that the conference bill included exemption from regu-
lation under section 4 of the Act for (a) any company the greater
part of whose business is conducted outside of the United States,
and (b) any company doing no business in the United States, in both
situations as long as such business is an incident to foreign business,
if the Federal Reserve Board finds that the exemption would not be
substantially at variance with the purposes of the Act and is in the
public interest (in substance in both versions of H.R. 6778). 192 Both
192 116 Cong. Rec. 41,482 (1970). What the Conference Report seems to have done is to
elide the provisions of two separate sections of the conference bill. Besides the Bevill
provision, which became § 4(c)(9) of the Act, the Senate committee bill contained in § 103(6)
the provision which became the present § 4(c)(13) of the Act, exempting from § 4 of the Act
shares of, or activities conducted by, any company which does no business in the
United States except as an incident to its international or foreign business, if the
Board by regulation or order determines that, under the circumstances and subject
to the conditions set forth in the regulations or order, the exemption would not be
substantially at variance with the purposes of this Act and would be in the public
interest.
Id. at 11,688. Prior to the 1970 Amendments, § 4 had contained an absolute exemption from
§ 4 (in a paragraph then numbered 4(c)(9)) for "shares of any company which is or is to be
organized under the laws of a foreign country and which is or is to be engaged principally in
the banking business outside the United States." This exemption would have permitted
United States bank holding companies to expand their banking business abroad without
supervision by the Board; as a result the Board opposed it and Chairman Burns recom-
mended its removal or amendment. Senate Hearings, supra note 170, at 145. However, the
United States multinational banks--which until that time had acquired their overseas in-
terests pursuant to the authorization contained in the Edge Act and a 1966 amendment to § 25
of the Federal Reserve Act and subject to the capital investment limitations therein, 12
U.S.C. §§ 601, 618 (1970)-had converted to the newly fashionable one-bank holding com-
pany structure and were anxious to obtain as much freedom as possible for overseas invest-
ment by their holding companies. The Act provision quoted above would have permitted the
holding companies to acquire interests in foreign banks free of any restrictions and § 2(h) of
the Act would permit under the right set of circumstances such foreign banks to freely retain
their purely foreign holdings. The Bevill language would also help greatly to exempt holdings
of foreign affiliates. But with the increasingly global scope of the business of multinational
banks, to be forced to limit foreign investment to the confines of provisions never intended to
cover such investments was absurd and the thought of having foreign investments judged by
§ 4 domestic standards set out in the House bill horrendous: the banks pushed for as much
freedom for their holding companies to go abroad as possible. "In addition to these sugges-
tions, we would urge that foreign affiliates principally engaged in activities outside the United
States be exempted." Testimony of David Rockefeller, President of the Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., in Senate Hearings, supra note 170, at 789.
We think it essential that U.S. banks be allowed to compete abroad on equal terms
without foreign competitors. It is therefore necessary that section 4(c)(9) of the 1956
act [former § 4(c)(9) as quoted above] be amended to permit U.S. bank holding
companies to engage in any activities in foreign countries permitted by the laws of
those countries.
Testimony of A.W. Clausen, President of Bank of America, in id. at 785. The result was a
compromise: § 4(c)(13) covers investment in, and activities of, any company (not just foreign
banks) which, in language paralleling that of the Edge Act, is foreign, not by place of
incorporation, but in the sense that its United States business, if any, is only incidental. At the
same time, however, the exemption is subject to the Board's discretion. The conference bill
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the House1 93 and the Senate1 94 made extensive comments upon, and
additional explanations of, the conference report before accepting it.
At no place in the debate, however, was there any mention of the
provisions concerning foreign interests. Only by accident do we
have some indication as to why first the Senate and then the con-
ferees removed the only guide to a concept of "public interest" in the
discretionary exemption for foreign activities and foreign-owned
subsidiaries. In the House debate on the conference bill, Representa-
tive Widsall included in the record a letter from the General Counsel
of the Treasury commenting on the differences between the House
and Senate versions of H.R. 6778. The letter included the following
paragraph:
Also, with respect to the exemption which would be
granted for foreign banking under both bills, we believe it
to be highly desirable that there be omitted the restrictive
words "by directly or indirectly facilitating the foreign
commerce of the United States." These words, which ap-
pear . . . [in] the House bill, are not contained in the
Senate bill. These words are unnecessarily restrictive as
there can be other ways in which exemptions for foreign
banks can be in the public interest as, for example, avoid-
ing the possibility of retaliation against American branch
banks abroad. 19s
Counsel for the Treasury apparently was opining without having
looked at Dr. Burns' Senate hearing testimony, in which Burns had
made it clear that the purpose of the phrase was to insure that the
"public interest" would be interpreted as avoidance of interference
with United States foreign commerce by regulation provoking re-
taliation against American companies abroad. In any event, the
letter does suggest that the conferees utilized the Senate version
because the additional language in the House version was open to
the Treasury's interpretation. If the Board has any guide to congres-
sional intent in section 4(c)(9), it is that the Act shall be administered
so as to further, not impede, world commerce.
kept this provision of the Senate bill as well as the Senate version of the Bevill amendment.
The terms of § 4(c)(13) could equally well be applied to holdings of foreign bank holding
companies as well as to foreign holdings of domestic bank holding companies, but the Board
has respected origins and in Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(0 (1973), has interpreted
§ 4(c)(13) as applying only to domestic bank holding companies. As a result, § 4(c)(13) is not
treated in this article.
193 116 Cong. Rec. 41,949-64 (1970).
19" Id. at 42,422-38.
19s Id. at 41,955.
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B. The Board Implements Section 4(c)(9)
by General Regulation
The Amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act were
approved on December 31," 1970,196 and the Board set to work to
amend Regulation y,197 the Board regulation covering the Board's
supervision of bank holding companies pursuant to the Act, to
accommodate the changes in the Act made by the Amendments.
Given the pressing problem of redefining the nonbank activities
permissible for domestic holding companies under the completely
rewritten section 4(c)(8), despite the pleas of the Committee of
Foreign-Owned Banks for an early general regulation, 19 the Board
did not issue a proposed provision implementing the new section
4(c)(9) until June 1971.199 As issued, the proposed regulation sent
shock waves through the foreign bank community.
As noted previously, despite Chairman Burns' concentration in
his Senate committee testimony upon the problem of United States
regulation offoreign activities of foreign companies, section 4(c)(9) of
the Act is not by its terms restricted to foreign activitied. So long as
the holding company itself is "foreign," that is, organized under the
laws of a foreign country, and the greater part of its business
conducted outside the United States (a term which the Board would
have to define), the Board could choose not only to provide special
treatment for foreign activities and holdings of the company, but
could also establish a standard (so long as the standard is not "at
variance with the purposes of the Act') for domestic activities and
acquisitions by- the foreign company differing from the standard
which is set out for nonbanking activities and holdings of domestic
holding companies (under section 4(c)(8) of the Act and under sec-
tion 225.4(a) of Regulation y 20 0 issued thereunder). Despite the
urging of the Committee of Foreign-Owned Banks that Congress
provide the Board with adequate guidelines, the legislative history
of section 4(c)(9) offered no guidance at all on this point. The most
the Board had to go on in making its determination of what was in
the public interest under section 4(c)(9) was Burns' and the Treasury
Counsel's statements concerning the importance of avoiding foreign
196 Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1761 (1970).
197 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (1973).
198 See text at note f84 supra.
199 Proposed amendment to 12 C.F.R. pt. 222 (as pt. 225 was then numbered), 36 Fed.
Reg. 11,944 (1971). The original proposal would have added a new subparagraph (0 to 12
C.F.R. § 222.4 to set forth the ground rules for nonbanking activities and interests of foreign
bank holding companies; when the regulation appeared in final form, 36 Fed. Reg. 21,807
(1971), it was numbered subparagraph (g) of 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (1973). The regulation will be
referred to hereinafter as either § 225.4(g) or "the foreign bank holding company regulation."
20012 C.F.R. § 225.4(a) (1973).
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retaliation. Chairman Burns appeared to be directing himself
primarily to the problem of extraterritorial effect of bank holding
company regulation, but if the public interest is seen as avoiding the
possibility of incurring foreign retaliation for "impos[ing] our ideas
of banking upon other countries," 20 1 a freer regime, within the
broad outlines of the purposes of the bank holding company legisla-
tion, for foreign bank holding companies and their holdings within
the United States might be warranted. 20 2
The Board, however, for reasons best known to itself, chose in
its proposed regulatory implementation of section 4(c)(9) to move in
the opposite direction, not only failing to provide any special treat-
ment for domestic holdings of foreign companies covered by the
Amendments, but limiting the proposed general exemption of sec-
tion 4(c)(9) for "foreign" holdings very strictly. Section 4 of the Act
applies to any stockholding by any bank holding company203 (except
those holdings specifically excepted) of over five percent of the
outstanding voting shares of non-"banks." If a policy decision is to
be made that holdings by foreign bank holding companies (as
201 Testimony of Chairman Burns, in Senate Hearings, supra note 170, at 145.
202 It would be unfair, however, to assume that because § 225.4(g), in both proposed and
final form, treats (with the exception discussed in the text at note 230 infra) only "foreign"
activities of foreign bank holding companies, the Board has read § 4(c)(9) to provide a special
standard for such activities alone, relegating "domestic" activities of foreign bank holding
companies to § 4(c)(8) of the Act. Section 225.4(g) sets out the nonbanking activities and
holdings that are considered exempt from § 4 without a special proceeding. Both the proposed
and the final regulation provide that a foreign holding company, if it is "of the opinion that
other activities or investments may, in particular circumstances, meet the conditions for an
exemption under section 4(c)(9) of the Act may apply to the Board for such a determination.
. . ." As will be obvious from the text, the attempt to carve out by general regulation what
activities and holdings should be treated as "foreign" presented difficult drafting and policy
problems: to carve out, except on a case-by-case basis, just what domestic activities might
meet the § 4(c)(9) standard may not be possible. However, the Board's introduction to the
proposed regulation could be read as if the Board were viewing § 4(c)(9) as looking only to
problems of extraterritorial effect of the Act. See 36 Fed. Reg. 11,944 (1971). Curiously, by
the time of the final regulation, the point of origin had taken a 180 degree turn: the
introduction to the final regulation described the purpose of the proposed regulation to be "to
implement [the Board's] regulatory authority under § 4(c)(9) of the Bank Holding Company
Act to exempt foreign bank holding companies from the prohibitions of section 4 of the Act
with respect to certain of their non-banking activities and interests in the United States." 36
Fed. Reg. 21,807 (1971) (emphasis added).
203 The Act in its present form defines a "company" in § 2(b) as "any corporation,
partnership, business trust or association . . . ." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(b) (1970). Under § 2(a) a
"company" becomes a "bank holding company" by having or acquiring "control' of a "bank"
as defined by the Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (1970). "Bank" is defined in § 2(c), 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(c) (1970). "Control" is defined by § 2(a)(2) of the Act as the power to vote 25% or more
of any class of voting securities of the bank; control of the election of a majority of the
directors of the bank; or such a determination by the Board after a hearing. 12 U.S.C. §
1841(a)(2) (1970). The nationality of the entity so controlling the "bank" is not germane to the
definition. Section 4(c)(9) in effect defines a foreign bank holding company as one "organized
under the laws of a foreign country the greater part of whose business is conducted outside the
United States." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(9) (1970).
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defined by section 4(c)(9)) in "foreign" companies are to be given a
blanket exemption, that is, are to be exempted from section 4's
divestiture requirement without separate consideration by the Board
of the appropriateness of each holding, then, in a world where
national boundaries hardly delimit business transactions, a prior
determination must be made as to just what is "foreign" in the sense
of inappropriateness of the assertion of jurisdiction under the Act
over the holding. Section 4(c)(9) itself only offers a definition of
"foreignness" for the holding company itself, not for the company's
activities or holdings.
Without guidance from section 4(c)(9), the Board had a number
of other possible treatments of the concept of "foreign" to chose
from. It will be recalled that the Act's statutory exemption for
certain foreign holdings of certain foreign bank holding companies,
section 2(h), 204 requires that the "foreign" company so held both be
incorporated abroad and do no business in the United States. Once
it is admitted that a company may have some United States business
and still be "foreign," where is the line to be drawn? By quantity?
The quantity concept raises a host of other questions, having to do
with what entity should be considered. For example, in determining
the quantum of United States business, what account should be
taken of a United States-incorporated subsidiary of a foreign com-
pany? Should a bank holding company holding ten percent of a
foreign company with a United States subsidiary be considered to
own a ten percent interest in a domestic company subject to the
rigors of section 4(c)(8)? Or should indirect holdings be considered
only if the foreign bank holding company controls the foreign par-
ent? Or should the United States subsidiary simply be viewed as an
incorporated branch of the foreign parent and its accounts consoli-
dated with the parent in dtermining whether the parent is foreign
or domestic? Any regulation purporting to exempt foreign activities
(rather than starting from the point of view as to what transnational
activities might be functionally appropriate) must struggle with
these questions.
As opposed to a quantity concept, section 4(c)(13)205 of the Act
offered the Board another approach which might be designated as a
"functional" one: it is the quality of the United States business,
which must be "incidental" to the foreign or international business
of the company, which determines whether the activity will be
viewed as domestic or foreign.
Soon after enactment of the Amendments, the Board itself
adopted, albeit for another purpose, a standard presumably bor-
204 12 U.S.C. § 1841(h) (1970).
20S 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(13) (1970). See note 192 supra and note 211 infra.
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rowed from the "establishment" concept in tax treaties. Section 5(a)
of the Act 20 6 requires newly covered companies to register on forms
to be provided by the Board. The Board's new Registration State-
ment required disclosure by the Registrant of its holdings in other
companies and submission of financial information with respect to
such companies. However, such disclosure in the case of companies
organized under foreign law was only required where the holding
was sufficient in amount of shares held to constitute the foreign
company a "subsidiary" as defined in section 2(d)2 07 of the Act
(twenty-five percent or more of the voting stock or certain other
indicia of control) and if the subsidiary had a branch or office, other
than a representative office, in the United States. 208 In its proposed
section 225.4(g), however, the Board did not follow this limitation of
asserted jurisdiction. To the contrary, the proposed section 225.4(g)
offered only the narrowest possible scope for exemption.
The initial definition in the proposed regulation of which bank
holding companies would be deemed "foreign" for its purposes gave
unexceptional content to the statutory phrase of section 4(c)(9)-"the
greater part of whose businesz is conducted outside the United
States" 209-- by requiring that more than half of the company's "con-
solidated assets and revenues" must be "located and derived outside
the United States. '210 Such companies might engage in direct ac-
tivities of any kind outside the United States and engage in "direct
activities in the United States that are incidental to its activities
outside the United States. ' 211 Thus, for judging direct activities, the.
206 12 U.S.C. § 1844(a) (1970).
207 12 U.S.C. § 1841(d) (1970).
208 See Committee of Foreign-Owned Banks, Comments on the Proposed Regulations
under Section 4(c)(9) of the Bank Holding Company Act 4 (Aug. 5, 1971) (paper in the files of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) [hereinafter cited as FOB Comments].
209 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(9) (1970). See text at note 171 supra for the text of the Bevill
amendment which, with the exception of the last clause, became § 4(c)(9).
210 36 Fed. Reg. 11,944 (1971); proposed 12 C.F.R. § 222.4(f)(1).
211 The "incidental" concept is used in § 4(c)(13), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(13) (1970). Its
origin is, without doubt, the Edge Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 611 et seq. (1970), which limits the
United States business of companies incorporated under it to that which "in the judgment of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, shall be incidental to its international
or foreign business," 12 U.S.C. § 616 (1970). See text at notes 84-86 supra. The scope of the
"incidental" concept can be very important to a foreign company which is engaged or wishes
to engage in various kinds of business in the United States and is regulated under the Act
because it has a United States "subsidiary" bank. Section 4 of the Act by its terms does not
apply to "banking" activities so that direct branching activities of covered foreign banks need
not be judged under this § 4(c)(9) standard (i.e., the branches may engage in purely "domes-
tic" business). The Board made this point in its interpretation accompanying the final
regulation under § 4(c)(9). See 12 C.F.R. § 225.124(b) (1973). But the major continental
multinational banks with United States outlets are also engaged in the securities business on a
multinational basis. Because the United States subsidiary banks are not member banks, § 20
of the Banking Act of 1933 (discussed in text at notes 55-57 supra) does not prevent their
parent banks from participating in underwritings in the United States market. Presently,
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Board borrowed the functional standard of section 4(c)(13) of the
Act.
As for the stock holdings of foreign bank holding companies,
the regulation proposed only to exempt by the general regulation212
holdings of twenty-five percent or greater in companies (wherever
incorporated) that are "foreign" by reason of their not engaging,
directly or indirectly, in any activities in the United States "except
as shall be incidental to the international or foreign business of such
company. '213 Thus, subsidiaries of foreign companies also were to
be judged by the functional standard. No "domestic" business was
to be allowed under the section 4(c)(9) general exemption. Holdings
of less than twenty-five percent (i.e., nonsubsidiaries) in foreign-
incorporated companies were to be permitted under the general
regulation if their United States business amounted to less than
twenty percent of their consolidated assets and revenues and if they
were not engaged at all "in the business of underwriting, selling or
distributing securities in the United States." 214 By the latter provi-
sion the Board was reading Glass-Steagall into the Act, even though
direct activities of the holding company, if "incidental," were not so
qualified.
In effect, under the proposed implementation of Congress' new
section 4(c)(9), not only would the specific approval of the Board
have to be obtained for the holding or acquisition of any greater
than a five percent voting interest in a United States corporation
(unless the corporation only had "incidental" activities in the United
States), but all such holdings in foreign corporations would have to
be qualified by a special application procedure if more than twenty
percent of their business derived from the United States.
Finally, ignoring the plea of the Committee of Foreign-Owned
Banks to the Senate hearings that the different view abroad toward
corporate disclosure be kept in mind, the regulation would have
required a foreign company to report information, including a list of
stockholders holding ten percent or more of any class of the
company's voting shares, to the Board with respect to any acquisi-
tion, pursuant to the exemption, of shares in a company with "any
business whatsoever in the United States.
'215
In accordance with its usual practice, the Board invited com-
however, since the final regulation utilizes the same standard for direct activities, such
underwritings will have to be "incidental" to the parent's activities outside the United States.
212 See note 202 supra as to application for specific exemption for other activities or
investments that in the holding company's opinion meet the conditions for an exemption
under § 4(c)(9).
213 36 Fed. Reg. 11,944 (1971); proposed 12 C.F.R. § 222.4(f(I)(iii).
214 36 Fed. Reg. 11,944 (1971); proposed 12 C.F.R. § 222.4(f)(1)(iv).
215 36 Fed. Reg. 11,944 (1971); proposed 12 C.F.R. § 222.4(0(3).
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ments on the proposed regulation. The American Bar Association,
in a letter dated July 23, 1971, expressed its apprehension that the
restrictiveness of the proposed regulation "could cause foreign coun-
tries to impose similar restrictions on the foreign activities of the
United States bank holding companies and banks in their foreign
activities" and proposed that the regulation simply authorize
foreign-based bank holding companies to engage in activities in the
United States to the same extent that domestic bank holding com-
panies were authorized to engage in foreign countries.
216
Except for the ABA's response, there was little comment from
Americans. Understandably, the Committee of Foreign-Owned
Banks commented, unhappily and in detail, that in the member
banks' "considered judgment . .. the proposed regulations would
result in a serious deterrent to new formations or acquisitions of
chartered banks in the United States by foreign banks. '217 In par-
ticular, the Committee was unhappy about the reporting require-
ments. This was especially so because the proposed regulations
could have been read to require reporting on acquisitions made in
the course of investment banking activities. The twenty percent
limitation on United States business for nonsubsidiary holdings in
foreign corporations to qualify under the regulation was also highly
troublesome. As the Committee's comments noted sagely, if un-
elegantly:
The fact that foreign corporations may derive 20% of their
revenues from the United States is not a significant entry
by a minority shareholding foreign bank into the United
States economy. This will be increasingly true as interna-
tional trade and business activities inevitably grow.
218
If the foreign bank holding company did not in fact control the
foreign corporation, it was hard to see why the strictures of section 4
should be applied to the holding of stock in a foreign corporation
with substantial United States business just because the foreign
holding corporation happened also to hold a twenty-five percent or
greater interest in a United States bank. The Committee realized
that the Board in narrowly restricting the proposed general regula-
216 The problem with this proposition is that at some point along the continuum of
investment in the United States by foreign groups that also own a substantial interest in a
United States bank, the United States policy of separation of banking and commerce must
apply to foreign bank holding companies. To permit Credit Suisse to acquire both control of a
major United States bank lending to the auto industry and a sizable interest in General
Motors just because Swiss law would not prohibit a United States bank holding company
from holding both in Switzerland is not a feasible proposition.
217 FOB Comments, supra note 208, at 2.
218 Id. at 8.
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tion was giving itself a chance to look at the "public interest" on a
case-by-case basis undIer section 4(c)(9), but nevertheless, the asser-
tion of jurisdiction in the proposed regulation, the announcement, in
effect, that minority shareholdings in foreign corporations would be
scrutinized because of those corporations' United States contact, was
troublesome. "Foreign banks need to know where they stand now in
order to decide whether participation in United States banking
through charter banks- is worth subjecting their overseas invest-
ments to regulation in Washington.
' 219
The Committee proposed, instead, that if it were deemed nec-
essary to control nonsubsidiary foreign holdings with United States
contact, the "simple and realistic" test of the Registration Statement
be used-i.e., whether or not the foreign company had branches or
operating offices in the United States. "If, and only if, they have
branches or operating offices in the United States, a presumption of
excessive involvementin the United States is raised .... "220 This
presumption could then be rebutted by showing that over fifty
percent of the company's business was outside the United States.
The same rules should apply also to "subsidiary" holdings (i.e.,
twenty-five percent or more of the voting shares) because "the
exemption should be based on the degree of involvement in the
United States, not on the nature of the relationship between two
foreign corporations.
'22 1
Finally, the Committee pointed out the harshness of the exclu-
sion from the exemption for nonsubsidiary holdings of companies
underwriting, selling or distributing securities in the United States.
The Committee was perfectly willing to accept the Glass-Steagall
restrictions as they exist in present law, 222 but protested the pro-
posed subsection (iv)(C) of the regulation on the grounds that
219 Id. at 5.
220 Id. at 13.
221 Id. at 15. This argument, plausible on its face, misses the point that presumably the
basic purpose of the Bank Holding Company Act is to prevent joint control of suppliers and
users of credit. The other purpose is to prevent evasion of the restrictions on stockholding by
banks (restrictions originating in the desire to protect depositors from bank speculation) by use
of holding company corporate structure. The first purpose should apply equally to foreign
holdings in the United States if these holdings have domestic economic impact. See note 216
supra. The second,"berhaps, is a more parochial notion which we do not wish to insist upon
as a condition of foreign bank entry. While we have an interest in protecting United States
depositors in foreign-owned banks, presumably this can better be done through, for example,
extension of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to foreign branches than by controlling the
holding companies" United States stock investments while ignoring their foreign financial
structure. To the extent that this division of concept makes sense, so do the Board's distinc-
tions betweer subsidiary and nonsubsidiary holdings.
222 'fhere was no attempt to argue in this brief that Glass-Steagall should not be given an
extraterritorial application so as to prevent a holding company controlling a foreign securities
company from acquiring control of a United States member bank; this restriction was
accepted. See FOB Comments, supra note 208, at 17.
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there is nothing in the legislative history of the Act, and
certainly nothing in the language of Section 4(c)(9) itself,
which indicates a Congressional concern to go beyond
these existing statutory schemes and deny, as to holdings
which existing law permits, the exemption from U.S. regu-
lation which Section 4(c)(9) was designed to allow .... 223
"If the 'laundry list' philosophy of prohibited activities, which has
survived the legislative process in part in Section 4(c)(8), is to be
applied without regard to extraterritoriality, Section 4(c)(9) loses its
purposes." 224 The Committee also pointed out that
given the fact that most of the U.S. activities of foreign
investment bankers relate to foreign investment in Ameri-
can securities, impairment of access to the United States by
any such firms might well have unintended adverse effects
on the U.S. balance of payments.
2 25
This threat, however, was minor. The result of the extraordinarily
restrictive approach of the proposed regulation, unanticipated on
the basis of Burns' testimony and the Registration Statement forms,
would be "to constitute a formidable barrier to charter banking in
the United States by foreign banks, which must be competitive in
the fields of investment and merchant banking abroad. ' 2 2 6 The
complaint was fair: in a world with both a high degree of national
regulation and necessity of flexibility for those connecting links in
the world economy, the multinational corporations, unthought-
through application of "national" treatment to foreign entry can
erect as high a barrier to entry as discriminatory treatment. One
hopes that the more egregious characteristics of the proposed regula-
tion were a result of haste to get a proposal on the boards, and not
the insularity of the regulator.
Section 225.4(g) of Regulation Y only appeared in final form on
November 16, 1971,227 effective December 1, 1971. An accompany-
ing interpretation228 (the Interpretation) expressed "the Board's
views on several questions that arose during the course of its consid-
eration of this matter [regulation of foreign bank holding
companies]. ,
229
223 Id.
224 Id.
22S Id. at 18.
226 Id. at 1.
227 36 Fed. Reg. 21,807 (1971).
228 12 C.F.R. § 225.124 (1973).
229 Id.
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So far as direct activities (that is, activities conducted in the
United States by the holding company itself) and foreign "sub-
sidiary" activities (that is, activities in the United States conducted
by foreign companies controlled by the holding company) of for-
eign bank holding companies in the United States were concerned,
the Board stuck to its guns, but lowered their range somewhat. The
functional section 4(c)(13) test of "incidentality" was retained for
direct United States activites of foreign bank holding companies,
but a new definition of "activities" in the Interpretation in effect
permits a foreign bank holding company to operate freely across
United States boundaries so long as it does not open within the
United States the type of facility that would qualify as an "es-
tablishment" under a 'typical tax treaty. Equally, foreign-
incorporated 230 subsidiary holdings remain subject to section 4 (that
is, may only be retained or acquired if the subsidiary could be
acquired by a domestic bank holding company or else is granted a
specific exemption under section 4(c)(9) upon application to the
Board) if the subsidiary has, directly or indirectly, 231 any "ac-
230 If the company in which the foreign bank holding company invests is incorporated in
the United States, any stock holding over the 5% permissible minimum will not be exempted
under § 225.4(g) if the company has other than "incidental" activities in the United States.
(Foreign bank holding companies, of course, may take advantage of all the other exemptions
to § 4 of the Act that are open to domestic bank holding companies.) However, this broad
brush is alleviated in two ways: the Interpretation, 12 C.F.R. § 225.124 (1973), makes clear in
subparagraph (d) that § 4 of the Act does not "apply to ownership or control of shares of stock
in the capacity of an underwriter or dealer in securites" but only to "ownership or control...
as an investment." 12 C.F.R. § 225.124(d) (1973). Thus a major concern of the Committee of
Foreign-Owned Banks-the effect on the merchant banking business of the parent banks
-,was met by the Interpretation. Secondly, the final regulation added a specific exemption,
with the consent of the Board, for investments by a foreign bank holding company in a
company "principally engaged in the United States in financing or facilitating transactions in
international or foreign commerce." 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(2)(iv) (1973). The genesis and scope
of this provision are mysterious. Since in addition to whatever special exemptions they may
obtain under § 4(c)(9), foreign bank holding companies may take advantage of all the
exemptions to § 4 of the Act that are open to domestic holding companies, this provision was
not necessary to permit a foreign bank holding company with the consent of the Board to
establish the equivalent of a so-called "Agreement Corporation" in which a national bank may
invest to conduct international or foreign banking, see 12 U.S.C. § 601 (1970), or to take a
minority position in an Edge Corporation, companies which are ordinarily thought of as
financing or facilitating transactions in international or foreign commerce. Investment in
Agreement or Edge Corporations would be permitted under § 4(c)(5), which authorizes bank
holding companies to invest in shares eligible for investment by national banks. Possibly the
secret is in the words "principally engaged," i.e., an Edge-type corporation is meant, but its
peripheral activities will not be judged by the strict Regulation K standards. See note 97
supra. We will see later an attempt by a holding company to give content to the term
"facilitating," and the 58th Annual Report of the Board suggests that the purpose of the
provision was to cover New York investment companies owned by foreign interests. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 58th Annual Report (1971). See note 280 infra.
231 A foreign subsidiary engages "indirectly" in activities in the United States by itself
having a subsidiary (presumably as defined by the Act) that does so. 12 C.F.R. § 225.124(0
(1973). However, subparagraph (f) goes on to say that a "company is not 'indirectly' engaged
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tivities" in the United States other than those which could qualify as
"incidental to the international or foreign business of such com-
pany." (Neither section 225.4(g) itself nor the Interpretation, how-
ever, give any clue as to what kind of "activities" might so qualify.)
However, the apparent scope of the jurisdictional assertion was
considerably circumscribed by the Interpretation's careful elucida-
tion of the content of the term "activities." Under the Interpretation,
in order for a foreign subsidiary of a foreign bank holding company
to be subjected to regulation under section 4 of the Bank Holding
Company Act, its activities in the United States must entail consid-
erably more contact with the United States than would be required,
for example, for jurisdiction of a court in the United States under a
typical "long arm" statute. For instance, a company, which from
locations outside the United States engages in international trade
with the United States or furnishes services, or finances goods or
services in the United States, is not for the purpose of the Act
engaged in "activities" in the United States. (Presumably, therefore,
securities may be sold in the United States if an independent broker
or agent is used.) A company is engaged in "activities," according to
in activities in the United States by reason of a noncontrolling interest in a company engaged
in such activities." Id. The question left unanswered by the Interpretation is whether "non-
controlling" means lack of control in fact, or whether there is a presumption that any holding
of 25% or more of the voting shares (the Act's definition of "subsidiary') is a controlling
interest so that a foreign bank holding company must qualify any of its foreign "subsidiaries"
that owns 25% or more of the voting stock of corporations engaged in "activites" in the United
States because the foreign subsidiary is "indirectly" engaged in activities in the United States.
The provisions of 12 C.F.R. § 225.124(e) (1973) would lead one to the conclusion that the
Board meant "noncontrolling" in fact. Subparagraph (e) addresses the question of when a
holding company owns shares "indirectly." The subparagraph does not use the term "sub-
sidiary," but instead provides that a foreign bank holding company does not "indirectly" own
voting shares by reason of a "noncontrolling" interest in the company owning or controlling
such shares. However, subparagraph (e) goes on to provide that if such noncontroUing interest
"is accompanied by other arrangements that, in the Board's judgment, result in control of
such shares by the holding company," then the holding company indirectly owns or controls
these shares, i.e., an apparent definition of actual control. In view of the purposes of the Act,
see note 221 supra, this interpretation would make better sense than a mechanical application
of a 25% rule. However, subparagraph (g) of the Interpretation suggests that when the
question is one of whether or not a holding company may use the 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(v)
(1973) exemption (see below), the test is less than 25% of the voting shares and not whether or
not the parent controls the company in fact. The technical reconciliation of the provisions
would be as follows: BHC owns 26% of a corporation, A, incorporated and doing business in
France, but does not in fact control A. A owns 25% of B, but does not control B, and B is
engaged in activities in the United States. Under subparagraph (e) of the Interpretation BHC
does not "indirectly" own the shares of B so as to have to find an exemption under § 4 for
those shares. However, A is indirectly engaged in activities in the United States through its
holding in B and since A is a subsidiary of BHC, BHC may only continue to hold its interest
in A if (1) B's United States activities are "incidental" to A's international or foreign business
(a coincidence if so, since A does not control B); (2) the Board, after application by BHC
under 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(3) (1973), grants BHC a § 4(c)(9) exemption for its holding of A; or
(3) A by coincidence fits into some other category of exemption in § 4. If the Board did not
mean to reach this result, its regulation and the Interpretation do not say so.
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the Interpretation, only if it owns, leases, maintains, operates or
controls a factory, a wholesale distributor or purchasing agency, a
distribution center, a retail sales or service outlet, a network of
franchised dealers, a financing agency, or a similar facility for the
manufacture, distribution, purchasing, furnishing or financing of
goods or services locally in the United States.
However, despite the delimitation of the term "activities," as
previously illustrated, 232 a foreign company that acquires an interest
in a United States bank sufficiently large enough to bring the Act
into play may bring its noncontrolled (but twenty-five percent or
more) foreign holdings within the ambit of section 4 because the
company in which the bank holding company has invested itself
owns twenty-five percent or more of a company with a United
States establishment. Once again it might be argued that the Board
was not intending by the rigor of section 225.4(g) to raise high
barriers to foreign entry by the holding company route, but only to
insure that each holding of twenty-five percent or more of the voting
shares of a foreign company with direct or "indirect" United States
activities is subjected to a special proceeding under section
225.4(g)(3). 233 These special proceedings permit the Board to con-
sider whether or not the nature of the United States activities and
their relationship in fact to the holding company's banking business
in the United States is consonant with the purposes of the Act. This
would not appear to be the correct interpretation. In the course of
examining the very few orders that the Board has made in section
4(c)(9) proceedings, it appears that the Board was articulating its
tendency to take the position that a foreign company owning or
acquiring a twenty-five percent interest in a domestic commercial
bank must accept, as a condition precedent to its entry into United
States banking, the application of the American concept of the
necessary separation of commerce and banking to any purely
domestic 234 business which the foreign company may share in
through other "subsidiary" holdings. The difficulty with this posi-
tion, of course, is that, given the ad hoc structure of federal regula-
tion of foreign bank entry, the imposition of the policy depends
upon the form of the foreign entry, and by so doing discriminates,
albeit conceivably with reason, between foreign banks (or their
owners) and other types of foreign investors. In those states that
232 See note 231 supra.
233 12 C.F.1. § 225.4(g)(3) (1973).
234 What is meant here is "purely domestic" in the sense that the activities of the
subsidiary or subsidiaries can neither be shown to be "incidental" to the foreign or interna-
tional business of the company nor be qualified under the mysterious "principally engaged in
financing or facilitating transactions in international or foreign commerce." See note 230
supra.
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permit entry of foreign bank branches, a foreigner with a foreign
bank charter could open a United States commercial banking facil-
ity and still invest freely in any other type of United States business,
thus leaving the aptlication of the principle to the vagaries of state
law and policy.
The one situation in which the Board was willing to make a
substantial change in its conception of regulation was that of the
nonsubsidiary foreign company with United States business (section
225.4(g)(2)(v)). It will be recalled that under the proposed regulation,
such a company (i.e., a foreign company in which the holding
company's interest is less than twenty-five percent of the voting
shares) was to be exempt under the general regulation only if less
than twenty percent of its consolidated assets and revenues were
located and derived from within the United States. Presumably,
accepting the Committee's pleas that such stringency was unwar-
ranted in the case of minority holdings, the final regulation permits
the foreign company in which a foreign bank holding company owns
less than twenty-five percent of the voting shares to be exempt so
long as less than half of its assets and revenues are located in and
derive from the United States. However, as under the proposed
regulation, the exemption is not available under the general regula-
tion for a nonsubsidiary investment in a foreign company which,
directly or indirectly, engages in the business of underwriting, sell-
ing or distributing securities in the United States. 235 Thus, with
respect to imposition of United States conceptions of banking struc-
ture upon foreign companies' foreign holdings with United States
contacts, the Board in this portion of section 225.4(g) is schizo-
phrenic. It recognizes that there is no reason to assert jurisdiction
over the nonsubsidiary stockholdings of a foreign bank holding
company if the companies are "foreign" in the sense that they are
principally engaged in business outside the United States;236 but, at
the same time, the Board evidently feels compelled to impose as a
condition of United States bank investment the furthest possible
extension of our particular policy of separation of commercial and
investment banking, and to insist on application of this policy to
foreign bank holding company foreign nonsubsidiary investments
235 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(2)(v)(c) (1973).
236 Indeed, it may be questioned why, if the amount of stock held is insufficient to give
control over the business, it should matter whether the company is incorporated abroad or
under United States law or how much of its business is derived from the United States. One
can understand "source of income" as the basis for the imposition of taxation; the extension to
jurisprudential notions of banking regulation becomes more metaphysical. Neither the
Board's regulation nor its Interpretation offer any clue to the Board's thinking on this point
and the only conclusion that can be drawn from the legislative history (or lack thereof) is that
Congress did not mandate anything on the point.
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with any securities business in the United States. The authority for
this hierarchy of policies is invisible: why deriving income from the
securities business in the United States (in a situation in which
Glass-Steagall would not in any event apply because the foreign
company with the United States securities business is not an
"affiliate" of the United States bank held by the holding company) is
worse than deriving income from commerce is not explained. Apart
from the jurisprudential problem, the drafting of the provision
leaves open the question whether "engage in the business" has the
same content as "engage in activities" so that a company will not be
barred from participating in a United States underwriting from
abroad so long as it does not do so through a United States estab-
lishment (the Interpretation's delimitation of the term "activities") or
whether the different phraseology mandates a different interpreta-
tion.
Thus, all in all, section 225.4(g), the general regulation imple-
menting section 4(c)(9), is equivocal. The question is, which should
predominate in regulation of foreign bank holding companies-the
general notions of banking structure and regulation which are the
genesis of the Bank Holding Company Act (the "policy of the Act"),
or the need to work out special conditions for a special situation,
foreign bank entry into the United States through local incorpora-
tion, so long as the special provisions do not permit conditions to
arise which are clearly antithetical to the purposes of the Act? The
Board did not receive any real guidance from Congress other than
the open-ended quality of section 4(c)(9). The final form of section
225.4(g) would seem to indicate that at the time of its issuance the
Board, while leaning toward strict imposition of the Act's standards,
had not fully worked out its own policy on the question of the
regulation of domestic activities of foreign bank holding com-
panies.
237
237 Whatever may have been the uncertainties of the Board concerning policy in Nov,
1971, by June 1972 the Board was stating that the "public interest" consisted of the full
application of § 4 -standards to foreign bank holding company United States incorporated
holdings, foreign subsidiary holdings with United States activities and foreign holdings with a
majority of United States source business. The issue came up in a peripheral fashion. At the
time, 51% of the shares of Republic National Bank of New York were owned by Trade
Development Bank of Geneva, the majority of which in turn was owned by a bank incorpo-
rated in Panama. The investment group ultimately behind the holdings desired to establish a
new intermediate holding corporation, Trade Development Bank Holdings, S.A. of Luxem-
bourg (Holdings), between the Panama and the Geneva companies, but in order to comply
with the United States law, had to apply for approval for Holdings to become a bank holding
company under § 2(a) of the Act. The Board approved the establishment of Holdings as a
bank holding company on the curious grounds that approval would be in the public interest
-because, without the interposition, the Geneva bank would have ten years to dispose of its
nonbanking activities in the United States (which, said the Board, without specifying their
nature, would not be permissible under § 4(c)(9) and § 225.4(g)), and, with the new company
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Next we turn to the Board's individual case decisions involving
foreign banks and foreign bank holding companies to see if it has
developed a clearer jurisprudence on a case-by-case basis. Interest-
ingly, the situations which the Board has considered by a proceed-
ing leading to an order have involved not only applications to
qualify holdings under section 225.4(g)(3) (special proceedings under
section 4(c)(9) of the Act), but have run the whole gamut of the
special features of United States banking structure which were
discussed in Part II, including the diffusion of power inherent in the
dual banking system; geographical limitations posed by state bound-
aries; and the attempted separation in United States law between
investment banking and commercial banking activities.
V. THE BOARD'S INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS INVOLVING
HOLDINGS BY NONNATIONALS
A. The Multistate Problems and Foreign Bank Establishment
Under the Bank Holding Company Act
The Board, in making determinations concerning foreign bank
entry under the Bank Holding Company Act, has in the past several
years been forced, whether or not it has given the policy determina-
tion explicit recognition, to make policy choices in a number of the
troublesome areas discussed in Part II. The first recognition that a
straightforward application of the shibboleths of American banking
structure to foreign bank entry might not be so simple, came-before
the 1970 Amendments would raise the problem pointedly. The
proceeding in question involved the multinational bank of British
origin, Barclays Bank Limited (Limited). Limited operates interna-
tionally through Barclays Bank D.C.O. (D.C.O.), its international
banking subsidiary, which in turn owns a subsidiary bank chartered
under California law, Barclays Bank of California. Limited had,
prior to the 1970 Amendments, become a registered bank holding
company, and, indeed, a multistate bank holding company, under
the Act because of its simultaneous indirect ownership of Barclays
of California through D.C.O. and its ownership of a minority in-
terest in Bank of London and South America, Limited, a "bank"
within the Act (as section 2(c) of the Act then defined the term)
because of its New York branch. 238 D.C.O. was also doing business
in New York, but did so through branches which had a relatively
injected, "applicant will be required to divest itself of these activities within two years from
the date Applicant becomes a bank holding company." 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 589 (1972).
238 See note 166 supra. Chairman Bums noted in his testimony before the Senate
committee hearings on the 1970 Amendments that the inclusion of situations such as this
within the Act in 1966 was the result of an accidental omission in the redrafting of the § 2(c)
definition of "bank" in the course of the 1966 Amendments.
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restricted international business and which were unable to offer
depositors federal deposit insurance. 239 Management determined to
reorganize D.C.O.'s branches into a separately chartered New York
bank. This move, however, would constitute D.C.O., as well as
Limited, a two-bank holding company and, therefore, subject to the
Act. Under the Act, prior permission from the Board was required
under section 3(a) before D.C.O. could acquire the shares of the
proposed New York bank. The problem for the Board, however,
was how, in view of section 3(d) of the Act, 240 it could authorize
D.C.O. to acquire a bank in New York when D.C.O. already held
the shares of a bank in California. Section 3(d) was, and is, un-
equivocal:
[ .. N]o application shall be approved under this section
which will permit any bank holding company or any sub-
sidiary thereof to acquire, directly or indirectly, any voting
shares of, interest in, or all or substantially all of the assets
of any additional bank located outside of the State in
which the operations of such bank holding company's
banking subsidiaries were principally conducted on July 1,
1966 or the date on which such company became a bank
holding company, whichever is later .... 241
In fact, of course, by virtue of being a foreign bank, D.C.O. was
already operating in the two states; and the incorporation of the
D.C.O. New York branches could be labeled a matter of mere
form. Certainly for the Board to deny the application on the basis of
section 3(d) would have been to elevate form over substance. To
ground the Approval Order on a rejection of formalism, however,
must have had two drawbacks for the Board staff charged with
writing the Statement which was to accompany the Order. First, the
Board in granting approvals under section 3 of the Act is required to
balance factors weighing in favor of, and factors weighing against,
permitting the particular transaction. 242 It was therefore necessary
for Barclays to make the inconsistent argument, and for the Board
to accept, that the D.C.O. branches in incorporated form would be
more competitive than they would be as direct branches, since this
finding of greater competition would be a factor weighing in favor of
approval under the decision process required by section 3(c) of the
Act. Secondly, it must have seemed undesirable to the Board to
underline the fact that foreign banks, by their ability to branch
239 See text at note 37 supra.
240 See text at notes 69-70 supra.
241 12 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (1970).
242 12 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (1970).
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directly, are regulated differently under the Act than are domestic
banks and their holding companies. Instead, the Board produced a
theory of approval of the Barclays transaction which neatly avoided
facing head on whether section 3(d) should apply in the same way to
foreign bank entry as to domestic bank expansion through holding
company structure. Since in terms of total deposits the D.C.O.
branches had larger operations than the California subsidiary, the
grandparent bank, Limited, could be said to have the operations of
its banking "subsidiaries" principally conducted in New York (the
test of primary location under section 3(d)). Therefore, since Limited
could be authorized to acquire additional banks in New York,
Limited could be authorized to acquire the New York bank indi-
rectly through D.C.O., and D. C.O. could acquire such a bank in its
status as subsidiary.
Since the theory upon which D.C.O. would be authorized
to acquire a bank in New York would be predicated upon
its status as a subsidiary of Limited, the approval granted
herein would continue in effect only for so long as D.C.O.
retains that status.
243
While an excellent, realistic decision for Barclays, the decision was
not calculated to reassure other foreign banks that the conflict
between section 3(d) and their needs as international banks to do
business in the United States in more than one center of interna-
tional trade as flexibly as possible would be resolved in their favor.
Moreover, the decision warned Barclays that from here on in,
except to the extent that it can utilize the legal routes across state
lines developed by United States banks with national internal busi-
ness, it will be treated, for better or worse, as a New York-based
holding company. In view of this determination, the New York
Long Island Trust Company decision 244 and the recent approval for
its rival, Lloyds Bank Limited, to acquire a major bank in Los
Angeles, First Western Bank Trust Company, 245 must have been
particularly galling to Barclays.
The multistate question was also present, in effect, in the
application by the Toronto-Dominion Bank, Toronto, Ontario, to
become a bank holding company (under the 1970 Amendments) by
acquisition of the stock of a bank to be incorporated in California.
Toronto-Dominion was operating in New York through a combina-
tion of an agency and a trust company incorporated under the New
York Banking Law. The Board, without raising the section 3(d)
243 57 Fed. Res. Bull. 45, 46 (1971).
244 See text at notes 120-34 supra.
245 See text at notes 110-12 supra.
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problem, merely noted of the trust company that it "does not accept
demand deposits. '2 46 Since the post-1970 definition of "bank" in
section 2(c) of the Act requires a combination of both acceptance of
demand deposits and the making of commercial loans, the Board
was saying that the trust company in New York was not a "bank"
and that therefore it did not have to consider the effect of section
3(d). However, this exclusion of the trust company from the status
of "bank" did not relieve Toronto-Dominion from regulation of the
trust company's business under the Act. On the contrary, it would
appear that the business of the New York trust company will be
regulated to a greater extent by the Federal Reserve Board than if
its status under the Act were that of a "bank" held under section 3,
assuming that Toronto-Dominion qualifies its trust company sub-
sidiary under section 4(c)(8) of the Act and not under section 4(c)(9).
In theory, at least, the Board under the Act regulates the holding
company, and the regulation of the subsidiary banks is left up to the
state or federal banking law and the concerned regulatory
authority. 247 But nonbank subsidiaries must fit into one or more of
the permissible activities of section 4, and thus the parameters of
their business are defined by the Act and regulations promulgated
under it. The Board is currently struggling, in terms of working out
the problems of multistate expansion for domestic banks, with the
permissible activities of a trust company which is held as a nonbank
subsidiary under section 4 and not as a "bank" under section 3. It is
exactly the problem of multistate banking, the problem circum-
vented in the Toronto-Dominion decision, that is causing the strug-
gle. The issue, without doubt, has come up because of the inexora-
ble push of domestic banking over state lines: the possibilities inher-
ent in Regulation Y, § 225.4(a)(4)248 have been only too visible to
246 57 Fed. Res. Bull. 534 (1971).
247 Cf. Shay, Bank Holding companies and the Fed: whose Board? 91 Banking Law
Journal 332 (1974).
248 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(4) (1973). Section 4(c)(8) of the Act authorizes the Board to
determine what activities of a bank holding company are "so closely related to banking or
managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)
(Supp. IT 1972). As noted previously, see note 141 supra, the Board in its Regulation Y came
up with a list of activities that will be permitted under § 4(c)(8), among them
§ 225.4(a)(4):
Performing or carrying on any one or more of the functions or activities that may be
performed or carried on by a trust company (including activities of a fiduciary,
agency, or custodian nature), in the manner authorized by State law so long as the
institution does not both accept demand deposits and make commercial loans
12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(4) (1973), amended effective June 24, 1974, 39 Fed. Reg. 19774 (1974).
Now trust companies under at least some state laws are flexible creatures; for example, under
N.Y. Banking Law § 96 (McKinney 1971), a trust company has all the powers of a commer-
cial bank except that it also has fiduciary powers. (Prior to the 1960 change in the New York
Banking Law which permitted foreign banks to be able to open direct branches with bank
deposit-taking and fiduciary powers, the Canadian banks opened agencies to do banking
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domestic banks, and the Board has felt the necessity for refining its
distinctions between a "bank" trust company and a "nonbank" trust
company, going far beyond the simple test used in the Toronto-
business and established trust companies to do corporate trust work and coordinate with the
agencies on lending. The Banking Department was willing to grant such charters on the
informal understanding that while under N.Y. Banking Law § 96 (McKinney 1971), the trust
companies would have the power to receive deposits from the public, they would not in fact
do so.) Thus if a New Jersey bank holding company could persuade New York to grant it a
charter, under § 225.4(a)(4) as initially promulgated it could in effect have a deposit-taking
instutition in New York performing corporate trust functions and a myriad of other tradi-
tional banking functions so long as it does not make "commercial loans." Or the new
subsidiary can take the Canadian route and do everything except advertise to the public for
deposits. This begins to look very close indeed to out-of-state branching and the Board began
to realize it-and to struggle with the problem. First, in Jan. 1972 a majority of the Board
approved the acquisition by the holding company of the Northern Trust Company of Chicago
of a large trust company in Florida, Nortrust Corporation, Chicago, Illinois. 58 Fed. Res.
Bull. 67 (1972). Governors Brimmer and Robertson of the Board pointed out in their
dissenting statement:
Many banks operate trust departments. Because of this fact we have qualms about
permitting the utilization of the Bank Holding Company Act to enable a holding
company that controls a large Chicago trust company (that is also a bank) to buy up
other trust companies (that technically are not banks under the Holding Company
Act) in other sections of the country. These qualms are enhanced by the fact that
trust companies often generate large amounts of uninvested trust funds, held await-
ing investment, which could be funnelled to an unaffiliated bank in the Holding
Company System located in distant cities.
Id. at 68. Next the Board as a whole decided it had better do something, and so proposed a
revision of Regulation Y, § 225.4(a)(4), 38 Fed. Reg. 18,691 (1973), "to clarify the boundaries
upon deposit-taking activities that are properly incidental to trust company activities which
the Board has determined to be so closely related to banking." Id. The Board admitted its
problem outright:
The definition of boundaries upon deposit-taking activities by trust company sub-
sidiaries . . . is especially significant in the case of multi-state operations. . . . In
some cases, trust companies are chartered as banks, but intend to limit their
operations to trust activities and not to engage in commercial banking. The policy of
section 3(d) would not apply to holding company subsidiaries of this type. The
proposed amendment would delineate the scope of deposit-taking activities that
could be engaged in by trust company subsidiaries consistent with nonbank status
under the Bank Holding Company Act.
Id. The limitations must have been too limiting and engendered protest, for on Oct. 11, 1973
the Board tried again. See 38 Fed. Reg. 28,082 (1973). This time, it added back in some
deposit-accepting functions (for agents or custodians) and limited what could be done with the
funds, to sale of federal funds, call loans to securities dealers or money market investments.
The revised proposal would broaden the scope of permissible deposit-taking by trust
company subsidiaries beyond the perimeters of the Board's original proposal, but
narrow the scope of permissible, incidental lending activities. In doing so, it seeks to
balance the desirable objectives of facilitating the achievement of greater efficiencies
in the conduct of trust operations and providing additional incentives for increased
competition for trust business on a nationwide scale on the one hand and, on the
other, to remove the possibilities of indirect evasion of section 3(d) of the Bank
Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. 1842(d)) through the augmentation of the com-
mercial lending capabilities of bank holding companies in states other than the state
in which their principal banking subsidiaries operate. The revised proposal draws a
rule that, based on the comments received, the Board believes would enable inciden-
tal deposit-taking consistent with the full range of conventional functions, or ac-
tivities of a trust company without risk of significant displacement of commercial
bank checking account services.
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Dominion order. 249 For Toronto-Dominion, however, the result of
establishing a commercial "bank" in San Francisco is that the ac-
tivities of its New York trust company will have to be fit into the
prescribed pattern of Regulation Y, § 225.4(a)(4) as amended, 250
trust company rather than its own pattern as a foreign-owned trust
company under New York law. It may well be that there is no
problem, that the New York agency has been handling, and will
continue to handle the commercial lending activities of Toronto-
Dominion, and that the trust company's business already fits into
the new Regulation Y, § 225.4(a)(4) pattern. If not, Toronto-
Dominion has the option of conforming to the new section 4(a)(4)
(presumably by transferring nonconforming lending or investment
activities to its agency) or attempting to qualify the New York trust
company by arguing that section 225.4(g) takes too narrow a view of
the scope of section 4(c)(9) of the Act and that section 4(c)(9) can be
interpreted to permit special situations for United States subsidiaries
of foreign bank holding companies. Certainly to have the traditional
way of doing business in the New York market by a major Cana-
dian bank transformed by extrapolation of domestic policy from
section 3(d) and the application of section 4(c)(8) would seem to be a
backhanded form of regulation indeed.
251
Id. This Oct. 11, 1973 version was adopted on May 22, 1974, effective June 24, 1974. 39 Fed.
Reg. 19774 (1974).
But what transcendental nonsense is this: this is the first time that the Board has
suggested that the intention of § 3(d) was to confine commercial lending activities within
geographic lines. The Board would seem almost to be creeping back a bit to its examiner's
views in Bancredit. See text at note 73 supra. For our purposes, however, the series of
proposed amendments illustrates the difficulties of applying a limitation such as § 3(d) to
domestically-owned vehicles; the attempt to rationalize § 3(d) and foreign bank entry under
the Bank Holding Company Act without better coordination of rules and function is equally
fruitless.
249 See text at notes 245-47 supra.
2SO See note 248 supra.
25 Yet at least one major foreign bank holding company seems to have concluded that it
is easier to behave as if one were a domestic holding company and apply for acquisition of a
domestic subsidiary under §4(c)(8) than to try to make any case for the application of § 4(c)(9)
to domestic companies. Standard and Chartered Banking Group Limited, London, England,
in the course of purchasing in London Mocatta & Goldsmid Ltd., one of London's major
bullion dealers, proposed to acquire 30% of Mocatta Metals, Inc., a United States corporation
with wholly-owned United States subsidiaries involved in buying and selling gold and silver
bullion and silver coin, dealing in exchange and silver futures and arbitraging gold and silver
in markets throughout the world. It would be hard to imagine a business more intimately
linked to international markets, or, presumably, in the language of Regulation Y,
§ 225.4(g)(iv), "facilitating transactions in international or foreign commerce;" but rather than
take a chance on the meaning of that language, Standard applied to the Board for prior
permission to acquire the Mocatta shares under § 4(c)(8) of the Act and § 225.4(b)(2) of
Regulation Y, asking for a finding that the Mocatta activities were so "closely related to
banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto." "Based on the
facts of record," the Board so found, but required Standard to terminate Mocatta's dealing in
platinum and palladium and other commodities. Interestingly, the Board noted in its state-
ment the close relationship of the bullion market in New York to those of London and Zurich
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B. Problems of the Dual Banking System
We have already discussed in considerable detail, in connection
with the proposal by Barclays to acquire the Long Island Trust
Company, the problems raised for the dual banking system in the
United States by the concurrent jurisdiction of the Board and state
banking authorities over bank holding company acquisitions. The
Board was faced with a similar problem in connection with the
proposal of the Royal Trust Company, Montreal, Canada, to ac-
quire a base of operations in Florida. Through a finder, the Cana-
dians located a national bank, Inter National Bank of Miami, for
sale and applied to the Board for approval under section 3(a)(1) of
the Act to become a bank holding company by acquisition of the
shares of the phantom national bank into which Inter National was
to be merged. Although the Florida authorities were apprised of the
proposed acquisition,25 2 they at first made no move, and did not
submit any comment to the Board while the Royal application was
pending. By order dated June 16, 1972,253 the Board approved
Royal's application, noting mainly that since Royal "is not con-
sidered to be a likely potential entrant into the Dade County bank-
ing market other than by the proposed acquisition of [Inter
National], consummation of that transaction is unlikely to have an
adverse effect upon potential competition. '25 4 The Board treated as
affirmative factors Royal's proposal to establish a trust department
in the Florida bank and "to improve the services offered by [Inter
National] Bank's international department. '2 s s No problem of pos-
sible conflict with Florida law was discussed, presumably since no
one raised the issue.
By letter dated July 13, 1972, the Florida Banking Commis-
sioner and the Florida Bankers Association asked the Board to
reconsider the order granting Royal's application on the ground that
the establishment of a trust department in a national bank located in
Florida owned by a foreign trust company would be prohibited by
and that "[t]he activities of Mocatta would complement the international banking operations
of Applicant, including especially its substantial banking operations in the gold-producing
countries of Africa," but the decision, being under § 4(c)(8), presumably is a determination for
all holding companies that bullion dealing is a proper activity and a suggestion to foreign
bank holding companies that national treatment is the route to success. Fed. Res. Press
Release, Sept. 27, 1973.
252 The Florida Banking Commissioner advised Inter National Bank by letter dated
April 18, 1972 that he would follow the advice of the Florida Attorney General that the newly
enacted Fla. Stat. Ann. § 659.141 (Cum. Supp. 1973), purporting to prohibit a foreign
(non-Florida) trust company from acquiring control over a trust company in Florida, would
not apply to the acquisition of a national bank with trust powers. See Royal Trust Co., Order
Denying Request for Reconsideration, 37 Fed. Reg. 18,414 (1972).
253 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 665 (1972).
254 Id. at 666.
255 Id.
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section 659.141 of the Florida Statutes. 25 6 The Board did grant a
temporary stay of its authorization to Royal to permit the parties to
brief the issues. If the Board, as urged, were to find that section
659.141 of the Florida Statutes was intended to forbid a foreign
trust company from acquiring control over a national bank operat-
ing a trust department, it would have been squarely faced with the
issue of whether the deference to state law, apparently mandated by
Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 257
should be applied in the case of foreign bank entry, or whether it
could be said that the 1970 Amendments, in enacting a special
provision for foreign bank holding companies, had indicated a con-
gressional purpose to apply different considerations to multinational
banking. In the case of the Royal application, the Board was able to
duck the issue: it accepted the opinion of the Attorney General of
Florida as to the scope of section 659.141 as the presently authorita-
tive interpretation of the Florida law and stated in addition that
"[t]he Board regards the advice of the Florida Attorney General as
sound. ' 258 However, the Board went further than the particular
facts of the case required and announced its policy. Full deference is
to be given to the dual banking system, and indeed, to state law in
general; just as the Board will not approve a domestic bank holding
company application in apparent conflict with the law of the state
into which entry is sought, 25 9 so the foreign bank holding company
must square itself away with state law:
Finally, the Board notes that its Order of June 16, 1972 (as
is the case with all approval orders under section 3 of the
Bank Holding Company Act), is permissive in nature, in
effect, removing only one obstacle to Royal's share
acquisition-that created by section 3(a)(1) of the Bank
Holding Company Act. That Order neither relieves Royal
of duties deriving from other laws nor shields Royal from
the consequences of violations of other laws. The courts of
Florida appear to be open to Petitioners and may be a
more appropriate forum than the Board for the interpreta-
tion and enforcement of Florida Statutes. 260
Whatever justification there may be for such a policy in the
case of acquisition of bank shares by a domestic holding company,
256 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 659.141 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
257 379 U.S. 411 (1965).
2s8 Royal Trust Co., Order Denying Request for Reconsideration, 37 Fed. Reg. 18,414,
18,415 (1972).
259 See NCWB Corp., Order Conditionally Approving Proposal To Operate a Trust
Company in South Carolina, 38 Fed. Reg. 7364 (1973).
260 37 Fed. Reg. at 18,415.
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the policy should at least be reexamined as applied to the interna-
tional context. If foreign bank entry is to be freed from the compli-
cations of our federal system and the effectual state veto over such
entry, Congress will specifically have to exercise its power over
foreign commerce and provide explicitly for the arrangement of the
respective spheres of jurisdiction between the federal and the state
governments. The Board has exercised administrative self-restraint
and has clearly indicated that it has no intention of interpreting the
Bank Holding Company Act so as to reach such a result.
C. Permissible Domestic Subsidiaries: French-American
Banking Corp. and Lloyds' Domestic Nonbank Companies
As we have seen, 261 the Board, in promulgating section
225.4(g), took a relatively narrow view of the new section 4(c)(9) of
the Act. It saw that section as providing for the problems raised by
the Act with respect to extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign bank
holding companies and their subsidiaries that are "foreign" in the
sense of doing no business, or only a specified portion thereof, in the
United States. Section 225.4(g), except for the authorization in sub-
paragraph (2)(iv) to own or control, with the consent of the Board,
the shares of any company principally engaged in "financing or
facilitating transactions in international or foreign commerce ,' 262
does not deal with foreign bank holding company participation in
companies that, either by reason of place of incorporation or amount
and type of United States business, are in effect classified by section
225.4(g) as domestic. 263 The question then remained whether, with
respect to such participation by foreign bank holding companies in
domestic companies, the general standards for the separation of
banking and commerce 264 being worked out for domestic holding
companies under section 4(c)(8) of the Act would be applied, or
whether the Board would recognize, on a case-by-case basis, special
claims by foreign bank holding companies for exemption with re-
spect to their domestic holdings from section 4 of the Act by reason
of the application of section 4(c)(9). The Board to date has consid-
ered particular cases of such holdings twice under section 4(c)(9).
265
In 1919, a major French commercial bank (together with two
United States banks) organized a company to act as a vehicle for
261 See text at notes 229-34 supra.
262 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(2)(iv) (1973).
263 See text at notes 212-13 supra.
264 See text at notes 139-41 supra.
265 As will be discussed in text at notes 313-22 infra, the Board has considered in detail
the problem of participation in a securities firm, but the particular application of Glass-
Steagall principles would seem to be a different question from the application of the separa-
tion between credit sources and credit buyers demanded by § 4.
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providing credit to aid the post-war recovery of France. This was to
be accomplished primarily by providing acceptance financing for
international trade. 266 The company was chartered under Article
XII of the New York Banking Law, 267 permitting the formation of,
and regulating, so-called investment companies. Over the years, the
company, French-American Banking Corporation (FABC), ulti-
mately one hundred percent owned by Banque Nationale de Paris,
the largest bank in France, 268 expanded its business to offer a wide
range of international financial services to banks, corporations and
individuals. 269 Under its charter, FABC can perform all of the
commercial operations 270 of a direct bank branch licensed under
Article V of the New York Banking Law271 except that, as an
investment company, it is forbidden by section 509 of the Banking
Law to "engage in the business of receiving deposits;" however,
section 509 authorizes maintenance "for the account of others credit
balances incidental to, or arising out of the exercise of its lawful
powers .... ",272
These credit balances gave the Board an initial problem when
Banque Nationale de Paris decided to extend its United States
business to California as well as New York and applied on June 23,
1971 for permission under section 3(a) of the Act to become a
holding company by establishment of a banking subsidiary, French
Bank of California, in San Francisco. 273 If FABC were a "bank" as
the Act defines that term, then Banque Nationale would have its
principal banking operations in New York and could not under
266 Memorandum Concerning the Status of French-American Banking Corporation
Under the Bank Holding Company Act, submitted by Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton in
connection with Banque Nationale de Paris' Application pursuant to § 3(a) of the Bank
Holding Company Act, on file at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
[hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
267 N.Y. Banking Law art. XII (McKinney 1971).
268 Banque Nationale de Paris, Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Company,
58 Fed. Res. Bull. 311 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Order].
269 Memorandum, supra note 266, at 1-3.
270 Under § 201-b of the New York Banking Law, a foreign branch may be authorized
to exercise fiduciary powers in the state; the Investment Company Article does not provide for
fiduciary powers for investment companies. However, it is probable that the New York
investment companies do perform functions which could be classified as corporate trust
activities. See the description of the business of French-American Capital Corporation, in text
at notes 288-89 infra.
271 N.Y. Banking Law art. V (McKinney 1971).
272 N.Y. Banking Law § 509(4) (McKinney 1971).
273 The letter of application with respect to FABC, dated July 7, 1971, in the Board's
fles; notes that had it been possible for Banque Nationale to establish a direct branch in San
Francisco, it would have done so. Id. at 5. The proposed business of the new subsidiary, a
"wholesale bank specializing in the financing of international trade" (Order, supra note 268),
would have permitted incorporation as an Edge Corporation if such stockholding were
permissible to Banque Nationale.
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section 3(d) of the Act establish a "bank" in San Francisco .274 The
Board had previously ruled in 1956 (under the definition of "bank"
as it existed at that time) that two other New York investment
cbmpanies were not covered under the term, 275 but had not yet
ruled on the question under the definition as revised by the 1970
Amendments. Counsel for Banque Nationale briefed the issue ex-
tensively, including a letter from the then Superintendent of Banks
of New York, stating that the New York State Banking Depart-
ment's distinction between "credit balances" held by investment
companies and New York agencies of foreign banks, and demand
deposits held by commercial banks, is "both meaningful and
administrable. '276 The Board capitulated and ruled that the in-
vestment company should not be regarded as a "bank"
because it does not accept demand deposits within the
meaning of section 2(c) of the Act.
In examining the legislative history of section 2(c), the
Board is persuaded that Congress meant to include in the
definition of "bank" only those institutions that offer to the
public the general convenience of checking account
facilities. 277
Having determined that FABC was not a bank, it then became
necessary for Banque Nationale to qualify FABC, and its equity
investments, as permissible holdings of a bank holding company
under section 4. Banque Nationale applied for permission to retain
FABC and its holdings, not under the general provisions of section
4(c)(8), but under the specialized provisions of section 4(c)(9). The
argument for FABC was that it qualifies under section
225.4(g)(2)(iv), the provision authorizing foreign bank holding com-
panies, with Board consent, to own companies "principally engaged
in the United States in financing or facilitating transactions in inter-
national or foreign commerce. ' '278 The Board agreed with this
274 Note that since § 2(c) of the Act (the definition of "bank') specifically excludes from
the definition of "bank" "any organization operating under . .. section 25(a) of the Federal
Reserve Act," 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1970), if Banque Nationale had been able to establish an
Edge Corporation in San Francisco, the § 3(d) issue would not have been raised.
275 Memorandum, supra note 266, at 6.
276 Id.
277 Board of Governors, Fed. Res. Rul. (Nov. 8, 1971) (available upon request to the
Board). The genesis of the problem of the out-of-state trust company subsidiary is clear. See
note 248 supra. Note that incorporation of an investment company subsidiary might be an
excellent conduit for non-New York holding companies to enter a specialized portion of the
New York market. If the Superintendent of Banks permits such entry, the Board may be
faced with the necessity of delimiting by regulation under § 4(c)(8) the scope of investment
company subsidiary business as it has had to do for nondepository trust companies.
278 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(2)(iv) (1973).
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contention; 279 the exemption has been given some public content,
and presumably will apply to investment companies owned by other
foreign banks.
280
FABC's business, according to Banque Nationale's Application
for exemption on file at the Board, consists of involvement in the
international exchange markets, including the international transfer
of funds and domestic and foreign collections, and import and
export financing. However, it also grants loans in other markets,
including bankers' loans, medium-term loahs, discounting receiv-
ables, granting and taking participations in loans to and from corre-
spondent banks, and selling short-term notes of foreign and domes-
tic entities to foreign and domestic clients.
281
The Application indicated that approximately seventy-six per-
cent of FABC's business relates wholly to international and foreign
commerce, and attempted to demonstrate that the majority of the
remaining activities also are so connected. The contention was made
that a loan to a United States company engaged in import-export
activities for working capital purposes "finances and facilitates
foreign commerce" (the section 225.4(g)(2)(iv) exemption). As we
have seen, one of the questions that section 225.4(g) raises is the
extent to which the Board is intending to import into regulation of
foreign bank holding company subsidiaries concepts derived from
the Edge Act. 282 So far as foreign activities of domestic bank hold-
279 Order of the Board, in Banque Nationale de Paris, Paris, France, 58 Fed. Res, Bull,
312-13 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Order of the Board].
280 The fact that the provision was drafted to cover New York investment companies
appears only from the notation (in the Board's Annual Report) that Governors Mitchell and
Maisel abstained from promulgation of § 225.4(g)(2)(iv) on the grounds that it would exempt
investment companies having some purely domestic business not otherwise exempted. "In
their view, the role of the specialized investment companies in the U.S. financial structure
was not yet well enough defined to permit taking a position regarding the appropriateness of
the exemption." Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 58th Annual Report
95-96 (1971). The language of the regulation itself gives no hint of its purpose.
281 The latter description of its business raised a question concerning the activities of
FABC that counsel perhaps had not anticipated: could it be that FABC was acting as a
commercial paper underwriter and dealer and thus might be an impermissible subsidiary in
light of Glass-Steagall policy? The Application file at the Board contains a letter from counsel
to a senior attorney of the Board differentiating the syndication and participation aspects of
the lending activities conducted by FABC from typical underwriting and dealing in commer-
cial paper; the gravamen of the argument is FABC's original lender function in the participa-
tions it sells. Apparently the argument was successful; the Board order does not even discuss
the issue.
282 This analysis of the jurisprudence of the Board was completed before the release by
the Board on Jan. 9, 1974 of its decision under § 4(c)(9) concerning the subsidiaries of Lloyds
Bank Limited with United States activities. Fed. Res. Press Release, Jan. 9, 1974. This
decision, analyzed in the text at notes 303-12 infra, explicitly recognizes the parallelism of
§ 225.4(g)(2)(iii), Regulation K and the test under § 4(c)(13) of the Act and its implementing
regulation, § 225.4(f) of Regulation Y. The text discusses some of the unresolved problems left
by this approach.
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ing companies are concerned, the Board in Regulation Y, section
225.4(f)2 8 3 has specifically recognized the parallel and has lim-
ited holdings to be permissible to domestic holding companies under
section 4(c)(13) of the Act2 84 to those in which an Edge Corporation
might invest. Moreover, section 225.4(g)(2)(iii), in setting the stan-
dard for domestic activities of companies in which shares are owned
by foreign bank holding companies, uses the Edge Act "incidental"
standard given content by Regulation K. But the exemption under
section 225.4(g)(2)(iv) of domestic activities viewed as "financing and
facilitating foreign commerce" is, at least so far as FABC is con-
cerned, broader than the permissible scope of domestic activity
granted to Edge Corporations under Regulation K. Under Regula-
tion K, section 211.7,285 regulating Edge operations in the United
States, the standard is "such limited business in the United States as
is usual in financing international commerce," but section 211.7(d)(1)
specifies that in financing import-export transactions, payments or
costs financed may not include "expenses in the United States of an
office or representative therein. '286 Working capital loans of the
kind made by FABC presumably do just that. Moreover, all the
United States business of an Edge Corporation must be related to its
foreign and international business. The decision approving the re-
tention of FABC by Banque Nationale in effect says that "princi-
pally" as used in section 225.4(g)(2)(iv) means the great majority of
the business, but exclusivity is not required.
To what extent the Board was aware in the FABC decision
that it was, in effect, declaring the scope of the section 4(g)(2)(iv)
exemption to be considerably broader than the range of United
States activities allowed Edge Corporations is not clear; 287 the im-
plications for foreign bank entry, however, are clear. If the foreign
bank desires multistate locations, the one place not to put a sub-
sidiary constituting a "bank" for the purposes of section 3(d) of the
Act is New York, where functionally equivalent entry can be
achieved by branch, agency or specialized investment company
without activating the Douglas Wall.
The decision, however, does not unbalance the competitive
scale in favor of foreign bank holding companies; the option to enter
the New York market through the investment company route is
open to domestic bank holding companies, assuming that the New
York Banking Department would be willing to charter such a
283 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(f) (1973).
284 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(13) (1970).
28S 12 C.F.R. § 211.7 (1973).
286 12 C.F.R. § 211.7(d)(1) (1973).
287 See discussion of the Lloyds § 4(c)(9) decision in text at notes 303-12 infra.
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subsidiary of a domestic holding company and the Board will qual-
ify it under section 4(c)(8). Moreover, as the Board pointed out in its
Lloyds decision involving section 4(c)(9), a domestic bank holding
company can perform the domestic financial functions of an invest-
ment company such 'as FABC through other subsidiaries of the
system. 288 The apparently ineluctable expansion of the geographic
scope of financial services is breaching the Douglas Wall for
everyone.
In 1970 FABC had broadened the scope of its business by
organizing a Delaware subsidiary, French-American Capital Corpo-
ration (FACC), to invest for its own account in the securities mar-
ket, to make venture capital investments and temporary short-term
investments, including participations in the syndication of foreign
and domestic loans. FACC also proposed to provide investment
advisory services for all types of investors, except open-end mutual
funds, and to provide corporate financial services for foreign and
domestic clients, including assistance in mergers and acquisitions.
As part of its venture capital activities, FACC had acquired an
equity position of fifteen percent in each of two American sub-
sidiaries of French enterprises: Indumat Equipment Corporation,
which sells :and leases scaffolding systems, and Locafrance-U.S.
Corporation, an equipment leasing concern.
FACC, unlike FABC, was clearly engaged principally in purely
domestic activities and so had to be applied for under section
225.4(g)(3), the provision for a special determination that particular
companies meet the section 4(c)(9) standards. The Board's discussion
in the Order concerning Banque Nationale's domestic subsidiaries
(the Order) is not illuminating: it simply states that in the Board's
opinion FACC's investment activities "are consistent with the pur-
poses of the Act and the public interest. '' 289 Presumably, since a
domestic bank holding company is free to acquire any shares it
wishes provided such shares do not constitute more than five per-
cent of the outstanding voting shares of the company in which the
shares are acquired, the investment activities of FACC could not be
faulted so long as the limits were observed. As for the proposed
investment advisory and corporate financial services, the foreign
bank holding company parent had no real grounds for a competitive
advantage and was not given one: the retention of FACC was
conditioned upon the limitation of the investment advisory services
to those that would be permissible for a domestic bank holding
company or its subsidiaries un der section 225.4(a)(5) of Regulation
y. 290
288 Fed. Res. Press Release, Jan. 9) 1974, at 5.
289 Order of the Board, supra note 279, at 313.
290 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(5) (1973).
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The latter decision seems reasonable enough. There is nothing
in the scanty legislative history to indicate that Congress meant the
open-endedness of section 4(c)(9) to be carried so far as to provide
special treatment for wholly-owned subsidiaries of foreign bank
holding companies that are engaged in purely "domestic" business.
Immediately, however, the possibilities in the loophole in the section
4(g)(2)(iv) exemption, the exception for companies principally en-
gaged in facilitating international trade, the loophole pointed out by
Governors Mitchell and Maisel, 291 becomes apparent. At the time of
the decision with respect to FACC, the Board had not determined
whether assistance in mergers and acquisitions was included within
the investment advisory and corporate financial services permissible
to a holding company nonbank company under section 225.4(a)(5) of
Regulation Y. What, however, is to prevent the parent FAiBC from
offering such advice to a foreign company concerning a domestic
acquisition? 292 Surely such activity would fall within the scope of
"facilitation of international commerce." Indeed, if the activity is
within the powers of an investment company under New York law,
why couldn't FABC perform the activity for domestic companies as
a non-"principal" one? If the parent could do the business, why not
the subsidiary? The Order does not answer this question.293 Pre-
sumably the denial to FACC of the right to offer domestic acquisi-
tion and merger advice is a way of saying that section 225.4(g)(2)(iv)
does not permit companies qualified under it to do domestic business
as a non-principal activity if such business would not qualify in any
event under section 4(c)(8) (as would FABC's non-internationally
related business). However the FACC decision still leaves open the
issue as to the permissibility of nonfinancial business that could be
shown to facilitate international commerce. The Order did not set
out the Board's reasoning process, but the decision on FACC's
holding of fifteen percent of Indumat Equipment Corporation would
seem to suggest the answer to this question and the outer parameters
of section 225.4(g)(2)(iv). The particular type of business of the
particular entity in which the shares are held will be examined, and
it is the business of the company invested in, and not the interna-
tional banking rationale for the acquisition of the interest, that will
determine whether or not the holding may be retained.
As a venture capital corporation, FACC supported the estab-
291 See note 280 supra.
292 N.Y. Banking Law art. XII (McKinney 1971), on investment companies, neither
specifically authorizes nor specifically prohibits such consulting business for investment com-
panies; the decision as to whether it would be within FABC's powers would presumably be a
matter of administrative determination on the part of the Banking Department.
293 The order concerning Lloyds' subsidiaries, released Jan. 9, 1974, would give an
answer, an answer bearing out the speculation in the text.
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lishment of two United States subsidiaries of French corporations by
taking fifteen percent equity participations in Locafrance-U.S. Cor-
poration and Indumat Equipment Corporation. In the sense that the
participations represented a form of financing of the parent invest-
ments in the United States, the Board could very well have ruled
that such minority holdings in United States arms of foreign parents
merely represented another form of "facilitating international com-
merce" (section 225.4(g)(2)(iv)) and could have permitted the hold-
ings without considering the particular type of business conducted
and its permissibility under section 4(c)(8) of the Act.294 Or it could
have accepted an argument, made by counsel for Banque Nationale,
that since under section 225.4(g)(2)(v) 295 the holding company could
have taken a less-than-controlling interest in the parent corporations
(because, despite the United States business of the subsidiaries,
more than half the parents' assets and reenues were located and
derived from outside the United States), there is no reason to pro-
scribe a noncontrolling interest in the United States subsidiaries.
The Board did not accept either argument. FABC itself could
qualify under section 225.4(g)(2)(iv) because its business consists
primarily of international financing. FACC would, in any event, be
permissible under section 4(c)(8) of the Act. The Board authorized
the fifteen percent holding in Locafrance-U.S. Corporation because
Locafrance engages in equipment leasing, an activity permitted
under section 4(c)(8), as developed by Regulation Y, section
225.4(a)(6). However, this authorization for the fifteen percent
equity interest in Locafrance has a condition: the investment may be
retained only so long as Locafrance "confines its activities to leasing
of personal property and equipment in accordance with § 225.4(a)(6)
of Regulation y.,,296 Thus, because a minor portion of the capital
for a United States subsidiary of a French corporation was raised
from a foreign bank holding company in the legal form of an equity
294 The process of distinguishing between portfolio investments acquired, in effect, as
part of international financing and the acquisition of an interest in a company for the purpose
of engaging in that type of business is not new to the Board. Under the Edge Act and
Regulation K, Edge Corporations may not invest in more than 25% of the voting shares of a
foreign corporation without specific Board consent and the Board has taken the position that
nonportfolio type acquisitions may only be made in financial type companies. If 25% or less of
the voting stock is obtained (and the amount invested does not exceed $500,000), the
investment is assumed to be a financing one and the particular type of business of the investee
is disregarded. See Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.8(a) (1973). The Board has also ruled that
Edge Corporations, in the course of acquisition of bond issues of foreign affiliates of United
States corporations, may acquire rights to acquire shares of the parent, even though an actual
investment in the United States parent would not be permissible. See 55 Fed. Res. Bull. 442
(1969); 12 C.F.R. § 211.104 (1973).
295 See text at note 235 supra.
296 Order of the Board, supra note 279, at 313.
FOREIGN PARTICIPATION IN UNITED STATES BANKING
participation, 297 the United States arm of the French company must
now tailor its lending procedures to meet the Board's requirements
for the activities of a domestic bank holding company leasing sub-
sidiary. The Board in connection with an application by Bank
America Corporation to engage in a type of short-term leasing not
meeting the present requirements of Regulation Y, section
225.4(a)(6), has explained its refusal to authorize the business par-
tially on the ground that the financial risks of recovery of the
investment in the leased property were sufficiently great as to out-
weigh any benefits to the public of entrance into the business by
Bank America Corporation. 298 Whatever the Board's responsibility
to protect the financial stability of domestic bank holding com-
panies, the same obligation need not be assumed vis-a-vis the
economic health of a fifteen percent investment of a foreign bank
holding company. Nor can Locafrance's competitive strength be
such that it can be argued that its leasing business must be cir-
cumscribed. The decision seems a purely formalistic one, not re-
quired by any policy set by Congress in the Act.
As for the Indumat investment, it could not be qualified at all.
The Board said simply:
FACC's investment in Indumat Equipment Corpora-
tion is an investment that would not be permissable to a
domestic bank holding company, since Indumat is engaged
in the business of selling goods in the United States. The
Board believes that such an investment is inappropriate for
a foreign bank holding company, and no sound reasons
have been advanced by Applicant in support of a contrary
conclusion.
299
The Board, then, would seem to have settled on an administratively
simple content for the concept of "appropriateness" to foreign bank
holding companies of minority interests in United States companies:
297 Possibly the result could be avoided by giving the financing corporation a convertible
debt obligation or debt accompanied by warrants. Regulation Y provides in 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.2(b)(5) (1970) that the owner of securities "immediately convertible at the option of the
holder... into voting securities presumably owns or controls the voting securities," but if the
convertible feature or warrants are of a type normally utilized in connection with a financing
investment, the rights should not be treated as ownership of the underlying shares. The Board
has permitted Edge Corporations to acquire rights so long as the rights are only exercised, if
exercise is permissible at all, in accordance with Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.104 (1973).
Any other result would be purely formalistic as it would unnecessarily require the financing to
flow through the parent.
298 Description of Board letter dated June 29, 1972, in Blaine, Federal Regulation of
Bank Holding Companies 6-12 (1973).
299 Order of the Board, supra note 279, at 313.
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
would the investment be permissible for a domestic bank holding
company?
As for FACC itself, the Board's decision also makes clear that it
must confine itself to activities permissible to a domestic bank
holding company subsidiary: it must limit its corporate financial
services "to the kind of services authorized by § 225.4(a)(5) of
Regulation Y."30 0 Since FACC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a
wholly-owned subsidiary of the foreign bank holding company, the
decision seems in accordance with the congressional purpose to
insure that in their own activities here, the foreign companies sub-
mit to United States views of the appropriate range of activities for
deposit-taking entities and their affiliates. It does not follow from
this point that noncontrolling interests acquired, as a form of
financing, in the dbmestic arms of foreign companies should also be
run through the same grid. Even as an administrative matter, it
would be possible to permit FACC, if necessary, with prior Board
consent, to acquire greater than five percent equity interests (but less
than control) in domestic subsidiaries of Banque Nationale's foreign
clients regardless of the type of business engaged in. In short, the
regulatory scheme could, without violating the purposes of the Act,
permit FACC to be a "French Edge Corporation" financing interna-
tional business in the United States.
The formalistic decisions as to Locafrance and Indumat seem
all the more curious in view of the scope given to FABC. If all of
FABC's business were shown to be incidental to its foreign and
international business, it could have been qualified as permissible
under section 4(c)(5) of the Act, the exemption from section 4 of the
Act for corporations in which a national bank is permitted to
invest. 30 1 By authorizing FABC under section 4(c)(9) of the Act, as
interpreted by section 225.4(g)(2)(iv), the Board has only required
FABC to be principally engaged in foreign or international business.
In a backhanded way, the Board has utilized section 4(c)(9) to
permit foreign bank holding companies to own state-incorporated
equivalents of Edge Corporations, but without the highly technical
distinctions imposed by Regulation K on domestic activities of Edge
300 Id. at 313. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(5) (1973) authorizes "acting as investment or financial
advisor."
301 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(5) (1970). National banks are specifically authorized by 12 U.S.C.
§ 601 (Supp. II 1972) to invest in the stock of "corporations chartered or incorporated under
the laws of the United States or of any state thereof, and principally engaged in international
or foreign banking . . . ." The statute only requires such so-called "agreement corporations"
(so named for the agreement which the corporation must enter into with the Board of
Governors before a national bank may invest in its shares) to be "principally engaged;"
Regulation K, however, restricts the operations of agreement corporations to those permissible
to an Edge Corporation engaged in banking. Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.10 (1973).
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and Agreement Corporations. If such flexibility can be granted to
the banking subsidiary, why not to the venture capital subsidiary in
its business of financing foreign investment in the United States?
The proposed acquisition, approved by the Board in December
1973,302 by Lloyds Bank Limited of First Western Bank and Trust
Company, Los Angeles raised for consideration by the Board, under
section 4 of the Act, Lloyds' holdings of companies with activities in
the United States. 30 3 Unlike Banque Nationale de Paris, Lloyds'
holdings involve only domestic "subsidiaries," five nonbank United
States-incorporated companies, one wholly-owned and the others
forty-six percent (approximately) owned. These holdings are clearly
analogous to direct activities by the holding company in the United
States. Thus in the Lloyds case, the Board was faced squarely with
choosing whether to give separate content to section 4(c)(9), to
permit a foreign bank holding company in an appropriate case to be
treated differently in the United States from a domestic holding
company, or to read domestic policy back into section-225.4(g) so as
to insure under it only national treatment.. Recall that in the legisla-
tive history of the one-bank holding company legislation two strands
of thought on foreign bank holding company treatment appeared.
One strand, appearing in the language of the original Bevill
amendment that ultimately became section 4(c)(9), "in the public
interest by . . . facilitating the foreign commerce of the United
States," is concerned with reciprocity, with reduction of barriers to
entry so that barriers abroad for our banks will not be raised. The
other strand is inward-focusing and reflects the concern that the
foreign entrants be subjected to the same requirements as domestic
holding companies so that the foreigners do not have a "competi-
tive" advantage. Although the Lloyds' subsidiaries, given the nature
of their business, could be seen as presenting a highly appropriate
situation for the former approach, the Board chose to direct its
analysis totally along the second strand. The Lloyds decision
confirms the approach of the Board perceived in the Banque
Nationale decision.
The five subsidiaries of Lloyds Bank Limited are Balfour,
Williamson, Inc. (BW), a New York company financing interna-
tional trade; Export Credit and Marketing Corporation (ECMC), a
company utilized to hold the shares of the remaining three; Export
Credit Corporation (ECC), also financing international trade; and
Drake America Corporation (Drake) and Drake America Corpora-
302 Fed. Res. Press Release, Dec. 10, 1973.
303 The Board announced its decision on these holdings in a Fed. Res. Press Release
dated Jan. 9, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Lloyds' § 4(c)(9) Release].
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tion (P.R.) (Drake P.R.), the latter two described as "export man-
agement compan[ies]."
30 4
Apparently taking the language of section 225.4(g) of Regula-
tion Y at face value, Lloyds applied to qualify these holdings under
the one general provision of section 225.4(g) seemingly applicable to
domestic subsidiaries, 30 subsection (g)(2)(iv), authorizing owner-
ship, with Board consent, of companies "principally engaged in the
United States in financing or facilitating transactions in interna-
tional or foreign commerce."
The Board evidently was regretting its inclusion of this provi-
sion in the regulation. The Lloyds' section 4(c)(9) Release does not
even discuss its apparent application to BW and ECC, both clearly
principally engaged in financing international commerce. Instead,
the Board in the Release elaborates on section 225.4(g)(2)(iii), 30 6 a
provision one would have thought intended to be applied to foreign
subsidiaries with United States activities. The Board points out the
parallelism of the language of this provision to the Edge Act, Regu-
lation K and section 4(c)(13) of the Act. The Release states:
In the Board's judgment, the activities of BW, except as
noted below, and of ECC are consistent with the scope
of activities permitted to Edge Act corporations under
§ 211.7(d)(i)(ii) of Regulation K and domestic bank holding
companies under § 4(c)(13) of the Bank Holding Company
Act and § 225.4(f)(1) of Regulation Y. 307
Therefore, the Board concludes, Lloyds' investment in the two
companies may be retained as "consistent with the purposes of the
Act and in the public interest." The words "except as noted below"
are significant: the Board required BW, as a condition of its reten-
tion by Lloyds, to cease engaging in the activity of arranging di-
rectly the shipment of goods from the United States and to cease
operating three small retail stores it had acquired in working out a
defaulted loan obligation to it. There was no evidence that these
activities constituted any significant part of BW's business, nor any
evidence that performance of these activities as a minor part of
BW's principal business of financing international trade was "sub-
304 Id. at 3.
30S See text at notes 262-63 supra. The Board in its Order does not mention that Lloyds
applied to qualify five holdings under § 225.4(g)(2)(iv), but see Application of Lloyds Bank
Limited, Form F.R. Y-I, filed Aug. 22, 1973, at 35, on file at the Board [hereinafter cited as
Application].
306 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(2)(iii) (1973), which provides that a foreign bank holding
company "may [o]wn or control voting shares of any company that is not engaged, directly or
indirectly, in any activities in the United States except as shall be incidental to the interna-
tional or foreign business of such company."
307 Lloyds' § 4(c)(9) Release, supra note 303, at 4-5.
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stantially at variance with the purposes of the Act." The standard
rather is the other way around; the decision on BW is a holding that
the foreign bank holding company may only qualify a holding as a
domestic subsidiary if all of its activities would be permissible to a
domestic bank holding company. This, of course, is to say that for
domestic subsidiaries, at least, section 225.4(g)(2)(iii) has no inde-
pendent meaning. If all it means is that a domestic company in
international trade may be retained by a foreign bank holding
company if the business could be done by an Edge or Agreement
Corporation, then section 4(c)(9) as interpreted by the Board has
added nothing to section 4(c)(5) of the Act.
308 But this is just what
the Board means; it makes its rationale explicit: "Performance of
these activities [those required to cease] would give Lloyds Bank a
competitive advantage over domestic bank holding 
companies.1 30 9
The Board, however, cites no empiric evidence that Lloyds would
be given any specific advantage in any specific market. If this
interpretation is what Congress meant by its addition of section
4(c)(9) to the Act, Congress could have said so more clearly.
As for Drake and Drake P.R., since the Board apparently felt
that their activities could not be categorized as United States busi-
ness that would be permissible to an Edge Corporation under Regu-
lation K,310 the Board was faced with saying why they could not be
303 See note 230 supra.
309 Lloyds' § 4(c)(9) Release, supra note 303, at 5.
310 The Board's description of Drake's business as that of an export management com-
pany, "functioning, in effect, as a domestic manufacturer's export department," is the self-
characterization utilized in the Application, supra note 305, and a supplementary letter from
counsel for Lloyds to the Board dated Oct. 23, 1973 (the Letter). Although Lloyds argued
that, in its foreign distribution functions, Drake was not engaged in the general business of
selling goods in the United States, but rather was acting as a conduit for financing purposes,
from the description of Drake's functioning given in the Application and Letter, the Board
concluded that Drake and Drake P.R. (with identical activities in Puerto Rico)
are investments that would not be permissible for a domestic bank holding company
under § 4(c)(8) of the Act since Drake and Drake P.R. engage in commercial
nonfinancial activities, which are not so closely related to banking or managing or
controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto.
Lloyds' § 4(c)(9) Release, supra note 303, at 6. Therefore, the only avenue left for qualification
was that which Lloyds itself had chosen, § 225.4(g)(2)(iv). However, to anyone familiar with
the method of operation of the factoring business (permissible to domestic bank holding
companies under Regulation Y, § 225.4(a)(1)), the characterization of Drake's relationship
with foreign buyers as "commercial nonfinancial activities" seems anomalous. In effect,
domestic factors operate (and describe themselves) as the billing departments of the "rag
trade." They take the credit risk that the buyers will not pay; they do not take the market risk
as seller even though their security interest in the goods may give them nominal "title."
Drake's operations sound similar, except that Drake sets up and evaluates distribution
networks and obtains the orders from the foreign buyers. (Factors do not handle the selling,
although they preevaluate the credit of buyers before agreeing to factor a buyer's invoices.) If
one were concerned with United States located activities, this distinction might be sufficient to
draw the line here between "financing" and "commerce;" however, since the actual activities
described as "commercial" all take place abroad, the line seems harsh. The decision is even
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qualified as "facilitating transactions in international or foreign
commerce" under section 225.4(g)(2)(iv). The Board explains:
The term 'facilitating' is intended by the Board to cover
international or foreign banking activities, such as those
carried on by New York 'investment companies' and is not
intended to include nonbanking activities such as the ex-
port management activities of Drake or Drake P.R. In the
Board's judgment, Drake and Drake P.R. are essentially
engaged within the United States in a domestic commercial
business even though that business concerns international
transactions. 311
The exemption, therefore, for these companies from section 4 of the
Act was denied. If section 225.4(g)(2)(iv) has any independent con-
tent left, apart from business that could in any event be qualified
under section 4(c)(8), it is in that word "principally," and as noted,
the Board has not yet clarified the extent to which an investment
company qualified under section 225.4(g)(2)(iv) may have minor
nonconforming business. 312 Given the approach of the Lloyds deci-
sion, it may be assumed that the Board's intention is to insist that
any domestic business qualified under section 4(c)(9) be permissible
under section 4(c)(8). The Lloyds decision is without doubt comfort-
ing to Lloyds' domestic competitors and, in view of the extent of
Lloyds' participation in the purely domestic banking market by
acquisition of First Western, may be a fair imposition of domestic
standards on that entry, but one wishes that the Board's analysis
had demonstrated more precision.
D. Banco di Roma Meets Glass-Steagall
The Board decision on Banque Nationale's United States sub-
sidiaries was released on February 7, 1972. Had counsel for Banco
di Roma read Banque Nationale's application folder at the Board,
and seen the Board's concern as to the nature of FABC's sale of
participations, considerable effort might perhaps have been saved.
Banco di Roma, the third largest commercial bank in Italy, in 1972
had an agency office in San Francisco and representative offices in
New York and Chicago. The San Francisco and Chicago offices
more curious in that the Board in 1967 authorized an Edge Corporation to hold shares in a
company acting for United States companies as an export sales manager, holding that the
company's United States activities were "incidental to its international or foreign business." 53
Fed. Res. Bull. 752 (1967); 12 C.F.R. §. 211.103 (1973). Thus the Board had a direct
precedent for authorizing Drake under its own new interpretation of § 225.4(g)(2)(iii), but
neither Lloyds nor the Board referred to the earlier decision.
311 Lloyds' § 4(c)(9) Release, supra note 303, at 6-7.
312 See text at notes 292-94 supra.
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were opened in 1970. As part of its world-wide loose alliance with
two other major Common Market banks, Credit Lyonnais of France
and Commerzbank of Germany, Banco di Roma in April 1971
purchased a one-third interest in a New York securities corporation
chartered in 1968 by Credit Lyonnais to "facilitate investments in
[the United States] by the European clients of the [bank]. '3
13
EuroPartners Securities Corp., as the Credit Lyonnais subsidiary
was renamed after its shares were sold to the other two banks,
although receiving most of its business through its parent banks or
their clients, operates a full-scale securities business, with general
brokerage, underwriting, investment banking and investment ad-
visory services. Even without looking at Banque Nationale's
difficulties, Banco di Roma could have guessed from the particular
limitations in section 225.4(g) on the permissibility of investments in
foreign companies engaging directly or indirectly in underwriting,
selling or distributing securities in the United States314 what the
Board's attitude towards a domestic subsidiary of a foreign bank
holding company so engaged would be. Nevertheless, Banco di
Roma persevered in its approach to the Board under the Act.
Unable at that time to open a branch in Chicago, 315 Banco di
Roma on May 1, 1972 obtained a charter from the Illinois banking
authorities for an Illinois subsidiary bank. Although the charter
presumably was not limited, the intention was to utilize the new
bank as an international banking arm of Banco di Roma, to
specialize in international trade with Europe originating in the
Chicago area. 316 Utilization of the separate corporate form brought
the new facility and Banco di Roma under the Act and on May 25,
1972, Banco filed with the Board its application for permission to
become a bank holding company by the acquisition of the new
bank's stock pursuant to section 3(a)(1), together with its letter
applying under section 4(c)(9) for permission to retain its one-third
interest in EuroPartners Securities Corp. As an affiliated company
engaged in the securities business, EuroPartners would seem prima
facie impermissible under the Glass-Steagall mythology.317
Banco's chief argument was that Glass-Steagall principles in
this situation would be purely formalistic: a branch was what they
313 Letter from Banco di Roma to Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
applying under § 4(c)(9) for approval to retain its interest in EuroPartners Securities Corp.,
May 25, 1972, on file at the Board [hereinafter cited as Letter].
314 See text at notes 235-36 supra.
315 See text at notes 38-39 supra.
316 Application of Banco di Roma to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, for permission under § 3(a)(1), May 25, 1972, on file at the Board; Banco di Roma
S.P.A., Order Approving Formation of a Bank Holding Company, 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 930
(1972).
317 See text at notes 44-63 supra.
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wanted and what, absent the unfortunate nature of Illinois law,
they would have had. The branch, of course, would not be subject
to federal law and so no issue as to the permissibility of the
EuroPartners' holding would have arisen. Banco also argued, rather
lamely, that the securities business of EuroPartners was in the main
incidental to the international bank business of the parent banks:
"These conditions are quite different from those envisioned when
the complete divorce between banking and securities business was
decreed by the Glass-Steagall Act, and seem to justify per se the
exemption requested under § 4(c)(9) of the Act. '318 To sweeten the
issue for the Board, Banco di Roma gave a list of assurances of
separation between the business of EuroPartners and Banco di
Roma (Chicago).
However, Banco's efforts were all to no avail. The Board
approved the acquisition of Banco di Roma (Chicago) and denied
the application to retain the interest in EuroPartners. The same idea
that informed the Banque Nationale decisions operated here:
American activities must be judged by American standards. "Banco
di Roma's investment in EuroPartners is an investment that would
not be permissible to a domestic bank holding company." 319 There
was a nod in the direction of the importance of Glass-Steagall
policy, as the Board noted that it was not persuaded that the public
benefits alleged for the affiliation (beneficial impact on the balance
of payments) would -outweigh the "possible adverse effects with
which Congress was concerned in the enactment of the Glass-
Steagall Act." The real rationale follows:
318 Letter, supra note 313. Despite the mention of "conditions," Banco apparently was
not attempting to argue that Glass-Steagall criteria should not be applied to a company
otherwise exempt under Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(2)(iv) (1973), as facilitating
international commerce, but rather that, under 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(3) (1973), this kind of
business is the kind of business that should be, under the standards of § 4(c)(9) (in the public
interest and not substantially at variance with the purposes of the Act), permitted to a foreign
bank holding company engaged in world-wide international banking and securities activities.
The Board in its denial order took the trouble in a footnote, 37 Fed. Reg. 21,012 n. 1 (1972), to
intimate that underwriting for United States customers, although only a small part (90% of
15%) of a business that was demonstrably (utilizing the 70% test accepted for French-
American Banking Corporation) principally facilitating international commerce (73% of
EuroPartners' gross income was derived from foreign sources), would disqualify a company
for a § 225.4(g)(2)(iv) exemption, as well as a § 225.4(g)(2)(iii) exemption (activities within the
United States incidental to those outside). Thus the Banco di Roma decision makes an
addition to the fleshing out of the scope of § 225.4(g)(2)(iv). The Board added: "The Board
expresses no opinion on the question whether a company engaged in the United States
exclusively in brokerage business for primarily foreign customers could qualify for exemption
under either of these sections," thus throwing up the question of whether brokerage will fall
within "facilitating international commerce." Order Disapproving Retention of Investment in
EuroPartners Securities Corp., 37 Fed. Reg. 21,012 n.1 (1972).
319 37 Fed. Reg. 21,012 (1972).
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An affiliation with a securities company would give a
foreign bank holding company an unfair competitive ad-
vantage over a domestic bank holding company in that a
foreign bank holding company would be able to offer its
customers an alternative means of obtaining financing to
[sic] credit facilities, namely, underwriting facilities. 320
To the extent that the foreign bank holding company is
genuinely analogous to a domestic bank holding company, that is, it
owns or controls an entity doing a full-scale commercial banking
business in the United States, the decision seems unassailable. The
problem arises with the nature of the business that Banco di Roma
proposed to do in Chicago. There was no suggestion that Banco di
Roma (Chicago) was interested in attracting local deposits. The
description of its business sounds identical to a New York bank's
Edge subsidiary in Chicago. Had Banco di Roma been able to
incorporate an Edge Corporation in Chicago, or the equivalent of a
New York investment company, the issue of affiliation with a
securities company would not have arisen.321 Yet in each case,
Banco would have the same competitive advantage cited by the
Board. The competitive advantage would, however, have its
price-no access to demand deposits subject to check. The line is
being drawn for the question of multistate banking;322 the same line
could serve as well for the application of Glass-Steagall. The Board
could conceivably have asked Banco di Roma if it would make the
exchange and could have authorized continued holding of the in-
terest in EuroPartners on the condition that Banco di Roma
(Chicago) limit its demand deposits to that type of credit balances
held by French-American Banking Corporation. Instead the deci-
sion was made on a simple (not to say simplistic) basis, one possibly
required by the present structure (or lack thereof) of treatment of
foreign bank entry. Reasonably enough, perhaps tiring of such
left-handed regulation under a statute never intended to be applied
to multinational banking, the Board is studying that structure.
E. Glimmerings of Multinational Cartels
The Board has not yet publicly voiced concern over the possi-
bility that the addition of significant United States arms to world-
320 Id.
321 Recall that Edge Corporations and New York investment companies are not
classified as "banks" for the purpose of the Act since they are not authorized to take demand
deposits from the public.
322 See note 248 supra.
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wide banking monoliths may raise the question of restraint of global
banking competition. Indeed, the Board has no mandate to consider
such a problem, nor, for the moment, does anyone else, 323 although
conceivably the Lloyds acquisition of First Western Bank and Trust
Company, Los Angeles, raises the issue.
An interesting aspect of the Board's section 3(a)(1) decision with
respect to Lloyds' acquisition of First Western 324 is its omission of
any analysis even approaching that of the New York
Superintendent's treatment of Barclays' size in the Barclays-Long
Island Trust Company decision. 325 Lloyds, with consolidated assets
of 13.4 billion dollars and deposits of 12.4 billion dollars, is the
fourth largest commercial bank in Great Britain; First Western is
the eighth largest bank in California. The combination presumably
has some impact on some markets (if only on the multinational
competition between Lloyds and Barclays). The Board, however, is
only entrusted with the competitive effects relative to the United
States, and as the Board said in its section 3(a)(1) decision:
Since Lloyds Bank and its subsidiaries do not compete
with Bank in any of the relevant banking markets in
California which Bank serves, consummation of the pro-
posal would eliminate no existing competition, nor would
it have a significant effect on the concentration of banking
resources in any relevant area. 326
The Board's Federal Reserve System Steering Committee reviewing
transnational banking is looking at business that could be consid-
ered a separate line of commerce and the original Committee chair-
man, Governor Mitchell, recently described the "characteristics of
international banking" to the Senate Banking Committee's Sub-
committee on International Finance. 327 But the presumably increas-
ing concentration in provision of global banking services, to my
knowledge, has not been studied. 328 To be more charitable to the
Superintendent of Banks of the State of New York, perhaps some-
thing like that was on his mind when he assessed Barclays' global
weight in its Long Island Trust bid.
323 There is a form of multinational antitrust standard in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
of Rome, but the day when the Charter of the United Nations will be amended to provide for
review of the global competitive impact of multinational acquisitions seems a long way away.
324 Fed. Res. Press Release, Dec. 10, 1973.
325 See text at notes 132-33 supra.
326 Fed. Res. Press Release, Dec. 10, 1973, at 2.
327 See Wash. Fin. News at A-6 (Jan. 28, 1974).
328 For the extent to which the major European banks are increasingly combining into
loose consortia, but certainly with power to act in concert, see International Banking Gets the
Team Spirit, Fortqne, June 1972, at 100; Dicken, International Banking Abroad, in Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago, The International Monetary System in Transition 114, 118 (1972).
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But so far, all we have (and perhaps all, jurisdictionally, we
can have) from the Board is a hint in the form of the questions it
asked the major Japanese banks that have established subsidiary
banks in the United States. In the course of 1971, Dai-Ichi Kangyo
Bank Limited, Mitsubishi Bank Limited and Sanwa Bank Limited,
Japanese banks each with over seven billion dollars in deposits,
applied for permission to establish United States subsidiary banks,
one to be located in Chicago and the other two in California. The
Board was aware of the fact that, as stated by the Board in its
approvals of the applications,
in general, the largest Japanese commercial banks are
linked in a group with their major Japanese customers
through interlocking stock ownership and that the mem-
bers of these groups tend to act in concert. In particular,
these groups include among their members companies that
do business in the United States, notably, major trading
companies accounting for a significant percentage of
Japan's exports and imports to and from the United
States. 329
The question was how to approach the issue of the alleged "acting
in concert." The Act itself sets out specific criteria for control; thus,
the Board asked the Japanese banks specific questions and the
replies came back: to the extent the information was available,
330
only one shareholder, an insurance company, owned as much as
5.85 percent of Mitsubishi and no one shareholder held over five
percent of Dai-Ichi Kangyo. None of the three banks "held with
power to vote more than 5% of the stock of companies with offices,
operations or activities in the United States. '331 The Board went
further in its questioning, as evidenced by a telegram from counsel
.for Mitsubishi Bank in the Board's files affirming that the Bank was
not a party to "any voting trust or other agreement for the voting of
its shares or the shares of other corporations beneficially held by it;"
counsel also affirmed that "the Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd. does not
329 Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Ltd., Tokyo, Japan, Order Approving Action to Become a
Bank Holding Company, 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 49 (1972).
330 A telegram in the Board's files from counsel for Mitsubishi, dated Aug. 11, 1971,
noted: "The shares of the Mitsubishi Bank Ltd. are widely held and actively traded on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange. For this reason specific information regarding beneficial holdings is
unavailable." As for holdings in companies of the Sansui Kai by a major insurance company
with, presumably, a holding in the Sanwa Bank, Limited, a letter in the Board's files, dated
Nov. 17, 1971, from counsel for Sanwa notes: "This data was gathered from various Japanese
publications and may or may not be accurate." Counsel for Sanwa indicated that Sanwa could
not supply information about loans from the insurance company to the Sansui Kai because the
information was not published "and the Sanwa Bank, Ltd. cannot obtain it in any other
way." Id.
331 Letter from counsel for Sanwa, dated Nov. 17, 1971, in the Board's files.
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know of any voting trust or other agreement between other com-
panies of the so-called 'Mitsubishi Group' for the voting of its or
their shares. '332 Nothing appeared that the Board could put its
finger on. The Act is very specific about the interlocks between
banks and commerce that are forbidden: the language is not that of
the endlessly interpretable, expandable antitrust legislative expres-
sions. The Board, however, has not hesitated in surrounding the
Act with the penumbra of Glass-Steagall. Would it then be appro-
priate for the Board to concern itself with the realities of the concen-
tration of economic power represented by the Japanese groups?
Another factor, however, comes into play here-the problem of
exportation abroad of the United States world view. Should the
economic impact of the addition to the Japanese groups of United
States commercial banks333 be considered on a worldwide scale, or
only with reference to United States economic impact? The Board
split on this issue. The press release announcing the decisions made
clear that any judgments as to the effects of Japanese company
structure would be made only on the basis of the application of
United States law to United States activities.
In acting on the applications, the Board was guided by
considerations underlying its implementation of section
4(c)(9), namely, that the foreign activities of foreign-owned
bank holding companies are a matter of foreign law, and
the domestic activities of such companies are a matter of
United States law.
334
The majority of the Board, in applying United States law to United
States activities, found no violation of the prohibitions of section 4
of the Act: "on the basis of the facts of record approval of the
applications would not conflict with the separation of banking from
nonbanking activities in this country.
'335
Only Governor Brimmer would have gone beyond the specific
technical requirements of the Act to look at the actual facts of
economic power. He dissented and would have denied all three
applications on the ground that
the record before the Board fully documents the existence
of a variety of relatively closed "clubs" to which key mem-
332 Telegr~.m from R. Briggs, Attorney for Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., to B. Tuttle, Div. of
Supervision and Regulation, Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C., Nov. 11, 1971.
333 The economic potential inherent in such an establishment is demonstrated by the
climb by the Bank of Tokyo's New York subsidiary in 1972, from 187th place in deposit size
among United States banks to 100th, in just one year. Wall Street Journal, May 10, 1973, at
1, col. 6.
334 Fed. Res. Press Release, Dec. 2, 1971.
33S Id. at 2.
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bers of the associated company groups belong-and which
reenforce the shareholding interlocks and cross-financing
patterns. I am convinced that the substantive result of
these arrangements taken as a whole is a network of con-
trol which the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as
amended in 1970, was intended to prohibit. 336
Governor Brimmer would seem to have been reading the Act's
prohibitions in a large sense, as incorporating the purpose of the
United States antitrust standards to promote the unfettered market
place. The majority of the Board made the decisions "on the facts of
record," but it may well be asked how much longer the question of
global impact of multinational bank establishment in the United
States can or will be avoided by looking only at the questions raised
by the Bank Holding Company Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Board has been forced to consider foreign bank entry and
its implications for United States banking structure and monetary
control in the context of the Bank Holding Company Act because its
jurisdiction has been limited to this Act. Regulation under the Act is
backhanded at best. The Board can say nobly, as it did in the press
release on the approval of the three Japanese subsidiaries, that in
the case of regulation of both foreign bank holding companies under
the Act and of foreign activities of domestic banks
the goal is to assure sound banking in a climate of fair
competition in the market place, giving due consideration
to the basic concepts established by the Congress for the
conduct of banking as it directly or indirectly affects the
nation's economy. 33
7
The level of abstraction of this, statement is high; as soon as that
level is reduced to the concrete cases of fitting a new phenomenon,
the nature of which is only beginning to be explored, into the
rapidly changing domestic banking structure, it is clear that Con-
gress has not provided basic concepts for the conduct of banking in
its present protean form, but has only provided retaining walls over
which the new waves are splashing. The Board is struggling hard to
channel the domestic waves and to preserve some semblance of a
coherent concept of regulation of financial institutions. It is no
surprise that Board decisions under the Act in foreign bank entry
336 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 51, 53 (1972).
337 See Fed. Res. Press Release, Dec. 2, 1971, at 2.
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cases have an ad hoc quality and seem to have no guiding
philosophy other than the principle supposedly338 articulated in
Regulation Y, section 225.4(g): the application of American law to
American activities, i.e., national treatment. The Board's rationale
for this principle is the supposed congressional desire to assure "fair
competition in the market place," fair competition, presumably,
between financial institutions owned by foreign groups and those
owned by United States citizens. This article has attempted to
demonstrate that the notion of the unfair competitive advantage of
foreign groups is largely mythical: whatever advantage the possibil-
ity of multistate branching offers is offset by the exclusion of for-
eigners from the possibilities inherent in the Edge vehicle. It is
believed further that the notion of "fair competition" between
foreign banks and domestic banks should be examined empirically.
What is the "market place"? Are the institutions in fact in geo-
graphically identical and economically distinct market places?
It was suggested in connection with the analysis of Regulation
Y, section 225.4(g) and the decision in regard to Banque Nationale
de Paris that there may be good reason to permit foreign bank
holding companies to participate in domestic businesses where such
participation would not be permissible to domestic holding com-
panies, or at least to develop separate criteria for judgment. The
Board's decisions on this point have been formalistic: if over five
percent of the voting stock, not permissible; no holding of voting
stock, no problem (the Japanese banks). Without doubt the Board
has initiated its special study of the role played by foreign banking
institutions in the United States banking markets because of its own
awareness of the present formalistic character of its regulation and
decisions. If, as one suspects, the study indicates that the foreign-
owned banks largely play a special role in a special market 33 9-- that
338 "Supposedly" is meant in the sense that Regulation Y, § 225.4(g)(2)(iv) offers an
exception to the principle, but the scope of the exception is not fully spelled out.
339 As noted in the text at note 38 supra, California law now has special provisions for
foreign bank entry. In its Weekly Bulletin, Vol. 64, No. 26, June 29, 1973, the California
State Banking Department announced suspension of all applications under these provisions
during the conduct, in cooperation with the Board's Steering Committee, of a study of
international banking regulation by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors. The Weekly Bulletin, Vol. 64, No. 35, Aug. 31, 1973, announced that processing
of applications would continue since "preliminary results of our own study and our own
experience during this period clearly indicate that the scope and depth of analysis required is
such that the time required for its completion is greater than originally anticipated." On Sept.
21, the Department was able to announce, in its Weekly Bulletin, Vol. 64, No. 38, Sept. 21,
1973, that it had already concluded that f'the activities of representatives are qualitatively
almost entirely different from the activities of domestic banks generally. . . ." (My thanks are
due to Dr. Bertwing C. Mah, Director of Research for the Department, for his cooperation in
sending me copies of the California questionnaire and the Weekly Bulletins reporting on the
study.)
FOREIGN PARTICIPATION IN UNITED STATES BANKING
they are apples and only peripherally competing with pears--then in
the absence of federal legislation specifically aimed at creating order
in the present morass, one can hope that the Board will exercise the
unrestricted mandate given it by section 4(c)(9) and move beyond
the simplistic application of the United States activities--United
States law formulation to regulation of domestic activities of foreign
bank holding companies in accordance with the realities of the
economic impact of those activities. This would mean, for instance,
that if the activities of a subsidiary bank are in reality those of an
Edge Corporation-that is, if the business is in the international
sector and the bank is not competing for local checking
accountsl 4°-the Board would not feel compelled to forbid the
foreign company to have simultaneously an interest in a financial
company with underwriting business. It would mean that if, in
reality, the domestic subsidiaries of foreign customers of the parent
bank would in any event have preferred access to funds from the
bank subsidiary of the holding company, that if the meaning of the
Act's separation of banking and commerce is not at stake, then
financing participations in such domestic subsidiaries need not be
automatically denied. 341 Hopefully, once function is fully described,
regulation will be able to be better adapted to function.
The Board has announced that its study is not dealing with the
problems of monetary flows. Nevertheless, the issue of the function
in the monetary area of the domestic arms of foreign multinational
banks is crucial. The concomitant of more precisely adapted regula-
tion under the Bank Holding Company Act is regulatory jurisdiction
in the Board over all institutions having sufficient access to the
international money markets so as to be able, by their international
In his testimony before the Senate Banking Committee's Subcommittee on International
Finance reporting on the progress of the System Steering Committee's study of foreign
institutions, see text at note 2 supra, Gov. Mithell gave indications that the study also is
finding that the United States offices of foreign-owned banks have, in general, a different
business mix than domestic banks. For a reprint of this testimony, see Wash. Fin. Rep. at A-6
(Jan. 28, 1974). See especially page A-9.
340 In the Banco di Roma decision, see text at notes 313-20 supra, the Board stressed the
unfair competitive advantage the Chicago bank would have in having an underwriting arm to
offer an alternative source of financing to its customers. Glass-Steagall was not aimed at this
problem at all; the supposed competitive advantage arises only because member institutions
that take demand deposits are forbidden to have underwriting affiliates or to underwrite.
There is no prohibition on the affiliation, for example, of a small loan company, a factor or a
mortgage company with an underwriting company, so long as no one of the group raises its
loanable funds by taking demand deposits from the public. If the foreign bank holding
company subsidiary "bank" is not so raising its funds, there is no reason mechanically to
apply Glass-Steagall.
341 On the other hand, if the economic reality is identical to the domestic situation which
Congress has proscribed, joint ownership of a bank and industrial companies with the bank
acting as a funnel for deposits to finance the industry, then foreign ownership should be no
bar to application of the prophylactic.
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transactions, to impede the Board's leverage on domestic economic
management. This paper has not attempted to discuss the possible
application of Regulations D and M, the regulations under which
the Board acts on the United States economy through control of
commercial bank reserves, to foreign banks in the United States; on
the contrary, the paper has assumed that adequate jurisdiction in
the Board for this purpose must be a legislative objective, whatever
the feasibility of a general federal overhauling of the regulation of
foreign bank entry.
In the best of all possible worlds, a rational Congress would
have the time not only to consider the legislative proposals President
Nixon has submitted in response to the Hunt Commission report,
342
but to consider and adopt legislation dealing directly with foreign
bank entry. The aim of the legislation would be to so reorder the
present morass of statutes as to create the greatest possible number
of options for foreigners wishing to risk their capital in the United
States banking and financial markets-in short, to rationalize the
current structure so as to encourage international investment in this
sector. Since the United States as a domestic policy matter regulates
the field of banking in a manner naturally tending to discourage
foreigners, the proposal of such legislation raises the dilemma of
how to encourage without favoring the foreign over the domestic
institution. The solution runs along the line hinted at by the Board
in the Regulation Y, section 225.4(g) special provision for the
domestic company "facilitating international commerce." To the
extent the foreign institution is entering to extend its own foreign
and international business, to establish a United States arm of its
worldwide business, it is entering a highly specialized market in the
United States to which most of our concepts of banking regulation
have little application. 343
Congress recognized the special nature of this market in 1916
by authorizing national banks to invest in "corporations ... princi-
pally engaged in international or foreign banking . . . . "344 The
authorization was hardly ever used, however, because the state
corporation laws generally did not have provisions for such
specialized creatures and the more general banking charters were
not appropriate for national bank investment. The solution was to
provide federal vehicles for entry into the market, the Edge Corpo-
rations. The point about both so-called Agreement Corporations and
Edge Corporations is that, in recognition of their special character
342 Wash. Fin. Rep. at A-15 (Aug. 6, 1973).
343 On the other hand, our antitrust notions might have great relevance if applied so as
to judge the economic impact on the global market of the size of the initial entry.
3- 12 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
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and business, they have been exempted from subsequent banking
regulation. Edge Corporations are not subject to Glass-Steagall re-
strictions on affiliation with securities corporations. Edge and Ag-
reement Corporations are not "banks" under the Bank Holding
Company Act. The Edge Corporation, as a federal corporation,
presumably has whatever immunities from state regulation that a
national bank has. The Agreement and the Edge Corporation, how-
ever, are designed to take domestic institutions into international
banking and banking in countries other than the United States. In
the case of the Edge Corporation, Congress solved the problem of
unfair competition with more severely regulated domestic institu-
tions by simply providing in the Edge Act that no corporation
organized under its provisions should "carry on any part of its
business in the United States except such as, in the judgment of the
Board of Governors ... shall be incidental to its international or
")345foreign business ....
As we have seen, the Board in Regulation K has given a
relatively restricted meaning to this language and has applied the
restriction to Agreement as well as to Edge Corporations. The line
of distinction between permissible and impermissible domestic activ-
ities presently drawn in Regulation K would not seem to be appro-
priate for United States vehicles of multinational banks. So long as
such vehicles restrict their business to banking and financial services
(including, for example, domestic payroll accounts and export man-
agement services) for United States customers principally engaged in
foreign and international business, and for foreign customers and
their United States subsidiaries, the business would seem to be
sufficiently restricted so as to obviate a claim of unfair competition
with domestic institutions.3 46 In any event, the problem of unfair
competition could be dealt with by offering this particular option to
foreign banks on an exclusive basis; that is to say, the vehicle could
not be used if the foreign bank otherwise established a branch or
subsidiary bank whose scope was not so limited. Given this restric-
tion, however, this kind of reverse Edge Corporation should not be
faced with any geographic restrictions; the foreign institution should
be allowed to have any number of such subsidiaries (or branches of
such subsidiaries) at any location desired. As participants in the
international and foreign commerce of the United States, the vehi-
cles should also be free of state regulation.
34S 12 U.S.C. § 616 (1970).
346 Those United States banks that have -established Edge Corporations in multiple
locations to serve this market might, however, have a legitimate complaint. If this were
determined to be so, the limitations on the foreign banks' vehicles could be drawn so as to
permit only those services that an Edge Corporation could offer domestic customers while
permitting a full range of services to accounts originating from abroad.
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These vehicles would have to be created by separate federal
legislation; at the same time, however, the Edge Act should be
amended to permit incorporation of these more limited vehicles by
foreigners who do not choose to limit their banking activities in the
United States to the new vehicles (the Edge Corporation option
should not be on an exclusive basis) or who would like to undertake
a joint venture with an American institution.
To the extent that the foreign investor does not wish to restrict
its United States banking operations to those related to its foreign
and international business, but rather wishes to establish an entity
to compete fully in the United States domestic banking market, it
should at that point become subject to United States rules in its
United States activities. The new subsidiary-or branch-should be
treated as a "bank" under the Bank Holding Company Act, be
subject to Glass-Steagall, geographic restrictions, etc. The only
changes in the present state of the law that would be necessary
would be (a) to amend the Bank Holding Company Act to apply to
the establishment of a branch of a foreign bank that is to operate in
essence as a domestic bank (including amendment of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act 347 to permit insurance of the branch's de-
posits); (b) to amend the Edge Act as noted above; and (c) to settle
by legislation the question raised by the New York Barclays deci-
sion, the power of the states to protect domestic banks by veto over
a foreign bank's proposed acquisition. It should be noted that to
forbid such a veto is not to destroy the dual banking system: if the
bank to be acquired is a state bank, it will be subject to state
regulation as usual. Moreover, these proposals in no way preempt
the states' present right to provide for the possibility of foreign bank
entry by branching legislation; they would merely end the anomaly
that choice of form should dictate results under the federal legisla-
tion.
347 Ch. 967, 64 Stat. 873 (1950) (codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1728(b), 1811-31 (1970) and in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
